Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (366 page)

100.
T
g
himself conceded as much when he said, on August 17, 1950, that “although I asked the Soviet Union to act as peace mediator, I was unable to advise her of our peace conditions in any concrete form.” See T
g
statement of Aug. 17, 1950, p. 4, in
U.S. Army Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II
, vol. 4, microfilm shelf no. 51256.

101.
Sait
, “Nihon no tai-So sh
sen gaik
,” p. 58.

102.
D. M. Giangreco, “Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945–1946: Planning and Policy Implications,”
Journal of Military History
61, no. 3 (July 1997), pp. 521–81. Giangreco has reproduced and annotated the minutes of the June 18 White House meeting. For the full text, together with the military estimates, see “Appendix” to Martin J. Sherwin,
A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race
(Vintage Books, 1987), pp. 355–63.

103.
Giangreco, “Casualty Projections,” p. 560.

104.
Ibid., pp. 574–77. His analysis should be compared with Barton Bernstein's discussion of casualty forecasting in “The Struggle Over History: Defining
the Hiroshima Narrative,” in Philip Nobile, ed.,
Judgment at the Smithsonian
(Marlowe & Co., 1995), pp. 127–256.

105.
Forrest C. Pogue,
George C. Marshall: Statesman,
vol. 4 (Viking, 1987, p. 19, from Pogue's February 1957 interview with Marshall.

106.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 1223.

107.
Matsuura S
z
,
Tenn
Hirohito to chih
toshi k
sh
(
tsuki Shoten, 1995), pp. 176–177.
Kido nikki (ge)
, pp.
1225-1226.