Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 (50 page)

That was Manstein—bold, quick of decision, and with a sure eye for the situation as a whole. His plan cut across the enemy's intentions. For General Kuznetsov was withdrawing his Soviet Fifty-first Army towards the south-east, in accordance with orders, to offer resistance at Feodosiya and Kerch.

General Petrov's coastal Army was utterly disorganized. It no longer had contact with its High Command, and hence it had no order for a withdrawal. Petrov assembled all his commanders, chiefs of staffs, and commissars of divisions and brigades at the headquarters of 95th Rifle Division in Ekibash. There was much heated discussion. Everybody was afraid to take the responsibility. Eventually it was decided to withdraw to the south, to defend Sevastopol.

That was exactly how Manstein expected the Soviets to react when he sketched out his plan at the Askaniya Nova farm. "Any questions, gentlemen?"

"None, Herr General!"

"Very well, you'll see to everything, Busse. I'm driving to XXX Corps."

Heels clicked. Outside, in the courtyard, the engine of the command car sprang into life. The radio transmitters moved off. The mobile headquarters section, the advanced command post of Eleventh Army, was moving off to the front.

As Manstein arrived at XXX Corps the message had just arrived that Major-General Wolff's 22nd Infantry Division, a former airborne division and hence somewhat better equipped with motor vehicles, had already organized its own motorized vanguard detachment from sappers, anti-tank gunners, Army anti-aircraft guns, infantry, and artillery. This force, commanded by Major Pretz, had already driven past Taganash to the road and railway junction of Dzhankoy.

On 1st November Colonel Ziegler's combat group took Simferopol. Together with the reconnaissance detachment of 22nd Infantry Division under Lieutenant-Colonl von Bod-dien, it then penetrated over the mountains down to the south coast at Yalta, cutting off strong forces of the Soviet coastal Army still streaming back towards Sevastopol.

In the eastern part of the Crimea the 46th Infantry Division reached the isthrrtus of Parpach and blocked it before the bulk of the Soviet formations got there. On 3rd November the regiments of 170th Infantry Division took the town and harbour of Feodosiya. In fierce fighting the 46th and 170th Infantry Divisions burst through the isthmus of Parpach.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thilo, the commander of 401st Infantry Regiment, and his adjutant, Lieutenant von Prott, were killed in front of the strongpoints and wire obstacles. Casualties were heavy. The companies were down to twenty or at the most thirty men. But the victory was complete. Only the Soviet Army headquarters personnel and some defeated formations without heavy weapons succeeded in escaping to the mainland by way of the Kerch road. On 15th November the strongly fortified town of Kerch was captured.

The advanced detachment of 22nd Infantry Division under Major Pretz was also advancing according to time-table. Bypassing Simferopol, it drove into the craggy Yayla Mountains. The men, though unused to mountain conditions, acquitted themselves admirably. In cooperation with 124th Infantry Regiment, 72nd Infantry Division, they took Alushta and surrounded a Soviet cavalry division. Yalta, the famous harbour and seaside resort, the Monte Carlo of the Black Sea, was occupied.

Lieutenant-Colonel Müller with his 105th Infantry Regiment, 72nd Infantry Division, turned along the coast road to the west, towards Sevastopol, and with a bold stroke took Balaclava, the southernmost bastion of the fortress.

Everything seemed to be going according to plan.

The 50th and 132nd Infantry Divisions of LIX Corps, coming from the north, were likewise pressing against the Sevastopol approaches. But abruptly Soviet resistance stiffened. Soviet naval infantry and fortress artillery, intact crack units, including the officer cadets of 79th Officer Aspirant Brigade from Novorossiysk, intervened in the fighting.

They did not yield an inch. It became obvious that with the available combat-weary German regiments Sevastopol could not be taken by surprise attack. Manstein was denied the ultimate prize of victory.

But even though Eleventh Army's pursuit lacked the crowning glory of a rapid fall of Sevastopol, the vigorous offensive spirit of its formations had nevertheless brought about the virtual annihilation of the enemy in the field. Twelve rifle divisions and four cavalry divisions had been largely destroyed. Six German infantry divisions took over 100,000 prisoners and destroyed or captured more than 700 guns and 160 tanks.

From 16th November 1941 onward Eleventh Army was faced with the task of taking the last enemy bulwark in the Crimea, one of the strongest naval fortresses in the world, by attack from the landward side. Sevastopol had to fall

—one way or another. It was not enough to bypass the huge naval fortress with its extensive port or to seal it off merely on the landward side. For that would enable Stalin, at any time he chose, to mount amphibious operations against the flank of the German Eastern Front. The time had therefore come to prepare a systematic attack against the fortress. Nothing must be left to chance. The correct employment of artillery and its. supply with ammunition was one of the key problems in this operation, next to the final sealing off of the fortress on the landward side.

The kind of preliminary work done by the artillery is illustrated by a typical scene at the batteries of 22nd Infantry Division north-east of Sevastopol. Sergeant Pleyer had just emptied the rain-water from a rusty food-tin, which stood underneath a leaky spot in the roof of the ancient Russian wooden dugout, when the telephone rang.

"Dora Two," Pleyer said into the instrument. Dora Two was the headquarters of 22nd Artillery Regiment. It was

situated in the notorious Belbek Valley, on Hill 304, close to the small village of Syuren. The distance to Sevastopol was 17 miles.

The voice at the other end identified itself as Albatross Three. "I'm listening," said Pleyer. And repeating every word slowly he wrote down the message: "Last night eight girls arrived without baskets. Message ends."

"Message understood. Out." Pleyer replaced the receiver and picked up a green file from the shelf by the telephone. The instrument rang again.

This time the caller was Heron Five. And Heron Five had an even more curious message for Pleyer than Albatross Three. Instead of eight girls having arrived without baskets, this time it was "Gerda bombarded with cake by organist."

Sergeant Pleyer did not laugh. Solemnly he wrote down the message, repeating, ". . . with cake by organist."

There was a constant string of this kind of message. They came from the forward observers of muzzle-flash and sound-ranging teams belonging to the batteries. Their messages about the Soviet gun positions located by them in the

Sevastopol fortress area had to be passed in code because in the difficult mountainous area the Russians time and again succeeded in tapping the German telephone-lines. For that reason code names had been given to calibres, geographical features, battery emplacements, troop units, and the German observer posts; these then resulted in such curious combinations as "girls arriving without baskets," or "Gerda being bombarded with cake by the organist." The information was entered in the ranging-cards at the artillery command posts. Every identified gun, every observer post, and every strong-point was carefully entered and accurately ranged. Thus the gunners were familiar with all important targets. In this way the fortress and its approaches were ceaselessly probed, reconnoitred, and plotted.

The kind of thing we have witnessed at Dora Two was going on at all command posts throughout Eleventh Army towards the end of November. They worked feverishly. Manstein wanted to take Sevastopol by Christmas. Eleventh Army had to be freed as soon as possible for its next task— the advance to the Caucasus. It could not afford to be tied down in the Crimea for months on end. For that reason Manstein concentrated all the forces he had on the attack against Sevastopol.

By difficult mountain fighting, in which Eleventh Army was now able to use also the newly arrived Rumanian 1st Mountain Brigade, the gap between the left wing of LIV Corps and XXX Corps in the Yayla Mountains was closed. But the four divisions which stood east of the fortress at the end of November were hardly enough for a final attack. As everywhere throughout the entire Russian campaign, forces too small numerically were again faced with objectives too great for them. As a result, Manstein had to accept the risk of denuding the exposed Kerch Peninsula apart from a single division—the 46th Infantry Division. That meant that the 185 miles of coastline were guarded by virtually no more than reinforced field pickets. What would happen if the Russians landed at Kerch? Manstein just had to hope for the best. He had every confidence in the commander of XLII Army Corps, Count Sponeck, an experienced and energetic general, and in his 46th Infantry Division.

On 17th December everything was ready for the attack on Sevastopol. At first light the guns of all calibres opened up along the entire 12-mile front of LIV Corps. General von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps again played its part in the operation. His ground-attack aircraft and dive-bombers attacked Soviet fortifications and gun emplacements. The first battle of Sevastopol had begun.

The town was in flames. It was to be taken from the north. The main weight of the attack was in the sector of 22nd Infantry Division, forming the right wing of LIV Corps. Alongside it were 132nd, 24th, and 50th Infantry Divisions. The grenadiers of 16th Infantry Regiment charged up the slopes of the Belbek Valley and made deep penetrations in the Soviet lines.

The 2nd Battalion penetrated as far as the notorious Kamyshly Gorge, and in a daring thrust gained the commanding height of Hill 192. Exhausted, and thinned out by heavy casualties, the platoons dropped down among the scrub.

Together with units of 132nd Infantry Division, its neighboring formation on the south, the 16th Infantry Regiment cleared the enemy out of the glacis and drove right against the fortified zone proper south of the Belbek Valley. The assault battalions of 132nd Infantry Division, superbly supported by mine mortars of the assault sappers, gained no

more than four miles in the first day of the attack. Even the terrifying "Stukas on foot" were unable to break the tough resistance of the gallant defenders.

Farther to the right, on the ridge of high ground, the battalions of 65th Infantry Regiment were fighting their way forward through pill-boxes and wire obstacles in an icy winter wind. They gained ground only slowly.

On the extreme right, in the sector of 47th Infantry Regiment and the Rumanian Motorized Regiment, the companies had been stuck for the past three days in front of the fortifications of the Kacha Valley under murderous defensive fire. Conditions were frightful.

On 21st December, in the sector of 47th Infantry Regiment, 22nd Infantry Division, Captain Winnefeld swept his company with him out of the inferno. Things could not possibly be worse: if they stayed where they were they would certainly be killed. If they charged they might possibly have a chance of surviving.

"Forward!" Into the Russian trenches! Hand-grenades— trenching-tools—machine pistols! Kill or be killed! The 3rd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment, likewise charged and broke into the Russian lines. On the coast the squadrons of Reconnaissance Detachment 22 and 6th Company "Brandenburg" Special Purpose Regiment seized the most forward Soviet strongpoint.

Then began a frightful tearing and clawing at the Soviet defences. At last, on 23rd December, 22nd Infantry Division reached the north-south road to the fortress with Colonel von Choltitz's 16th Infantry Regiment. The outer ring of fortifications around Sevastopol was in German hands.

But Sevastopol was tough. From the twin turrets of the underground heavy armoured battery "Maxim Gorkiy" the defenders pumped their 30'5-cm. shells into the German positions. Pillboxes and machine-gun posts were belching fire.

In this inferno the German troops spent Christmas Eve.

There were no candles, no church bells, and no letters. For many there was not even a plateful of hot food. Progress by 24th and 132nd Infantry Divisions was only step by step. Well-aimed Soviet mortar-fire was battering

German reserves in the clearings among the scrub and on the road. The defenders were solidly established in earth and timber dug-outs which had to be knocked out one by one. Thus the attack was reduced to a multitude of separate actions. The battalions of 24th Infantry Division literally killed themselves fighting. The only progress made was in the sector of 22nd Infantry Division.

On 28th December, at 0700 hours, the weary men of 22nd and 24th Infantry Divisions rallied for the final assault against the core of the fortress. The regimental commanders were sitting at their field telephones, receiving their orders.

"All-out effort," was the order. "The fortress must fall by New Year's Eve!" By New Year's Eve. So off they went.

Anyone who was in this action flinches to this day at the mere thought of it. They were appalling battles for 65th, 47th, and 16th Infantry Regiments.

Colonel von Choltitz with his 16th Regiment was in the very heart of the attack. By nightfall of 28th December his assault troops had worked their way close to the powerful Fort Stalin, which commanded the northern sector outside Sevastopol. If this fort could be smashed the road would be open to Severnaya Bay, the huge harbour of Sevastopol. And whoever commanded the bay could strangle the fortress.