Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (12 page)

On 5 September Natzmer flew to Hitler’s headquarters. Prior to the midday situation conference, Guderian confided that in the long run the
evacuation of the Baltic States was essential, because he needed Army Group North’s divisions to strengthen other sectors of the Eastern Front. Guderian stated that he was trying to convince Hitler of this and ordered Natzmer to make preparations for the withdrawal in secret. Although Guderian did not mention a possible evacuation during the conference with Hitler, afterward he again instructed Natzmer to begin preparations. The following day Natzmer visited Army Detachment Narva and Eighteenth Army and informed them that although Hitler still wanted to defend the present front, the situation in Finland could lead to the evacuation of the Baltic States at any time. Guderian again commanded the army group to make concrete preparations for the withdrawal, although he refused to put the order in writing.
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As a precautionary measure Schörner ordered the construction or improvement of several defensive positions in the army group’s rear area: the Estland–West Position, running east to west on a line from the northern tip of Lake Wirz to the Gulf of Riga south of Pernau; the Wenden Position, an arc sixty miles east of Riga; the Segewold Position, ten miles closer to Riga than the Wenden Position; and the Mitau–Ost Position, a line twenty miles south of Riga joining the Wenden Position at the Düna River.
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On 9 September Schörner notified Keitel that he had briefed Army Detachment Narva regarding evacuation measures for Estonia. A few days later OKH instructed the army group to accelerate its preparations so that the withdrawal, its code name now changed to “Aster,” could begin three days after receipt of the order.
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The arrangements for Aster, especially the construction of defensive positions, had not been ordered a moment too soon.

Stavka planned a major offensive to clear the Baltic States of German forces and capture Riga. The Soviets intended first to isolate Army Group North and then to split up and destroy its formations. Finland’s withdrawal from the war facilitated this purpose, enabling the Russians to shift troops from Karelia to strengthen Leningrad Front. Stavka’s plan called for Leningrad Front to attack to the north in the Dorpat sector and fall upon Army Detachment Narva’s rear. Joined by units thrusting across the Narva Isthmus, Soviet forces would then sweep along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Second and Third Baltic fronts, having Riga as their ultimate goal, were to break through Eighteenth Army’s defenses and dash to the Gulf of Riga, cutting off the retreat of Eighteenth Army and Army Detachment Narva. First Baltic Front’s mission was to drive on Riga and the Gulf, thereby isolating all German troops north and east of the city. The size and extent of this offensive demonstrate Stavka’s determination to inflict a deathblow to Army Group North.
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MAP
4.
THE RETREAT FROM ESTONIA

The three Baltic fronts opened the offensive on 14 September, simultaneously attacking toward Riga. Schörner soon warned OKH that although his troops had prevented a breakthrough, he had been forced to commit his reserves on the first day. Fearing the worst, he alerted his senior commanders that the order for Aster could be given the following day. The next morning Schörner pleaded with Guderian to secure Hitler’s approval for Aster, arguing that this was the last chance to save his army group. He also phoned Wenck, now head of OKH’s Command Group
(Führungsgruppe),
and repeated this request, insisting the decision be made that day.
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Wenck suggested that he come to East Prussia to help persuade Hitler to
order Aster at once. Schörner met with Hitler the following day, and he must have been convincing, for only fifteen minutes after the conference began Schörner notified the army group of Hitler’s approval.
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Hitler’s consent, however, was conditional—he insisted that the withdrawal not begin for two days, during which time he could revoke the command.

Hitler never had a chance to exercise his option. Leningrad Front launched its offensive on 17 September and immediately scored a breakthrough near Dorpat. Schörner authorized Aster to begin at once and informed Guderian that whether the retreat had been sanctioned or not was now irrelevant, because the Soviet breakthrough had forced the measure. The army group instructed Army Detachment Narva to begin its retreat on the evening of 18 September, and Hitler approved Schörner’s order the next day.
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In the south, pressure against Riga mounted. Bauske fell on 16 September, and Schörner ordered Sixteenth Army back to the Mitau–Ost Position, although the Soviets had already captured some sectors of this line. An attack conducted by Army Group Center from 16 to 18 September, intended to expand the corridor linking the army groups, made little head-way but eased the tension at Riga by forcing Bagramian to divert units to stop the German assault. To gain forces to bolster the line near the Latvian capital and to launch an attack against the Soviets near Mitau, Schörner obtained permission to retreat to the Segewold Position on 20 September.
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In the north, Aster proceeded according to a drastically accelerated timetable. Most troops crossed the Estland–West Position from 21 to 23 September, although some units withdrew to bridgeheads around Estonian ports to await evacuation by sea. The last German ship left Reval on 22 September, and Pernau was evacuated the next day.
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Since by this time Schörner had received permission to continue the retreat past the Wenden Position to the Segewold Position, on the night of 26 September the Germans withdrew to this line.
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Army Group North had successfully completed Aster.

In the meantime the situation at Riga had reached crisis proportions. On 22 September the Soviets captured Baldone, scarcely fifteen miles south of the Latvian capital, and also broke through Eighteenth Army’s front near Walk. The SS division “Nordland,” which arrived from the Narva front that day, rushed into action and managed to prevent a Soviet breakthrough south of Riga. To make matters worse, the army group’s shortage of ammunition, troops, and aircraft fuel persisted. Guderian promised Natzmer that all available ammunition was on the way and declared that the army group’s only chance was to continue to retreat—the sooner the better. Schörner
commanded Third Panzer and Sixteenth armies to hold their positions while Eighteenth Army fell back to the Segewold Position.
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Hitler summoned Schörner to East Prussia on 28 September to discuss future operations. The Führer still wanted an attack to remove the Schaulen–Mitau salient, but Schörner insisted that he could not assemble sufficient forces for this if he remained in the Segewold Position. Hitler finally agreed to a retreat to the Tuckum Position, west of Riga, but only after the army group carried out an attack to smash Soviet forces near Schaulen. To gain forces for this operation, code-named “Blitz,” Hitler allowed Schörner to withdraw to the Riga–Ost Position. Hitler ordered the army group to continue preparations for the attack and also to reinforce its garrison on the Baltic Isles.
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For the Soviets, the September offensive had produced results exactly the opposite from its intention. Instead of being splintered, Army Group North, weakened but still intact, had withdrawn its northern flank and reduced its front by nearly half. In addition, Schörner had concentrated his strength around Riga, making Soviet attempts to capture the city more difficult than when the offensive began. This required a change in plan, and Stavka decided to shift the direction of the attack westward to the Baltic coast. The new plan called for First Baltic Front to attack Third Panzer Army and thrust to the sea near Memel. At the same time, Second and Third Baltic fronts were to break through the Segewold Position, seize Riga, and clear the Baltic coast up to Libau. In a separate operation, Leningrad Front received orders to capture the Baltic Isles by amphibious assault. To prevent the Germans from sending reserves to the Memel area, Third Belorussian Front would tie down German forces with an attack into East Prussia. Stalin displayed great interest in arrangements for this offensive and discussed preparations with Marshal A. M. Vasilevskii, Stavka’s representative to the Baltic fronts.
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From 30 September through 4 October the front remained relatively calm. The Germans prepared for Riga’s evacuation, readying its factories, bridges, and port installations for demolition. Rear-area services transferred westward into Courland, and Estonian troops, plus Estonians capable of military service, boarded ships for the Reich to re-form their units. At the end of September the army group’s deployment invited an assault against Third Panzer Army. Eighteenth and Sixteenth armies occupied the front from the Segewold Position to the Aa River with their tightly packed formations. Army Detachment Grasser (formerly Army Detachment Narva), on either side of Doblen, defended the junction between Sixteenth and Third Panzer armies. Third Panzer Army, stripped of all but one of its armored divisions, held a long, winding front from east of Moscheiken to the Memel River with only a handful of divisions.
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The army group detected the buildup of Soviet forces opposite Third Panzer Army but assumed that the Russians would require considerable time before they could launch an assault. Schörner ordered the accelerated delivery of reinforcements to this sector, yet he believed that the Russians could not complete regrouping before mid-October.
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MAP
5.
THE WITHDRAWAL TO COURLAND
(
FRONT LINE
10
OCTOBER
1944)

The Soviets, however, unleashed their offensive on 5 October, catching the Germans off guard. The Russians shattered Third Panzer Army’s defenses, ripping a fifty-kilometer gap in the front in the first forty-eight hours. On 10 October spearheads of the Soviet Fifty-first Army reached the Baltic coast at Polangen, a small port twenty miles north of Memel. Army Group North again had been cut off from land contact with the rest of the front—this time for good.

As the Soviets surged toward the Baltic, Army Group North acquired an exposed southern front that grew longer by the hour. To avoid encirclement in the congested area around Riga, the army group had to form a southern front in Courland and protect Libau, the only port capable of handling the army group’s supply. To this end, Schörner flew to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October and secured permission to retreat to Courland. “Thunder,” the withdrawal to the Riga–Ost Position, had been completed the previous day. It was now to be followed by “Rain,” a retreat to the Aa Position, and “Sunshine,” a final jump to the Tuckum Position.
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The retreat proceeded at an accelerated rate. The army group had canceled preparations for Blitz on 6 October and shifted Eighteenth Army to the area east of Libau to coordinate the establishment of a southern front. German divisions freed in the course of the retreat raced to the west to halt the Soviet drive on Libau. Shortly after noon on 17 October Sixteenth Army occupied the Tuckum Position. The withdrawal to Courland had been completed exactly one month after the order for Aster had been given.
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In the meantime, Schörner prepared an attack Hitler had ordered to regain contact with Army Group Center. This operation envisioned a thrust along the coast to link up with the besieged garrison of Memel, followed by a breakthrough attack to East Prussia. The army group coordinated its plans with the navy, which pledged to support the assault with artillery from heavy warships. Dönitz demonstrated keen interest in this operation, assigning a pocket battleship and a heavy cruiser to it.
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As Schörner assembled his forces, however, the Soviets once more thwarted his intentions by launching an attack of their own, on 16 October, two days before the breakthrough operation was scheduled to begin. The Russians struck Eighteenth Army between Skuodas and Moscheiken and attacked near Doblen, at the junction of Army Detachment Grasser and Sixteenth Army. The Germans managed to prevent a breakthrough, but the divisions assembled for the attack to Memel were drawn into the battle. Schörner
could not attempt the attack to the south until he halted the Soviet assault. In addition, the Russians also launched an offensive into East Prussia, compelling Army Group Center to commit its armored reserves.