Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (42 page)

Thus once the parties had defeated their oligarchic opponents, they could not refrain from using the throne as a political weapon. In Diet discussions on the Peace Preservation Law and on the Pak Yol affair, emotional issues connected with the legitimization of state power and of Japanese national identity figured prominently. In this situation Hirohito and his entourage found it impossible to avoid being drawn into the political conflict.

VI

Searching for some fundamental, enduring concept of identity and purpose to hold to in a Japan that was undergoing very rapid industrial and social change, Japanese in all walks of life debated the meaning of
kokutai
during the regency years. If the presence of the young regent, the rise of Taish
democracy, and the change in the basis and direction of Japanese foreign policy gave meaning to this period, so did the experience of national questioning and redefinition expressed in
kokutai
debates. Neither Hirohito nor Makino or
anyone else in the entourage knew what to make of the slow, continuous erosion of belief in established ideology. To deal with this challenge, which was most visible on the Left, the court attempted to strengthen both the orthodox version of
kokutai
ideology and imperial authority, in preparation for Hirohito's accession to the throne.

In the regency years
kokutai
discussions flourished among elite and nonelite groups alike, signaling a remarkable loss of confidence in the monarchy, a weakening of the ideological ties binding some segments of the officer corps to the imperial house, and a gradual unwinding of belief in orthodox
kokutai
thought itself. By the end of the regency, the very word
kokutai
had become detached from its dreamlike referents in mythology and was floating freely, ready to be adapted to the needs of any person or group seeking to redress a grievance, punish an opponent, aggrandize power, or adjust the political horizons of the Japanese people.

This is to say that in Japan the 1920s was a time of intense ideological and cultural conflict: While the government, the regent, and his court entourage all clung uncritically to an official version of
kokutai,
reform-minded people in different fields of endeavor attempted to make Japan's national ideology compatible with modern scientific thought, as well as with the trend toward impersonal bureaucratic rule. The political world debated the
kokutai
, and so too did officers in the armed forces, priests in shrines and temples, and professors in the universities. Invariably these discussions had to address the legitimacy of the emperor's rule and the sort of moral value that he and the imperial system had, or ought to have, in Japanese society.
⁸⁷

A small minority of liberals sought to reconcile the Imperial House with the spirit and logic of Taish
democracy. In mainstream
kokutai
debates of the period, they envisioned a political system along the lines of a Western-style parliamentary democracy, and wanted to preserve the imperial house by simply removing it com
pletely from politics. Most reform-minded writers, however, aimed only at an updating of the “original story” by which the nation rationalized its political life. Standing against them were traditional conservatives, who sought the foundation of the
kokutai
solely in the imperial bloodline of succession and emphasized the direct personal rule of male emperors and their absolute political authority. Traditionalists were aggrieved by Japan's subordination to the West and wanted nothing to do with democracy. They held that the
kokutai
was immutable, and that those who tried to turn the emperor into a mere symbol were guilty of lèse majesté.

For the ruling elites discussion of the
kokutai
was invariably linked to the problem of controlling dangerous thought. A truly stable moral basis for Japanese politics required universal acceptance of the
kokutai
. But the more the
kokutai
was debated, questioned, and interpreted, the more difficult it became to maintain that common moral foundation. Seeking to resist the democratic current and build up the waning imperial authority, on November 10, 1923, the Kiyoura cabinet adopted a “cultural policy” based on the regent's Imperial Rescript on the Promotion of the National Spirit. Prime Minister Kiyoura thereupon formed, in February 1924, a Central Association of Cultural Bodies in response to Hirohito's call for the improvement of thought and “the awakening of the national spirit.” Invited to the association's convocation meeting to discuss a national campaign against “dangerous thoughts” associated with the labor movement and the Left were representatives from Shinto, Christianity, and Buddhism, including the leaders of Nichiren.

The sect, founded in the thirteenth century, was then enjoying its golden age of influence and growth, and two of its leading proseltyzers—Honda Nissh
and Tanaka Chigaku—immediately seized on this “national spirit” campaign to draw up an appeal asking the court to issue a rescript conferring on Nichiren, the founder of their religion, the posthumous title of “Great Teacher Who Established the Truth,” so that they could then use it for
proseltyzing purposes.
⁸⁸
After the court granted Nichiren the title, Imperial Household Minister Makino is alleged to have declared: “This decision was due to the emperor's benevolent awareness that the present ideological situation in Japan requires better guidance by sound thought, and especially, firm religious belief.”
⁸⁹

In fact the imperial house, controlled by Makino and Hirohito, awarded the title because it considered the social situation bad enough to warrant the services of the most passionate enemies of Taish
democracy, the Nichiren believers. When Honda went to the Imperial Household Ministry to receive the award, he met Makino and told him that the Nichiren religion “is the banner of an army on the offensive in the ‘ideological warfare' of the present day.” Honda also expressed his patriotism and boasted about the Nichiren sect's antidemocratic, anticommunist nature.
⁹⁰
That Buddhism (or the faith of Nichiren believers, many of whom were upper-echelon military officers and civilian right-wing ideologues) had to be called on to supplement emperor ideology indicates that the official creed was never able to exercise a controlling influence on all groups in Japanese society.
⁹¹

Other forces deeply concerned in these years about guiding the people's thoughts and maintaining the
kokutai
were the military services, activist right-wing political organizations, and the new nationalist “study associations.”
⁹²
Baron Hiranuma Kiichir
's National Foundation Society (
Kokuhonsha
), established in 1924, and the Golden Pheasant Academy (
Kinkei Gakuin
), founded by Yasuoka Masahiro in 1927, later became influential in the bureaucratic reform movement of the 1930s. The Golden Pheasant Academy had direct links to the throne via Yasuoka's patron, Makino Nobuaki, who arranged to have Vice Imperial Household Minister Sekiya Teizabur
contribute to its educational and propaganda activities as his personal representative.
⁹³

Despite these government-supported campaigns to control discussion of the
kokutai
, unofficial attempts to widen the political
horizons of the people by reinterpreting the
kokutai
continued. House of Peers and ex–Home Ministry bureaucrat Nagata Sh
jir
wrote a book in 1921 defending the throne in terms of its symbolic and social utility.
⁹⁴
He rejected the orthodox view of the
kokutai
based on mythology and offered the belief that the imperial house could win the hearts and minds of the people provided it became a “palliative force,” standing outside politics.
⁹⁵
Imperial Household Ministry editor and writer Watanabe Ikujir
published
K
shitsu to shakai mondai
(The Imperial house and social problems) in 1925, a work that sought to encourage young workers and activists in the labor movement to rely on the imperial house to solve the nation's social ills.
⁹⁶