History of the Second World War (92 page)

In the political sphere the most notable feature of the period was the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel in favour of his son, and the replacement of Marshal Badoglio as Italy’s prime minister by the anti-Fascist Signor Bonomi.

For the Allied armies in Italy the sequel to the long-sought capture of Rome was very disappointing. That was partly due to higher decisions and partly to the Germans’ recovery and countermoves.

Although Maitland Wilson had accepted the American view that ‘Anvil’, even though delayed, was the most effective operation that the Mediterranean Command could undertake to draw German divisions from northern France, and thereby aid the progress of the Normandy advance, Alexander had a different view. On June 6, two days after the entry in Rome, he set forth his plan for exploiting ‘Diadem’. He considered that if his forces were left intact, they would be able to attack the Germans’ ‘Gothic Line’ north of Florence, on the ‘thigh’ of the Italian peninsula, by August 15 — the same date that Wilson had fixed for ‘Anvil’, and would be able to break through this barrier-line unless Hitler diverted eight or more divisions to reinforce it. After that he considered that he would soon be able to overrun the north-east of Italy and have a good chance of driving on through the ‘Ljubliana Gap’, as it was called, into Austria. It was a remarkably optimistic view of the possibilities of speedily overcoming the series of mountain obstacles between Italian Venetia and Vienna, with their many potential delaying positions — and the more optimistic in view of the repeated repulses that the Italians had suffered there during the First World War even in the initial approaches.

But the plan appealed to Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, particularly Alan Brooke — as an alternative to the heavy losses, and even catastrophe, they feared in Normandy. In advocating the plan Alexander had better ground in emphasising the moral value of impressing his troops with the importance of the Italian campaign.

The American Chiefs of Staff, under General Marshall’s guidance, opposed this dubious new extension of the offensive in Italy, but Alexander succeeded in winning over Maitland Wilson. Then, however, Eisenhower intervened in favour of ‘Anvil’. Once more, Churchill and Roosevelt were brought into the dispute. By July 2, the British had to give way, and Wilson was ordered to launch ‘Anvil’ — now more modestly re-named ‘Dragoon’ — on August 15. The decision entailed the departure of the U.S. 6th Corps (with its three divisions), and then of the French Corps (of four divisions) — whose chiefs and members naturally preferred to help in the liberation of their motherland. The Fifth Army was thus reduced to five divisions, and the Army Group lost about 70 per cent of its air support.

Meanwhile Kesselring and his men were already striving with much effect to check the Allies’ exploitation of the partial victory they had gained. The German losses in ‘Diadem’ had been serious, four of the infantry divisions having to be withdrawn to refit, while a further seven had been seriously reduced. But four fresh divisions were on the way, as well as a regiment of heavy tanks. Most of these reinforcements were sent to the 14th Army, which was covering the easier routes of advance. Kesselring’s plan was to slow down the Allied advance by a series of delaying actions throughout the summer, and retreat to the strong Gothic Line for the winter. About eighty miles north of Rome there was a natural line of defence near Trasimene, the scene of Hannibal’s most skilful trap, which offered a suitable position for the first stand. The skilled demolition work of the German engineers would help to slow down the Allied advance.

This advance began on June 5, the day after the Americans entered Rome. But it was not pushed very hard at the moment when it could have been most dangerous. Then the French took over the lead in the Fifth Army’s sector. Meanwhile the British 13th Corps was pressing up Routes 3 and 4, further inland, but it met increasingly stiff opposition, and came to a standstill along the Trasimene line. The advance in other sectors was also brought to a standstill. Thus in barely a fortnight after the withdrawal from Rome, Kesselring had stabilised the momentarily very dangerous situation.

Moreover he had been told that O.K.W. was sending him four more divisions — which were on or earmarked for the Russian front — as well as drafts to resuscitate his more battered divisions. And this was in addition to the four fresh divisions and one heavy tank regiment that were already arriving. Ironically, this large addition to Kesselring’s strength came at a time when Alexander was faced with the depressing fact of having to part with seven of his divisions, and the larger part of his air support as well as much of the logistical elements of the Allied Army Group in Italy.

Kesselring had proved himself a very able commander, and he was now rewarded by good fortune. He had decided to make a stand, on a convenient natural line of defence, just as the Allies’ exploiting drive was running out of steam.

The two months of the summer following June 20 were a period of disappointment and frustration for Alexander’s armies. Advances were piecemeal and never looked decisive. Battles were a series of isolated actions between individual Allied and German corps, in which the German policy was to hold a position until the Allied corps opposite was seen to be deploying for a massive attack and to slip away to the next obstacle line.

The upshot of Kesselring’s rapid regrouping meant that the 14th Panzer Corps, on the west coast, now faced the 2nd U.S. Corps; the 1st Parachute Corps faced the French Corps (not yet withdrawn for ‘Anvil’); the 76th Panzer Corps faced both British Corps, the 13th and 10th; while the 51st Mountain Corps faced the Polish 2nd Corps on the Adriatic coast.

By the beginning of July, the Allied centre, hindered by bad weather, was at last pushing through the Trasimene line — but after a few days was again checked, on the Arezzo line. By July 15 the Germans slipped away from that, and gradually retired to the Arno line, from Pisa through Florence and eastward. Here the Allied armies were forced to a prolonged halt, with their goal, the Gothic Line, only a short distance beyond. Some compensation for their frustrations was the Poles’ capture of Ancona, on July 18, and the Americans’ capture of Leghorn on the 19th, which shortened their supply lines.

In view of the British desire, especially Alexander’s and Churchill’s, to press on with the campaign in Italy — despite repeated disappointments and reduced forces — plans went ahead for mounting a great autumn offensive against the Gothic Line. It was hoped that it would still be of value in drawing off German forces from the principal theatres, or, alternatively, that if a collapse occurred on the Western Front this would lead to a German withdrawal from Italy and thereby enable Alexander’s forces to exploit a breakthrough in northern Italy by a drive towards Trieste and Vienna.

The previous plan for an attack on the Gothic Line, devised by Alexander’s Chief of Staff, Harding, and the Army Group staff, had been based on the idea of a surprise thrust through the centre of the German front, in the Apennines, but on August 4 Oliver Leese, commanding the Eighth Army, persuaded Alexander to adopt a different plan. The basis of this was to switch the Eighth Army back to the Adriatic side, secretly, and for it to break through there towards Rimini. Having thus focused Kesselring’s attention on the Adriatic coast, the Fifth Army would strike in the left centre, with Bologna as its objective. Then, when Kesselring reacted to this fresh thrust, the Eighth Army would thrust forward again and break into the Plain of Lombardy, where its armoured forces would have more scope for manoeuvre than they had ever enjoyed since landing in Italy.

Despite the administrative problems it would involve, this new plan was the more welcome since the prospects of the original one were impaired by the removal of the French, with their skilled mountain troops. Leese also considered that the Fifth and Eighth Armies would function better when they were not aiming at the same objective. Alexander was quick to agree with his arguments, and adopt the new plan — which was codenamed ‘Operation Olive’.

But it had drawbacks which became more evident after the operation was launched. While the Eighth would no longer be faced with a series of mountain ridges it would now have to overcome a series of awkward river crossings that would slow down its advance. By contrast, Kesselring profited from having a good lateral highway for switching his forces, in Route 9 — the trunk road from Rimini westward through Bologna. The planners also seem to have been unduly optimistic about a continuance of dry weather. In any case, the country north of Rimini, although flat, was boggy — and far from suitable for a fast drive by armoured forces.

Alexander’s offensive opened well, on August 25 — ten days later than originally promised. The Germans were again taken by surprise — as the move of the British 5th Corps (of five divisions) and the Canadian 1st Corps (of two divisions) into positions of readiness behind the Polish 2nd Corps had not been detected. (The British 10th Corps continued to hold the mountain sector near the centre, while the 13th Corps moved farther westward to support the Fifth Army’s coming attack.)

Only two low-grade divisions, although backed by the 1st Parachute Division, held the Adriatic sector — German troop movement at the time was mostly going from east to west. The Polish Corps’ advances up the Adriatic had attracted little attention, and it was only on August 29, after four days’ progress by these three Allied corps on a broad front — by which time they had advanced some ten miles, from the Metauro to the Foglia — that the Germans began to react. By next day, parts of two more divisions had arrived on the scene, to help in checking the Allied advance, but they were too late to prevent the Allied thrust reaching the Conca river-line, about seven miles farther on, by September 2.

But the Eighth Army’s momentum was flagging. The key battle was for the Coriano ridge behind the Ausa — two more rivers further — on September 4. Here the British advance came to a halt and crumbled. Meanwhile the Germans were getting some reinforcements — and heavy rains came to their aid on September 6.

Kesselring had ordered a general withdrawal of his other divisions into the Gothic Line positions, which had shortened his front and set free some of his troops for the Adriatic sector. That partial withdrawal opened the crossings of the Amo so that the Fifth Army was now ready to strike. From September 10 onward the U.S. 2nd Corps and British 13th Corps attacked the weakly held but stubbornly defended German positions, and eventually, a week later, broke through the Il Gioga Pass north of Florence. Once again Kesselring seems to have been taken by surprise, as he did not recognise that this was a major offensive until the 20th, ten days from the start, when two divisions were rushed to that sector. By then, however, the Americans’ reserve division, the 88th Infantry, was thrusting forward to attack Bologna from the east. Even then, although the Germans had lost the Gothic Line and a rearward key feature in Monte Battaglia, they proved capable of checking the Allied attacks. In late September Mark Clark was led to revert to the idea of a more direct attack on Bologna.

Meanwhile the Eighth Army was still in difficulties on the Adriatic flank. By September 17, elements of ten German divisions were on the scene and helping to slow it down. Although the Canadians succeeded in reaching Rimini by the 21st, and thus the Po Valley delta, the Germans fell back to another defence line, the River Uso — the historic Rubicon of ancient times. There were still thirteen rivers to cross in this flat and water-logged region before the Po itself, and in the effort nearly 500 tanks had been knocked out, bogged, or broken down, while many of the infantry divisions had been reduced to skeletons. So the Germans were able to move a large proportion of their strength to check the Fifth Army.

On October 2, Mark Clark’s renewed offensive towards Bologna opened, this time along Route 65. All four divisions of his 2nd Corps were thrown in, but the defending Germans fought with such tenacity that during the next three weeks the American advance averaged no more than a mile a day, and on October 27 the offensive was abandoned. By the end of October the Eighth Army advance had also petered out, after only five more rivers had been crossed, and the Po was still fifty miles distant.

The only notable changes of the period were command changes. Kesselring was injured in a motor accident and replaced by Vietinghoff. McCreery replaced Leese — who was being sent to Burma — in command of the Eighth Army. Towards the end of November, Maitland Wilson was sent to Washington, and succeeded by Alexander, while Mark Clark took over the Army Group in Italy.

The Allied situation at the end of 1944 was very disappointing in comparison with the high hopes of the spring, and the summer. Although Alexander still showed optimism about an advance into Austria, the slow crawl up the Italian peninsula made such distant horizons appear increasingly unrealistic. Maitland Wilson himself admitted as much in his report of November 22 to the British Chiefs of Staff. The disbelief, and discontent, of the Allied troops was manifested in a growing rate of desertions.

A final Allied offensive in 1944 sought to gain Bologna and Ravenna as winter bases. The Canadians, in the Eighth Army, succeeded in capturing Ravenna on December 4, and their success led the Germans to send three divisions to check the Eighth Army’s further progress. That seemed to offer the Fifth Army a better chance. But this was forestalled by an enemy counterattack in the Senio valley on December 26 — prompted by Mussolini with the idea of emulating Hitler’s counteroffensive in the Ardennes, and largely carried out by Italians who remained loyal to him. This attack was soon, and easily, stopped. But the Eighth Army was now exhausted, and very short of ammunition, while the Germans were known to have strong reserves near Bologna. So Alexander decided that the Allied armies should go on the defensive, and prepare for a powerful spring offensive.

A further damper to the hopes placed in the Italian campaign was the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to withdraw five more divisions from that theatre to the Western Front, in order to give the Allied armies there more punch for their spring offensive into Germany. As a consequence, the Canadian Corps of two divisions was despatched thither, although further divisions did not have to go.