History of the Second World War (90 page)

From the autumn of 1943 onward, the most that the Allies could hope to achieve was a negative aim — that of keeping as many German divisions as possible pinned down in Italy, and away from the force available to meet the coming Anglo-American invasion of France, through Normandy, in mid-summer 1944.

The Teheran Conference of the three major Allied Powers in November 1943, and immediately preceding the Anglo-American Conference at Cairo, confirmed this conclusion by the decision that ‘Operation Overlord’, the cross-Channel attack through Normandy was to have priority, along with ‘Anvil’, the supplementary landing in the South of France, while the aim in Italy was confined to the capture of Rome and a subsequent advance to the Pisa-Rimini line in the peninsular leg. Exploitation north-eastward into the Balkans was not to be undertaken. Indeed, it does not appear to have been a major point, or consideration, of British policy at this time.

In spite of the basic agreement on priority for ‘Overlord’ and ‘Anvil’, there was still much underlying disagreement between the American and British leaders over the importance of the campaign in Italy. The British view, as held by Mr Churchill and Sir Alan Brooke, was that the more forces the Allies put into Italy the more German forces they could draw thither, away from Normandy — a view that proved mistaken, but was inspired by Churchill’s hope of a great and primarily British success in that theatre of war. The Americans’ view, in so far as it differed, was governed by their concern that any reinforcement of the Allied strength in Italy should not subtract from its strength in France which they considered, rightly, the decisive theatre. They recognised more realistically than Churchill, or the British military chiefs, the difficulties of terrain that were likely to hinder any quick success in Italy, and its exploitation. They were also deeply suspicious of a British inclination to focus on Italy as an evasion of an invasion of France, the harder task.

Kesselring now had fifteen divisions in the 10th Army (apart from a further eight with the 14th Army in the north) to hold his front, on what was called the Gustav Line, against a continuation of the Allied offensive. Although most of the German divisions were of weaker strength,* and some badly reduced, they looked capable of holding on against any direct frontal assault by the eighteen Allied divisions which had been landed in Italy by the end of 1943.

* The strength of the German divisions varied widely, and some that had been engaged in heavy fighting were very shrunk, but even on full establishment they averaged only about two-thirds the size of Allied divisions.

So the natural solution was an amphibious landing behind the Gustav Line, and that promised to be all the easier since the Allies had both air and naval superiority. If launched in conjunction with a fresh attack on the Gustav Line, it should be able to lever the Germans out of that line and break their hold south of Rome. Such a plan, named ‘Operation Shingle’, was already on the stocks, and Churchill, who had been feeling impatient at the slow progress in Italy, gave it fresh impetus. He obtained the necessary shipping at the Cairo-Teheran Conference by agreeing to the American desire for ‘Anvil’, the South of France landing planned for the summer, and then asking that the assault-craft should remain in the Mediterranean until that time — so that they would be available for the amphibious landing at Anzio, just south of Rome, which was projected for January.

The plan drawn up by Alexander and his staff was well designed in broad outline. The offensive on the existing peninsular front, the Gustav Line, was to be launched by Mark Clark’s Fifth Army, about January 20. The U.S. 2nd Corps was to strike across the Rapido River, and up the Liri valley, as soon as the French Corps on its right and the British 10th Corps on its left had drawn off most of General Senger’s 14th Panzer Corps by preliminary thrusts. Once the main advance got going, the seaborne U.S. 6th Corps would be landed at Anzio. It was hoped, and expected, that the German reserve divisions would then be hurrying southward, and would turn back to meet the Allied landing forces at Anzio — while in the confusion, the Fifth Army should be able to break through the Gustav Line and link up with the 6th Corps at Anzio. Even if the German 10th Army was not crushed between the two, the Allied Command hoped that it would have to withdraw to the Rome area to reorganise.

But the plan did not work out. The German troops were not so confused or exhausted as the Allied Command hoped, and they fought with their usual tenacity. On the other hand, the Allied preparations had been rushed and the Fifth Army’s offensive was disjointed in delivery.

It started well with a successful assault crossing of the Garigliano River, on the night of January 17/18, by McCreery’s British 10th Corps on the westerly sector. And this led Kesselring to despatch a large proportion of his reserves (29th and 90th Panzergrenadier Divisions, and parts of the Hermann Goring Division) to that front. But the attack, on the 20th, of the U.S. 2nd Corps across the Rapido, in the left centre, proved a costly failure — the two leading regiments being largely destroyed. The Liri valley was strongly held, and any attack up it was in full view of Monte Cassino, the formidableness of which position had been underestimated. The Rapido itself had a very fast current and even an unopposed crossing would have been difficult, while in this case the U.S. 36th Division was launched at it after only five days for rest and preparation since its capture of the outlying Monte Trocchio on the approach to the Rapido. The assault attempted by the British 46th Division advancing on its immediate left was also a failure. The Fifth Army’s offensive was still proceeding, but looking gloomy, when the seaborne force landed at Anzio on January 22.

The Anzio sector offered the only suitable beaches for a landing behind the German flank, unless the Allied planners ventured to choose a site north of Rome — and that would be considerably farther from the main front on the Gustav Line. Even so, Kesselring was taken by surprise, considering a north of Rome landing more dangerous to him strategically, and had only one unit in the Anzio area when the Allied landing took place — a battalion of the 29th Panzergrenadier Division that was in rest there. Fortunately for him the commander of the invading force, Major-General John P. Lucas, who had taken over the command of the 6th Corps during the last part of the Salerno battle, was extremely cautious and also deeply pessimistic; he had expressed his pessimistic views, even before the operation was launched, not only in his diary but also to his subordinates and allies, including Alexander himself.

His 6th Corps comprised for the initial landing two infantry divisions, the 1st British and 3rd U.S., assisted by Commando and Ranger units, a parachute regiment, and two tank battalions, while they were to be followed up by the American 1st Armored Division and 45th Infantry Division. That strength would assure not only overwhelming superiority at the landing places but the prospect of powerful exploitation — which Churchill hoped would quickly reach the Alban Hills south of Rome and cut the strategically vital Routes 6 and 7, thus cutting off the German 10th Army in the Gustav Line.

The landings — by the British just north of Anzio, and the Americans just south of the town — were easily achieved, being almost unopposed. But the Germans’ reaction was rapid and resolute. Their forces in the Gustav Line were ordered to stand fast, on the defensive, while the Hermann Goring Division was switched back northward and other available units rushed down from Rome. Kesselring was told by O.K.W. that he could call on any of the divisions in northern Italy, and that in addition he was to be sent two divisions, three independent regiments, and two heavy tank battalions. For Hitler was anxious, and eager, to give this Allied seaborne move such a knock as would frighten off the Allies from further landings in Italy, and from their prospective landings on the coast of France.

Kesselring’s re-shuffle of his forces was a remarkable feat. Elements of eight German divisions were brought to the Anzio sector in the first eight days. The command set-up was also reorganised at the same time. Mackensen’s 14th Army took over the Anzio sector, controlling the 1st Parachute Corps and 76th Panzer Corps that now respectively held the areas north and south of the Allied beachhead. Vietinghoff’s 10th Army was left to hold the Gustav Line, with the 14th Panzer Corps and the 51st Mountain Corps. In all, eight German divisions were assembled round the Anzio beachhead, seven were under Senger’s 14th Panzer Corps opposing Mark Clark’s Allied Fifth Army, and only three were under the 51st Mountain Corps to check the British Eighth Army on the Adriatic side of Italy — while six divisions were left in northern Italy under General von Zangen. (The British Eighth Army was now commanded by Sir Oliver Leese, with Montgomery’s recall to England to take charge of the plans and preparations for the coming Allied invasion of Normandy.)

Churchill’s hope of a speedy thrust from Anzio to the Alban Hills was nullified by Lucas’s obstinate determination, backed by Mark Clark, to concentrate on consolidating the beachhead before thrusting inland. But in view of the Germans’ swift reaction and superior skill, along with the clumsiness of most of the Allied commanders and troops, Lucas’s super-caution may have been a blessing in disguise. An inland thrust, in such circumstances, could have been an easy target for flank attacks, and have led to disaster.

While the planned beachhead area was secured by the second day, and the supply problem thereby simplified, the first real attempt to push inland did not start until January 30 — more than a week after the landing. It was soon brought to a halt by the German forces on the spot. Moreover the whole beachhead could now be harassed by German artillery fire, and Allied aircraft, which were operating from the Naples area, were unable to prevent Luftwaffe raids on the crowded shipping around Anzio. So Mark Clark’s forces on the Gustav Line, instead of being aided by the Anzio lever, again tried a direct attack to aid the hemmed-in seaborne force at Anzio.

This time the U.S. 2nd Corps sought to overcome the Gustav Line by an attack on Cassino from the north side. On January 24 the American 34th Division led the assault, with the aid of the French on its flank. But it was not until after a week’s heavy fighting that it managed to secure a firm bridgehead, and before then Senger had brought more of his reserves into the sector, making this strong defensive position stronger than ever. On February 11 the Americans were withdrawn, heavily depleted and badly exhausted.

After that abortive effort the newly-formed New Zealand Corps (Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg) was brought up, composed of the 2nd New Zealand and 4th Indian Divisions, both of them veteran divisions that had greatly distinguished themselves in the North African campaign — the 4th Indian, of combined British and Indian units, had been rated by the Germans as the best division there. Freyberg’s plan for a converging assault on Cassino offered no real change from the past procedure of costly frontal assaults on well-sited and stubbornly defended German positions. Francis Tuker, commanding the 4th Indian, urged an indirect approach and wider manoeuvre, through the mountains, which the French also favoured, but his influence was diminished by him falling ill. His division was cast to tackle Monte Cassino itself, and after the rejection of his proposals for a wider manoeuvre he asked that the historic monastery, which crowned this height, should be neutralised by a concentrated air bombardment. While there was no evidence that German troops were using the monastery — and ample proof subsequently that they abstained from entering it — the great edifice so dominated the scene as to have a sinister and depressing effect on troops who had to attack the height. The request was granted, after endorsement by Freyberg and Alexander, and on 15 February a tremendous bombing attack was delivered that demolished the famous monastery buildings. The German troops then felt justified in moving into the rubble, which enabled them to establish a still firmer defence.

That night, and the following one, repeated attacks by the 4th Indian Division made no important progress. So on the next night, February 17/18, the New Zealand Corps reverted to the original plan. The 4th Indian Division succeeded in capturing the oft-disputed Point 593, but was pushed out by counterattacks from German parachute troops, and the 2nd New Zealand Division was driven out next day from its bridgehead over the Rapido by a counterattack from German tanks.

Pending the arrival of the large reinforcements that O.K.W. had promised, to help in wiping out the Allied bridgehead, Mackensen launched counterattacks to hinder the Allied forces from expanding it. The first, on the night of February 3, was against the salient created by the British 1st Division in its abortive push towards Campoleone on January 30. Fortunately the leading brigade of the British 56th Division had just landed, and the thrust was held. A further and heavy counterattack came on the 7th and although it was held at bay British losses were so heavy that the 1st Division had to be replaced by the U.S. 45th Division, which had now arrived.

By mid-February Mackensen was ready to launch his counterstroke, having now ten divisions surrounding the five Allied divisions in the bridgehead, and a strongly reinforced Luftwaffe to give him good support. ‘Goliaths’, the new remote-controlled, explosive-filled, miniature tanks, were to be used to cause confusion among the defenders. The build-up had not been affected by the Allied attacks at Cassino, nor was it seriously hindered by Allied airpower.

The German attack on the bridgehead began on February 16, with probes all along the perimeter, and frequent raids by the Luftwaffe. By evening a gap developed in the sector held by the U.S. 45th Division. It was the opportunity for which the Germans had been waiting — fourteen battalions, led by Hitler’s favourite, the Infantry Lehr Regiment, supported by tanks thrust forward on the 17th to expand the gap and push down the Albano-Anzio road. Victory was in sight.

But the amount and mixture of forces crammed on this one road became an internal hindrance while offering a crowded target for the Allied artillery, aircraft, and naval bombardment squadrons. And the ‘Goliath’ tanks were a failure. However, despite the heavy losses suffered, the weight of the assault pushed the Allied forces back, and on the 18th a renewed assault, reinforced by the 26th Panzer Division, made further progress towards the beaches. But the 56th and 1st British and 45th U.S. Divisions fought desperately, and successfully, to hold the final defence line of the bridgehead. The German thrust was checked at the Carroceto creek, and the assaulting troops wilted under the strain. The Panzergrenadier divisions made their final effort on the 20th, but it was soon brought to a halt. The conduct and success of the defence was helped by the arrival of General Lucian K. Truscott, first as deputy, and then as successor, to Lucas. On the British sector Major-General W. R. C. Penney, commander of the 1st Division, had been wounded, and replaced by Major-General Gerald Templer, who ably co-ordinated the defence of both this and the 56th Division.