Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (356 page)

51.
Tanaka,
Dokyumento Sh
wa tenn
, dai gokan
, p. 475. See also Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings
(New York, 1981), p. 114. Even today the entire picture of the human damage wrought by the atomic bombs is difficult to grasp.

52.
Cyril Clemens, ed.,
Truman Speaks
(Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 69.

53.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, pp. 1220–21.

54.
Ishiguro Tadaatsu,
N
sei rakuy
r
(Oka Shoin, 1956), pp. 421–22; Suzuki Kantar
Denki Hensan Iinkai, ed.,
Suzuki Kantar
den
(1960), p. 372. Minister of State Shimomura conveyed the concerns of the Advisory Council to the cabinet. Agricultural Minister Ishiguro in his memoirs commented on Suzuki's motivations (p. 422):
I still don't know his true intention in making this statement…. At cabinet meetings [Suzuki] only stressed fighting through to the end. He maintained the same attitude in his press conferences and toward the Potsdam Declaration. So I couldn't understand whether this cabinet was going to continue the war or end it. Judging solely from appearances, I could only understand that the cabinet intended to continue fighting. There was not a single sign of their wanting to quit. Yet I imagined that precisely because the prime minister did not give expression to quitting the war meant that, at heart, he wanted to.
This was Ishiguro's invocation of the
haragei
defense on Suzuki's behalf.
Haragei
is the Japanese cultural practice whereby two parties in a negotiation advance their respective positions by subtle, nonverbal mutual deception.

55.
STD
, p. 120.

56.
Wada Haruki, “Nisso sens
,” in Hara Teruyuki, Sotogawa Tsugio, eds.,
K
za Suravu no sekai 8, Suravu to Nihon
(K
bund
, 1995), p. 110.

57.
Sait
Haruko, “Nihon no tai-So sh
sen gaik
,” in
Shiron
(Tokyo Joshi Daigaku) 41 (Mar. 1988), p. 49; see Wada Haruki, “Nisso sens
,” p. 110.