Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (13 page)

On 18 October OKH reviewed Army Group North’s status in relation to the overall, continually deteriorating, situation on the Eastern Front. Army planners believed that Schörner’s army group was essential to fending off Soviet attacks on Germany itself. Earlier that month Guderian complained that Germany had suffered over 360,000 unreplaced losses on the Eastern Front in September alone. Bonin concluded that Schörner could not attempt the attack to Memel as long as the army group held its current positions. The Soviet offensive in East Prussia, which particularly worried Bonin, prevented Army Group Center from mounting an operation to relieve Schörner as it had done in August. Bonin thus devised another solution to extricate Schörner’s forces. First, the entire army group would withdraw into bridgeheads around the ports of Libau and Windau. Troops in the smaller Windau bridgehead would be evacuated by sea, and Schörner’s main force would attack from Libau toward Memel. After the creation of a broad bridgehead around Memel, Army Group North would give up its positions around Libau and mount another operation to regain contact with Third Panzer Army.
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Bonin flew to Courland the next day to meet with Schörner and Natzmer. Schörner complained that his main concern was the shortage of weapons and the weakened state of his divisions. Bonin asked whether the army group, under current conditions, could defend its present front in the long run. Schörner replied in the affirmative, provided that no forces were withdrawn and that OKH guaranteed the army group’s supply. The three officers concurred that the withdrawal of any divisions would jeopardize the army group’s ability to maintain its present front, and they further agreed that an attack along the coast to Memel had little chance of success under prevailing circumstances. They also sketched out a slightly altered version of Bonin’s plan to bring Schörner’s forces back to the Reich. This proposal suggested that the army group withdraw into a bridgehead only around Libau, where Schörner could assemble a powerful assault force to break through to Memel. Once this had been accomplished, Schörner would abandon the Libau bridgehead and attack into East Prussia.
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Hitler rejected this solution and the following day ordered Schörner to go over to the defense along his present front in Courland and to ready several divisions for evacuation by sea. Schörner, however, did not give up his intention to break through to Memel. On 25 October he submitted plans for another attack to the south, assuring Hitler that the offensive had good
prospects of success as long as no divisions were withdrawn from Courland.
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Yet the next day OKH reported that Hitler had refused Schörner’s plan, “in view of the overall situation on the Eastern Front.” This final proposal to break through to Memel denied, Army Group North went over to the defense in Courland, with a coastal front of about 320 kilometers and a land front approximately 250 kilometers in length.
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There the army group remained until Germany’s capitulation in May 1945.

As enemy armies approached and finally entered German territory from both east and west, Dönitz grew increasingly desperate. In the West, the navy lost its best Atlantic U-boat bases when the Allies drove the Germans from France. In the East his greatest concern was the Soviet advance upon ports along the Baltic, and on several occasions in September and October he actively intervened in decisions regarding Army Group North’s operations in an attempt to hold the Russians as far as possible from the Baltic Sea. Dönitz traveled to Hitler’s headquarters on 15 September because he had been alerted to a forthcoming decision about Army Group North’s proposed retreat from Estonia. Voss had first warned Dönitz on 12 September, when he reported that Guderian had suggested the withdrawal to Hitler earlier that day. Aware that Army Group North’s retreat was also of decisive importance to the navy, Voss advised Dönitz’s presence at the
Wolfsschanze
(or Wolf’s Lair, Hitler’s headquarters in East Prussia, present-day Poland) on the 15th if at all possible. Probably seeking a way to prevent the withdrawal, the next day Wagner phoned the Skl from the
Wolfsschanze,
requesting data on the importance of Estonian oil.
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Later on the 16th Kummetz reported that Army Group North had already issued orders to begin the evacuation of Estonia the next day. This information caught the Skl unawares, and Wagner investigated the matter, only to discover that although OKH had not yet ordered the retreat, the evacuation presumably would take place. Kummetz pointed out the decisive importance of maintaining fighter bases near Libau and Windau should Army Group North withdraw. The Skl notified the Luftwaffe’s operations staff of the need for fighter aircraft to protect supply and evacuation transports as well as U-boat bases.
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At the end of September the Skl issued new instructions for naval warfare in the eastern Baltic. This directive took into account radical changes resulting from Finland’s withdrawal from the war, the evacuation of Estonia, and the loss of Swedish waters for shipping—for on 26 September Sweden had closed its territorial waters in the Baltic to foreign vessels. In addition, for the first time since 1941 the navy seriously had to consider the possibility
of the Soviet fleet’s emergence from the Gulf of Finland. The Skl had based its planning on the assumption that Riga and the Baltic Isles would remain in German hands, although the loss of these areas, plus the likelihood of increased tension with Sweden, was not ruled out. Despite these changes the Skl persisted in regarding its primary goal in this theater as continuing to blockade the Soviet fleet inside the Gulf of Finland. To fulfill this task the Skl intended to maintain the mine barrages by sowing new minefields to close any gaps the Soviets cleared. The deployment of U-boats at the exits to the Gulf of Finland to observe the location of Soviet mine-clearing activity thus received increased importance. To support the minefields’ guardians, as well as to engage in a timely manner Soviet vessels attempting to break out, the Skl ordered torpedo boats, motor torpedo boats, and destroyers held in readiness as close as possible to the minefields. Libau and Windau served this purpose well. In addition, the navy decided to hold a powerful cruiser task force ready to intervene at any time.
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Although these precautions consisted of potential engagements in coastal regions, the Skl warned that Soviet aircraft and submarines could now to threaten the entire central Baltic, endangering German shipping and training areas. The main focus of coastal protection was assigned to the Baltic States, since the Skl doubted the Russians would attempt landing operations far from the front lines. Clearly distressed over the loss of the army’s front on the Gulf of Finland, the Skl noted on 2 October that Army Group North had retreated “despite great disadvantages for the war at sea and the situation in general.”
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As German armies withdrew and the Soviets approached the Baltic, several problems arose, or resurfaced, for the navy. The Skl was confronted with decisions regarding the defense of the island of Tütters, the possible evacuation of the Schörner’s entire army group by sea, artillery support in coastal areas, and the supply of isolated army units. On 9 October Conrady had alerted the Skl that the Soviet thrust to the Baltic could require the navy once more to supply Army Group North by sea.
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Courland’s ports of Libau and Windau figured prominently in decisions affecting the army group, especially regarding its supply. The importance of these ports had first arisen in the summer, when they became vulnerable in the wake of Army Group Center’s collapse. Dönitz had immediately ordered naval personnel placed at the army’s disposal, including all naval troops earmarked for Tanne, and instructed naval forces based on land to defend ports to the end. The Skl had declared that the retention of a bridgehead in northern Courland, including Windau, was essential to controlling the Irben Straits.
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The Germans had to dominate these straits if
the army group was to receive supplies through Riga. At the beginning of August, shortly after Army Group North’s isolation east of Riga, Model commanded Third Panzer Army to protect Libau and Windau and to prevent a Soviet advance along the coast to the Irben Straits. Army Group Center also ordered Third Panzer Army to regard Libau and Windau as fortresses and to lay in three months’ supplies. Third Panzer Army considered this senseless and protested that if the army had to retreat, it could not detach forces strong enough to hold out on their own for three months. After Third Panzer Army had been attached to Army Group North, its chief of staff mentioned to Natzmer that although both ports had been stocked with supplies, they still officially had not been declared fortified sites. Natzmer replied that it would be best not to draw attention to this matter; Natzmer obviously had no interest in defending Libau or Windau at this point. In October, however, when the Soviets threatened to sever the land link to East Prussia and the army group planned to evacuate Riga, the army and navy agreed upon the importance of the ports, particularly Libau. On 7 October OKH instructed the army group to view both cities as fortresses.
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After 10 October the army group, now entirely dependent upon supply by sea, realized that these ports collectively represented its sole lifeline to the Reich.

Another source of distress for the navy concerned provisions for the army group’s evacuation if the Soviets again isolated Schörner’s forces east of Riga. On 6 September, the navy’s liaison officer to OKH reported that Guderian had requested information on available transport space and the time required to evacuate Army Group North by sea. Based upon Conrady’s estimate of the army group’s strength at 520,000 men, the Skl’s shipping department concluded that to evacuate the troops, without their horses or equipment, would require approximately five weeks and the use of all suitable naval vessels. If the army group’s horses and artillery were also transported, the evacuation would last eight weeks. Finally, if the army group brought out all of its equipment the operation would take five months. The Skl declared, however, that fuel was available only for the evacuation of the troops.
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Yet the day after Hitler ordered the army group to go over to the defense in Courland, the Skl issued “revised” figures on the navy’s transport capabilities.
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The appearance of Soviet troops along the coast also led to increased demands by the army for warships to bombard coastal sectors, and on several occasions surface vessels supported the land fighting with their heavy guns. Light naval vessels repeatedly assisted the army group, shelling Soviet positions along the Gulf of Riga and south of Libau. Support from the Second
Task Force, however, required fighter protection, and Schörner often preferred to have the available aircraft at his disposal for other missions. Dönitz demonstrated his willingness to help the army by ordering a reduction in naval cadet training cycles, so that nearly all of the surface fleet remained operational.
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At the end of October Meisel issued instructions stating that the fleet’s main task lay in the Baltic: to support ground forces by coastal bombardment and to protect the army’s supply routes. The navy cautioned the army, however, not to expect the type of support that Anglo-American warships had provided their invasion force in Normandy, because Germany did not possess air superiority in the area, nor did it have adequate antisubmarine protection.
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The evacuation of Estonia also signified the final loss of the shale oil deposits. One hindrance to the army group’s secret preparations to withdraw from Estonia was that it was difficult to disguise arrangements for the evacuation of economic goods. This was especially true in the case of the shale oil works, because the installations were not under the army group’s control and preparations would have alerted the populace to what was afoot. Once Hitler had consented to Aster on 16 September, Schörner immediately ordered evacuation measures for the shale oil works to begin. OKH ordered the destruction of all oil installations and the withdrawal of as much valuable machinery as possible.
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In response to Wagner’s query about the importance of Estonian oil for the navy, the Skl replied that it was not decisive, due to relatively plentiful stocks of fuel oil. Kummetz, however, disagreed. In mid-August he had reported that because of increased demands upon his forces, Germany must retain the shale oil works if he was to carry out his tasks.
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A long-standing disagreement between the army and navy concerning the island of Tütters provides an interesting example of interservice tension on the northern sector. Tütters formed the southern, and Hogland the northern, anchor for the
Seeigel
mine barrage in the Gulf of Finland. The island had been seized in April 1942,
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and almost from the moment of its capture the army and navy had squabbled over which was responsible for its defense. At the end of August 1943 Eighteenth Army had requested the navy to take over the island’s protection. Despite Army Group North’s insistence that possession of the island was more helpful in blockading the Soviet fleet than for coastal protection, OKH informed the army group that Hitler had explicitly ordered that Tütters remain attached to the army.
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A few days later Heusinger sent the army group a report from the army’s liaison officer with the navy. He also enclosed a letter to the army group chief of staff in which he claimed that the navy was relieved that it was not
responsible for Tütters’s defense. Heusinger suggested that Kinzel should request additional naval support for the island’s defense, so that the navy later could not blame the army if Tütters were lost and the Soviet fleet entered the Baltic. As Heusinger advised, the army group asked for increased naval participation to defend the island.
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