Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (8 page)

To gain forces to halt the Soviet advance on Dünaburg and to repulse attacks against Sixteenth Army’s left flank, Friessner requested permission to withdraw a division from Army Detachment Narva. He also proposed that the forces on the Narva front retreat about twenty kilometers to a shorter line on the Narva Isthmus. Hitler approved the division’s withdrawal but not the retreat. Friessner once more met with Hitler on 18 July, and the Nazi dictator commanded Model and Friessner to scrape together mobile assault groups to delay the Soviet advance until the armored divisions could assemble for the counteroffensive, now scheduled for the end of the month. Both army group commanders pleaded for replacements, but Hitler replied that the establishment of new divisions had priority. Citing military, diplomatic, and economic factors, he commanded Army Group North to hold its present front at all costs.
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MAP
3.
THE SOVIET
1944
SUMMER OFFENSIVE

Third Baltic Front launched its offensive in mid-July against Eighteenth Army’s right flank south of Lake Peipus and attempted to drive a wedge between Sixteenth and Eighteenth armies. The Russians captured Ostrov on 21 July and Pleskau two days later. The Soviets continued to push back Third Panzer Army, increasing the gap separating Army Groups North and Center to seventy kilometers. With the exception of Army Detachment Narva, Army Group North had been ejected from the Panther Position. On 22 July Gen. Heinz Guderian, Zeitzler’s replacement as
chief of the Army General Staff, notified Friessner that after consulting the Finns, Hitler had approved Army Detachment Narva’s retreat to the shorter line. The previous day Kinzel, army group chief of staff, had attended a conference called by Guderian. When Kinzel reported that the army group faced destruction if it did not withdraw, Guderian flew into a rage, shouting that retreat was out of the question and threatening Kinzel with execution by firing squad for defeatism. Kinzel was relieved on 23 July.
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Friessner informed Hitler the next day of the danger to his southern flank and once more insisted on a withdrawal behind the Düna. Weary of Friessner’s seemingly endless requests to retreat and convinced that the situation required a firmer hand, Hitler replaced Friessner with the Nazi Party favorite, Gen. Ferdinand Schörner, whom he specifically granted the broadest possible powers in a unique Führer directive.
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Goebbels was convinced that the deteriorating situation in the northern sector required decisive leadership and that Schörner was the one best suited for the task.
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Leningrad Front launched its attack in the Narva sector on 24 July but could not pierce the German defenses. The withdrawal to the new position on the Narva Isthmus proceeded as planned, and the Germans evacuated the city of Narva on 26 July. Farther south, however, the situation remained critical. On 26 July Gen. Oldwig von Natzmer (Kinzel’s replacement as army group chief of staff) informed Gen. Walter Wenck (head of OKH’s operations section) that to gain two divisions, Schörner had ordered the evacuation of Dünaburg and a withdrawal to a position connecting the Düna River with Lake Peipus.
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Wenck protested that Hitler had not approved this action; Natzmer replied that the army group had no choice. Unlike Küchler, Lindemann, or Friessner, Schörner immediately granted permission for retreats he deemed necessary, not informing Hitler or OKH until the orders had been issued. Schörner also commanded Sixteenth Army to halt its attack to the south, an attack upon which Hitler had constantly insisted for the past month. On 28 July Schaulen, a key communications center, fell to the Soviets. At this time Gen. Ivan Bagramian, First Baltic Front’s commander, received permission to wheel north and drive on the coast west of Riga.
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The Russians reached the outskirts of Mitau on the 28th, severing the army group’s last rail link to East Prussia. Schörner scraped together what forces he could to halt Bagramian’s advance, but on 30 July, Fifth Guards Tank Army reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga near Tuckum. Bagramian had cut off Army Group North’s land contact with the Reich.

At the beginning of August the distance separating Army Groups North and Center had increased to 120 kilometers. The successful invasion of France and Allied advances in Italy prevented Hitler from transferring
units from there to the East to plug the gap. Schörner’s forces, however, faced a new threat from another direction. Second and Third Baltic fronts had resumed the offensive and threatened to break through at the junction of Sixteenth and Eighteenth armies. Schörner informed OKH that his troops were exhausted and so badly weakened that they could not fight defensively for much longer, much less attack to regain contact with Third Panzer Army.
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He proposed, as had Friessner, Army Detachment Narva’s retreat to Reval for evacuation by sea and the gradual withdrawal of Eighteenth Army to a bridgehead around Riga. Following this, he planned to attack to regain contact with Army Group Center and establish a new front along a line Kovno–Schaulen–Bauske–Schlock. Schörner, therefore, proposed a withdrawal to a line west of Riga and the Düna.
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He warned that any delay would make the withdrawal more difficult and pointed out that the situation in Finland could make the retreat essential. Wenck visited Schörner’s headquarters on 10 August and promised that Army Group Center’s counterattack would begin in six days.

Soviet attacks against Eighteenth Army’s left flank increased in intensity, and on 12 August the Russians broke through the German line south of Verro and threatened to do so near Dorpat and Walk as well. Schörner ordered the First Air Force to send all available aircraft to support Eighteenth Army’s crumbling left flank. If that failed to halt the Soviet advance, Schörner declared, he was prepared to order the evacuation of Estonia. He informed OKH that unless he received reinforcements to seal the penetration at Verro, the army group must give up the Narva sector and retreat to Riga. Schörner requested an immediate decision from Hitler, warning that the Russian breakthrough already endangered the retreat. Hitler commanded the army group to hang on and promised to airlift a division to the army group.
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The Russians, however, failed to exploit their success, and Schörner managed to seal off the penetration.

Relief was finally on the way from the south. Army Group Center, commanded by Gen. Hans Reinhardt, prepared an attack to regain contact with Schörner’s forces. This operation envisioned a blow by two powerful armored forces against Soviet divisions in Latvia and Lithuania. One group was to capture Schaulen, and the second would seize Mitau. To cover the northern flank Group Strachwitz, composed of two armored brigades, received orders to advance on Tuckum. The attack began on 16 August. Although the main German forces initially made good progress, they were unable to capture Schaulen or Mitau. Nevertheless, the Soviets were forced to halt attacks against Sixteenth Army in order to parry the German blow.
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Strachwitz’s smaller force, supported by the heavy guns of the navy’s
Second Task Force, captured Tuckum and broke through on the extreme northern flank, opening a passage to Army Group North on 20 August.
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Further attacks in the following days expanded the slim corridor to a width of about twenty miles.

After nearly two months the gap between Third Panzer and Sixteenth armies had been closed. But Eighteenth Army was still in danger, as the Soviets had broken through on both flanks. The Russians captured Dorpat on 26 August and gained bridgeheads over the Embach River, threatening Army Detachment Narva’s rear. Schörner again considered ordering Estonia’s evacuation, fearing Soviet troops advancing on Dorpat would cut off Army Detachment Narva’s line of retreat.
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In the following days, however, Soviet attacks diminished. The summer offensive had run its course. Yet as the crisis of the summer appeared finally to have passed, another catastrophe loomed for Germany, this time in Finland.

Prior to the assault on Army Group Center, the Soviets had launched an offensive against Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus. The Russians attacked on 10 June and quickly gained ground, piercing two of Finland’s three defensive lines on the isthmus in less than a week. Finnish pleas for German assistance met with approval; realizing that the Finns desperately needed help, on 12 June Hitler rescinded the embargo on arms deliveries to Finland. He informed Dönitz that he would support the Finns as long as they continued to fight, but there was a price; he would again block shipments to Finland if they negotiated with the Soviets. German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop arrived unannounced in Helsinki on 22 June to attempt to bind Finland closer to Germany. Four days later President Risto Ryti pledged that he would not negotiate a separate peace with the Soviets without German consent. Once that assurance had been received, ships laden with war materiel streamed into Finnish ports. From 23 June to 3 September Germany sent the Finns 47 tanks and assault guns, 50 antitank guns, 88 artillery pieces with over 184,000 shells, 88 antiaircraft guns, 24,112 antitank grenades
(Panzerfaust),
16,602 bazookas
(Panzerschreck),
and more than four million rounds of ammunition.
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Considering Germany’s catastrophic materiel losses in France, Italy, and Russia throughout the summer of 1944, these were significant deliveries. Mannerheim requested six divisions to reinforce Finnish troops, but the Germans did not have such forces available. Hitler offered what he could, however, ordering Army Group North to send an infantry division to Finland on 20 June.
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German supplies helped but initially could not halt the Soviet attack. On 21 June the Russians captured Vyborg, dealing a serious blow to Finnish morale. A few days later the Soviets again threatened to break through
Finnish lines, but Mannerheim succeeded in repulsing the assault. At the beginning of July the Russians shifted their operations to seizing islands in Vyborg Bay. The division sent from Army Group North arrived in time to repel a Soviet landing on the northern shore of Vyborg Bay. By mid-July the situation had stabilized, and the Finns detected the withdrawal of Soviet divisions from the Karelian Isthmus. The military crisis there had passed.

Politically, however, Finland was still in turmoil. The Finns had not received as much assistance from Germany as they had expected or as much as the Germans had promised, and casualties had been heavy for the small nation.
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Furthermore, Finland’s leaders nervously followed the Red Army’s successes against Army Groups Center and North. At the end of July Soviet pressure forced Army Group North to recall its division from Finland, the only one the Germans had sent.

The day after the fall of Vyborg, on 22 June, the Finns had asked Erik Boheman, secretary-general at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, to inform the Soviets that they were ready to discuss peace. The Russians indicated willingness the next day but demanded that Finland’s president and foreign minister first issue a written statement that Finland was ready to capitulate.
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Dissatisfied with these terms, the Finns fought on. After the front had stabilized, however, Finnish politicians believed that it was time to resume negotiations, for it was unlikely Finland would be able to withstand another attack. Ryti resigned on 31 July, and Mannerheim became president by parliamentary decree on 4 August. The change of government alarmed Hitler, who ordered Schörner to Finland to assure Mannerheim that Army Group North would hold its positions along the Narva Isthmus.
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By this time the army group had been cut off from the rest of the front, however, and it is unlikely that Schörner’s optimistic report eased Mannerheim’s concern. Keitel arrived in Finland for talks with Mannerheim on 17 August, and Finland’s new president explained that he did not consider Ryti’s assurance of late June binding on his government. The Finns realized Germany was in no condition to provide help against a future Soviet attack. The Anglo-Americans had made impressive gains in the West, and in the East the Red Army stood at the gates of Warsaw. News of Romania’s surrender the following week also had a sobering effect.

On 25 August the Finnish legation in Stockholm reestablished contact with the Soviets, and the next day the Finns officially declared the Ryti agreement invalid. Finland’s parliament voted to break off relations with Germany on 2 September and ordered all Nazi troops from its soil by the 15th, two preconditions set by the Soviets before they would receive
a Finnish armistice delegation.
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Finland’s cooperation in the war against the Soviet Union had come to an end.

The events of the summer on the Eastern Front and in Finland brought one disaster after another to Hitler and Dönitz. Both Nazi leaders viewed Finland’s continued participation in the war as crucial. On 15 June Hitler instructed Dönitz to examine how the navy could help the Finns, and the grand admiral commanded Kummetz (Naval High Command, Baltic), to do everything possible to demonstrate Germany’s readiness to aid Finland. Kummetz stated that the Finns did not consider support from German destroyers and torpedo boats necessary; Dönitz nevertheless ordered the dispatch of the cruiser
Prinz Eugen
and torpedo boats to strengthen Finnish resolve, and he emphasized the extraordinary importance of keeping Finland in the war. Dönitz also sent three submarines to the Gulf of Finland to guard against a Soviet landing and decided to withdraw nine artillery barges from Norway, explaining that he was willing to put up with difficulties in Norway to help Finland. He informed Assmann that he had ordered the pocket battleship
Lützow
readied to follow
Prinz Eugen
should the situation require it.
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Heavy German surface vessels lay in readiness at Utö, prepared to intervene against Soviet amphibious operations on Finland’s southern coast. Dönitz insisted that it was vital to strike a blow against Soviet naval forces to deter the Russians at the outset from conducting landing operations.
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