Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (361 page)

, p. 460; and John W. Dower, “Sensational Rumors, Seditious Graffiti, and the Nightmares of the Thought Police,” in Dower,
Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays
(New Press, 1993), pp. 101–54.

77.
Kimishima Kazuhiko, “‘Sh
sen k
saku' to ‘kokutai' ni kansuru ichi shiron,” in
Tokyo Gakugei Daigaku Kiy
, Dai Sanbumon, Shakai Kagaku 34 (Dec. 1982), p. 157, citing Toyoda Soemu,
Saigo no teikoku kaigun
(Sekai no Nihonsha, 1950), pp. 206–7.

78.
In his dictated statement to interviewer
i Atsushi of GHQ's Historical Section on November 28, 1949, T
g
said, “I cannot recall that Minister of the Navy Yonai introduced all the four conditions,” and went on to accuse Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda of adding three conditions to the sin
gle one that he, T
g
, had proposed. But other officials interrogated in the follow-up interviews stated otherwise.

79.
According to Tanaka Nobumasa's reconstruction, based on the memoirs of Toyoda Soemu and T
g
Shigenori, General Umezu stated the case for self-disarmament as follows:
The word “surrender” is not in the Japanese military lexicon. In our military education, if you lose your weapons, you fight with your bare hands. When your hands will no longer help, you fight with your feet. When you can no longer use your hands and feet, you bite with your teeth. Finally, when you can no longer fight, you bite off your tongue and commit suicide. That's what we teach. I do not think that it will go smoothly to order such an army to abandon its weapons and surrender. We should request that our army and the allied army designate the place and time in each theater of operations and the units will gather there to hand over their weapons. We ourselves will collect them…
Tanaka,
Dokyumento Sh
wa tenn
, dai gokan
, pp. 479–80.

80.
Awaya Kentar
, “Tokyo saiban ni miru sengo shori” in Awaya Kentar
, et al.,
Sens
sekinin, sengo sekinin: Nihon to Doitsu wa d
chigau ka
, pp. 79–80.