Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (113 page)

Hirohito and Prime Minister General T
j
had reviewed the entire war thus far and were now thinking of pulling the army out of Rabaul altogether, a move the navy high command strongly opposed for fear it would shut down the entire support setup in the South Pacific. But the emperor and T
j
were determined to get Japan back on track strategically. They had reexamined their guidance of the war and agreed on the need to contract all Pacific fronts while at the same time launching a new offensive in the eastern part of New Guinea. The new “absolute defense line” would be established well behind the line of contact with the enemy; there, at
strategically selected points in rear areas, the army and navy and their air forces would reorganize, rebuild, concentrate, and prepare to defend aggressively with immediate counterattacks.

On September 15 Nagano and Sugiyama made formal written reports to Hirohito that set forth a conflict between their interpretations of the “absolute defense perimeter” concept. While taking note of the need to strengthen defensive positions in the “rear” around the Caroline Islands, Nagano emphasized that the navy had to go on seeking opportunities in certain areas of the Pacific where the war situation had become “somewhat disadvantageous”—that is, near disasters. Those certain areas for a great naval victory happened to lie some twelve hundred miles outside the “absolute defense line.” The navy, in short, still intended to fight the decisive battle in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands areas. Its concept of the rear line simply meant a foothold where war power would be accumulated, and from which the navy would launch attacks far forward at the line of contact.
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General Sugiyama, on the other hand, stressed an energetic defense of “the presently occupied areas” to gain time in building stronger rear-area defenses—that is, the “absolute line” where supplies and troops would make ready for quick-reaction counterattacks or offensive thrusts—as the emperor had ordered.
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How Hirohito adjudicated this army-navy high command discrepancy is unclear. There is no record that he intervened forcefully to unify the services in their application of the “absolute defense perimeter” concept. It seems more likely that Hirohito tacitly approved the navy's continued offensive-mindedness, while not rejecting the army's insistence on contraction of the front lines. Two-track positions were entirely in keeping with his character. Over the next two weeks the liaison conference met on numerous occasions to discuss the shift toward the defense. Finally, on September 30, 1943, a conference of the Imperial Headquarters was convened in Hirohito's presence.

While the emperor sat silently listening, Privy Council President Hara put questions on his behalf to T
j
, Sugiyama, Nagano, the president of the Planning Bureau, and the minister of commerce and industry. Hara's questions revealed that although the government had planned “to produce 40,000 aircraft” during 1944, the present annual output was, as T
j
nonchalantly admitted, only “17,000 to 18,000 planes.” When Hara asked Nagano if he was “confident of securing the absolute defense perimeter” with 40,000 aircraft, the navy chief of staff “stiffened the mood of the conference” by replying, “I cannot assure the future of the war situation.” T
j
came to his rescue, saying, “As the imperial rescript stated, this war is essentially for our self defense and very self existence. So whether Germany wins or is beaten, we have to fight on to the end regardless of how the war situation may develop hereafter. Nothing has changed in our resolve to fight until we achieve our aims.”
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A curious exchange followed that showed how, though the huge disparity in national industrial power between Japan and the United States was already painfully manifest at the fronts, the high command had set aside rational calculations and had begun to rely on spiritualism: