Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (359 page)

72.
Kido always tried to leave the impression that he and Hirohito were consistent opponents of the militarists. Interviewed on April 6, 1966, he declared: “On the whole, our minds were already prepared [for surrender] earlier. That's why we weren't shocked by the atomic bombs…. There was also a plus aspect to the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. I assumed at the time that if there had been no atomic bombs and the Soviet Union hadn't joined in, we might not have succeeded.” The following year he opined boastfully: “Because the Soviets and the atomic bombs did the job for us, one could say that Japan was able to revive to this extent.” “Kido K
ichi-shi to no taiwa,” in Kanazawa Makoto et al., eds.,
Kazoku: Meiji hyakunen sokumenshi
(Hakuyo Sensho, 1978), p. 185; Wada Haruki, “Nisso sens
” in Hara Teruyuki et al., eds.,
K
za Suravu no sekai 8, Suravu to Nihon
(K
bund
, 1995), p. 119.

73.
For the text of “Wahei k
sho no y
k
,” see Yabe Teiji,
Konoe Fumimaro, ge
(K
bunkan, 1952), pp. 559–62.

74.
Yoshida,
Sh
wa tenn
no sh
senshi,
pp. 23–24.

75.
Yoshida Yutaka, “Konoe Fumiraro: ‘kakushin' ha ky
tei seijika no gosan” in Yoshida et al.,
Haisen zengo: Sh
wa tenn
to gonin no shid
sha
, p. 40. In Aug. 1945 Soviet troops captured 639,676 Kwantung Army soldiers, “including 26,583 officers and 191 generals.” Except for the generals, most (about 570,000) were forced to work at hard labor in the camps. See S. I. Kuznetsov, “Kwantung Army Generals in Soviet Prisons (1945–1956),” in
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
11, no. 3 (Sept. 1998), p. 187.