Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (45 page)

P
rince Hirohito's regency for his father ended with the Taish
emperor's death in Hayama at 1:25
A.M
., December 25, 1926. Hirohito succeeded immediately to the throne. The imperial regalia were transferred to him, and at the age of twenty-five he became, by right of blood, tradition, myth, and history, but also by authority of the constitution, the so-called 124th emperor of Japan.
¹
Thus, after a brief rite, Article 1 of the constitution, which stipulated that “[t]he empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal,” was fulfilled. Simultaneously, he became commander-in-chief of the armed forces with the authority to issue orders that required no cabinet advice.

The privy council thereupon met and, in accordance with the custom inaugurated at the time of the Restoration, constituted the calendar by the reign of the new emperor. His imperial reign and future posthumous title would be “Sh
wa,” meaning literally “brightness” and “harmony” or “illustrious peace”—a name duly announced on December 28.

That same day the new emperor issued a series of imperial edicts: to soldiers and sailors; to Prince Kan'in, Prime Minister Wakatsuki and Prince Saionji, and to the nation at large, informing all that he had succeeded and asking for their continued loyalty to the throne. Through these rescripts Hirohito let the nation know
that, in his eyes, the military still enjoyed a privileged status, and that the last
genr
, Prince Saionji, would continue to control the selection of the next prime minister.
²
He promised that he would abide by the constitution, “cultivate inherited virtue and…maintain intact the glorious tradition set by our ancestors,” starting with “Our imperial grandfather,” whose “educational developments” and “military achievements” had “enhanced the grandeur of the empire.”

I

Hirohito could now enter more fully into political life, intent on realizing his youthful idea of imperial rule. Firmly supporting but also guiding him was his defining community: seven polished, urbane gentlemen, all much older than himself, who exercised a continuous influence on him through their presence at court. I refer to these seven men, variously, as the “court group,” “staff,” or palace “entourage.” The members of the court group who occupied official bureaucratic positions during the late 1920s were Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Makino, Grand Chamberlain Chinda, Imperial Household Minister Ichiki, and Chief Military Aide-de-Camp General Nara, as well as three key secretaries who functioned as heads of staff.

On January 22, 1929, one week after Grand Chamberlain Chinda died, Makino brought in retired Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, a supporter of naval arms reductions, as his replacement. Suzuki served for seven years until his resignation in 1936. Meanwhile, Chief Military Aide Nara continued until his retirement in April 1933. Although Nara played the same role with respect to military matters that Makino played with respect to political affairs, he was less of a court man and had less political weight than Makino.
³

The three chief secretaries were Kawai, Sekiya, and (for a short period) Okabe Nagakage. They helped to resolve disputes within
the government, gather information for the emperor, and exert political influence on him. Kawai began his bureaucratic career as a secretary in the House of Peers. In the summer of 1926, he entered the Imperial Household Ministry as Makino's assistant, and the next year took on extra duties, becoming chief steward to the empress and chief secretary to the grand chamberlain. Kawai held all these posts concurrently until 1932, when he became director of the Office of Audits of Imperial Accounts. He was fastidious, hardworking, somber: a man with a keen sense of mission to serve the emperor, whom he held in awe. During this phase of his palace career, Kawai met Hirohito almost daily, maintained close contacts with the heads of the Home Ministry's political police, and kept Hirohito informed of national trends through police sources.

Sekiya started out as a Home Ministry bureaucrat and gained experience in the Japanese colonial empire. In 1921, after a short stint as governor of Shizuoka prefecture, he entered the Imperial Household Ministry as Makino's trusted information collector and messenger. He participated in Hirohito's Western tour and in the arrangements for his marriage in 1924. With his firsthand knowledge of colonial administration, Sekiya aided the court group when the Imperial Household Ministry began investing the profits from the emperor's vast landholdings in shares of stock in colonial enterprises. Like Kawai, Sekiya was methodical, efficient, and diligent—just the sort of bureaucrat Hirohito liked to have around him. He was also as dedicated as Makino was to keeping the court an independent force, free from control by party cabinets.

The wealthy nobleman Viscount Okabe Nagakage, the third member of the court group, played the role of liaison between court and government ministries. In February 1929 Okabe became chief secretary to Makino, concurrently holding the position of vice grand master of ceremonies. Of higher rank and social status than either Kawai or Sekiya, Okabe was both more relaxed in his personal attitude toward the emperor, and also more complacent in his
assessment of political problems. He was also much less inclined to the radical right than either Makino or Sekiya.

Interacting with these palace officials, and a part of the court milieu even though situated outside the palace, were the special guardians of the throne. Foremost among them was the venerable last
genr
, Saionji Kinmochi. Although Saionji's seasoned judgment and experience carried weight, and he sometimes gave important direction to Hirohito and the court group, historians have exaggerated his influence on the politics of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Born in 1849 of an ancient family of civil nobles (
kuge
) of the second rank, Saionji enjoyed a special relationship with the palace bureaucrats, who drew on his advice even though he was seldom in their company.
⁴
He was also the staunch defender of the economic interests of the Sumitomo
zaibatsu
, which was headed by his younger brother, Baron Sumitomo Kichizaemon.
⁵

During the years Makino served as imperial household minister, Saionji executed by proxy the emperor's prerogative of recommending the successor to a prime minister. Thereafter, until May 1932, when Hirohito effectively deprived him of that control, Saionji still had influence on each succession of regime. He could also speak out on the appointment of members to the court group.
⁶
From 1927 onward, however, whenever the court group had completed its deliberations to select a new prime minister, they would send a messenger to the aged Saionji in Kyoto, Odawara, Okitsu, or wherever else he happened to be residing. Saionji would sanction their decision, then resume his essentially nonpolitical life, far removed from the daily pressures of the court. Saionji listened well, advised carefully, but stirred himself to act personally only in extreme situations, such as assassinations and mutinies.
⁷
Whenever he did act, however, his efforts were disastrous for the causes of liberalism and party government in Japan.

Nevertheless, of the entire court group and those in its milieu, Saionji alone wanted to move to a multiparty system of politics in
which the two main conservative groups—the Seiy
kai and Kenseikai (later Minseit
), representing the interests of big landlords and big business—would control the Diet, support the orthodox view of the
kokutai,
and always remain totally dependent on the will of Emperor Hirohito rather than the confidence of the Diet.
⁸

In 1929, when party cabinets were nearing the height of their power, a sharp division emerged between Saionji and the court group (including the emperor). Saionji shared with Makino a basic ignorance of the workings of modern political parties and an aversion to the principle of parliamentarism. But where Makino and the palace entourage believed that difficult political problems could be resolved only by the emperor's intervention, Saionji wanted the emperor to avoid political judgments.
⁹
Saionji also looked askance at Makino's radical rightist sympathies. Because Saionji stood outside the process of decision making at court during this and later periods, Makino and the other members of the entourage often had to persuade him to go along. Usually Saionji would swallow his doubts and assent to their decisions.