Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (243 page)

57.
Parks M. Coble,
Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937
(Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 24–25.

58.
Otabe, “Kaisetsu: Mansh
jihen to tenn
, ky
ch
,” p. 257; Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” pp. 189–92.

59.
Ibid., p. 179, citing from
Harada nikki, bekkan
, p. 356.

60.
Ibid., pp. 185–86.

61.
James B. Crowley,
Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938
(Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 109.

62.
Three days later, at Hirohito's insistence, Makino again discussed the problem of military discipline with Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki, but took no further action. See Hatano Sumio, “Mansh
jihen to ‘ky
ch
' seiryoku,” p. 109;
MNN
, entries of August 19 and 21, 1931; and
Harada nikki, dai nikan
, pp. 39–40.

63.
By practicing austerity in a time of acute depression, while insisting that his bureaucratic servants do likewise, Hirohito probably imagined that he was setting a good example, when he was really contributing to the demoralization of the bureaucracy. On the salary reduction issue, see Otabe, “Kaisetsu: Mansh
jihen to tenn
, ky
ch
,” in
KYN, dai gokan
, p. 255, citing Kawai's entries of May 27 and 30.

64.
KYN, dai gokan
, p. 152.

65.
The Army General Staff officers who hosted the meeting were Gens. Kanaya Hanz
, Ninomiya Harushige, Hata Shunroku, and Tatekawa Yoshitsugu. Their guests from the Navy General Staff were Adms. Oikawa Koshir
, Taniguchi Naomi, Nagano Osami, and Kond
Nobutake. The navy's “special organ” in Manchuria was not established until Jan. 27, 1932. See Shinmy
Takeo, ed.,
Kaigun sens
kent
kaigi kiroku: Taiheiy
sens
kaisen no keii
(Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1976), pp. 118–19; K
ketsu,
Nihon kaigun no sh
sen k
saku—Ajia taiheiy
sens
no saikent