Hitler (156 page)

28. ADAP XII, 2, p. 892.

29. Gisevius,
Adolf Hitler,
p. 471. On Hitler's depressed mood during the period before the beginning of the campaign, which was in such striking contrast to the optimism of the military leaders, see, for example, Walter Schellenberg,
Memoiren,
pp. 179 f.

30. Thus to the British ambassador, cited in Jacobsen,
Aussenpolitik,
p. 377.

31. KTB/OKW I, p. 341.

32. Halder,
Kriegstagebuch
II, pp. 335 ff.

33. Cf. Krausnick, “Judenverfolgung,” in:
Anatomie des SS-Staates
II, pp. 363 ff., with further references to sources. Hitler personally edited the text of the assignment for Himmler and ordered it included in the High Command of the armed forces directive for March 13, 1941; cf. KTB/ OKW I, pp. 340 ff. Further to that assignment see Walter Warlimont,
Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht,
pp. 167 ff.

34. Cf. Nuremberg Document NOKW-1692, reprinted in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener,” in:
Anatomie des SS-Staates
II, pp. 223 f. The “commissar order” is printed
ibid.,
pp. 225 ff. See also the testimonies of the generals at Nuremberg, IMT XX, pp. 635, 663; IMT XXVI, pp. 406 ff., and XXXIV, pp. 252 ff., 191 ff.

35. IMT XXXVIII, pp. 86 ff. (221-L). Along the same lines Rosenberg informed the “most intimate participants in the Eastern problem” on June 20, 1941 : “From today on we are not waging a crusade against Bolshevism solely to save the poor Russians from this Bolshevism for all time to come, but rather we are doing so in order to further German world policy and to secure the German Reich.” Cf. IMT XXVI, p. 614 (1058-PS).

36. Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, Nuremberg Documents IV, pp. 312 if.; further data in Helmut Krausnick, “Judenverfolgung,” pp. 367 f.

37. Thus to Japanese Ambassador Oshima on July 15, 1941; cited in Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
I, pp. 600 ff. For Halder's note see his
Kriegstagebuch
III, p. 38.

38. See Alexander Dallin,
German Rule in Russia 1941–1945,
p. 62. For the shift in emphasis in the armaments program and for the planning of the return march from the Soviet Union, cf. Directive 32 b of July 14, 1941, printed in Walther Hubatsch,
Hitlers Weisungen,
pp. 136 ff., and KTB/ OKW I, pp. 1022 ff.

39.
Hitler's Table Talk,
p. 44. For the intended fate of Leningrad and Moscow, see Halder,
Kriegstagebuch
III, p. 53;
Tischgespräche,
p. 251; Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
I, p. 643; KTB/OKW I, pp. 1021, 1070; Zoller,
Hitler privat,
p. 143. In his speech of November 8, 1941, Hitler also declared that Leningrad would not be captured, but starved out; see Domarus, p. 1775. A detailed prognosis for the annihilation of the city was elaborated in an order issued by Admiral Kurt Fricke, naval chief of staff, dated September 29, 1941: “It is planned to surround the city in a close encirclement and level it to the ground by bombardment with artillery of all calibers and by continual bombing from the air. Pleas for surrender resulting from the city's predicament will be rejected, since the problem of sheltering and feeding the population cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war for our existence we can have no interest in preserving even a part of this urban population.” Cited in: Michaelis and Schraepler XVII, pp. 380 ff.

40. Cf., for example, the references in various conversations in Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
I, pp. 64, 594, 619, 628. According to Halder, Marshal Coulaincourt's memoirs of the campaign of 1812 were withdrawn from circulation in the winter of 1941–42. See Dallin,
German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945.

41. Halder,
Kriegstagebuch
III, p. 295; also Hillgruber,
Strategie,
pp. 551 f. The following spring Hitler once more declared that he would have “gladly waged this war against Bolshevism with the British navy and air force as partners.” See
Tischgespräche,
p. 244.

42. KTB/OKW IV, 2, p. 1503.

43. In conversations with Swedish Foreign Minister ScaVenius and with Croatian Foreign Minister Lorkoviĉ. Cited in Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
I, pp. 657, 661.

44. To Ambassador Oshima on July 15, 1941, cited in
ibid.,
p. 605. For the opinion of Brauchitsch see Goebbels,
Tagebücher 1942–43,
p. 132. Hitler did commute General von Sponeck's death sentence to imprisonment, but two and a half years later, after the attempted assassination of July 20, 1944, the Gestapo turned up at Germersheim Fortress and made short work of shooting the general.

45. Goebbels,
Tagebücher 1942–43,
p. 133.

46. Franz Halder,
Hitler als Feldherr,
pp. 50, 52. As Speer (p. 239) reports, the ascent of Mount Elbrus was one cause of Hitler's vexation. He took a characteristically exaggerated view: “For hours he raged as if his entire plan of campaign had been ruined by this bit of sport.”

47. See Speer, p. 287. In a personal communication Speer has informed the author: “As I have now learned from a member of the RAF staff, there were technical obstacles to carrying out the concept of paralyzing vital segments of industry. There was, for example, the impossibility of finding the target at night, over great distances, by electronic means, and of course there was the inadequate range of the fighter escorts for the American daylight bombers. These bombers had tried to attack Schweinfurt by day without escort, but had to take excessively heavy losses. All that changed in 1944.” About one-third of the German capacity to wage war was dependent on the production of synthetic gasoline; the air force relied on that source for all its fuel. See Hillgruber,
Strategie,
pp. 420 f.

48. Churchill, speech at the Mansion House, November 10, 1942.

49. See Domarus, pp. 1935, 1937 f., 1941.

50.
Ibid.,
p. 1937.

51. Speer, pp. 245 f.; also Warlimont, pp. 284 f.

52. Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 126 ff.

53. Gibson,
The Ciano Diaries,
p. 556; also Goebbels,
Tagebücher 1942—43,
p. 126, and Speer, p. 302.

54. Goebbels,
Tagebücher 1942–43,
p. 241. For the preceding remark see Speer, p. 249.

55. These phrases may be found, in the order given, in
Tischgespräche,
pp. 210, 212, 303, 348, 171, 181.

56. See, in the order given,
Tischgespräche,
pp. 355, 351, 361, 468, 258, and Zoller, p. 174.

57.
Tischgespräche,
p. 465. The parallel to the “period of struggle” first comes up in the speech of November 8, 1942, where it is promptly used several times; see Domarus, pp. 1935, 1936, 1937, 1941, 1943, 2085; also
Tischgespräche,
p. 364, i.a.

58. Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 779 f.; cf. also Henry Picker in:
Tischgespräche,
pp. 128, 130; also Speer, p. 243.

59. Ribbentrop to the Nuremberg tribunal psychiatrist Douglas M. Kelley, cited from Hans-Dietrich Röhrs,
Hitler. Die Zerstörung einer Persönlichkeit,
pp. 53 f.

60. See the extensive references to Hitler's health in Maser,
Hitler,
pp. 332 f.

61. Morell log, cited
ibid,
p. 339; the drug was prostacrinum, an extract of seminal vesicles and prostate glands. On Morell and his methods of treatment, cf. Trevor-Roper,
The Last Days of Hitler,
pp. 59 ff.

62. Report of Dr. Erwin Giesing of June 12, 1945, cited in Maser,
Hitler,
p. 429.

63. This is Röhrs's (
Hitler,
p. 121) wholly erroneous view. On the question of whether Hitler was suffering from one of the forms of Parkinson's disease, or only from what is called the Parkinson syndrome, see
ibid.,
pp. 43 if. and 101 f.; also the study by Johann Recktenwald,
Woran hat Adolf Hitler gelitten?
which assumes a Parkinson syndrome caused by encephalitis. See also Maser,
Hitler,
pp. 326 ff. and Bullock, pp. 717 f. Probably the exact nature of Hitler's illness can no longer be determined, since no examination with a specific investigatory aim was ever undertaken. Because of the extremely inadequate documentation, none of the various diagnoses can be persuasively supported or rejected; the principal symptom of both Parkinson's disease and the Parkinson syndrome, namely the shaking arm or leg, can also be caused by many other diseases.

64. See Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
p. 608, and the speech of November 8, 1942, Domarus, p. 1944.

65. A variety of interpretations has been offered for the motives and the background of this speech. Some see it in connection with the demand for “unconditional surrender” formulated in Casablanca a good three weeks earlier (see, for example, Werner Stephan,
Joseph Goebbels,
pp. 256 f.), some as an attempt by the Propaganda Minister to enhance his personal position and announce his claims to the position of second in command, for with the disintegration of Hitler's personality and Göring's simultaneous loss of prestige, that position had become crucial. Cf. Rudolf Semler,
Goebbels
—
the Man Next to Hitler,
pp. 68 f., also Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel,
Doctor Goebbels,
pp. 245 f., Heiber,
Joseph Goebbels,
pp. 328 ff., and the balanced summing-up by Günter Moltmann, “Goebbels' Speech on Total War, Feb. 18, 1943,”
Republic to Reich,
pp. 298 ff. On thie initiative of the Goebbels-Speer-Ley-Funk combination see also Speer, pp. 254 ff.

66. In England, for example, the number of servants in private households was reduced to one-third of what it had been before the war, whereas in Germany the figure actually increased; cf. Speer, pp. 220, 540. The number of women employed in industry rose only slightly during the war, from 2,620,000 on July 31, 1939, to 2,808,000 on July 31, 1943; a year later it had dropped again to 2,678,000. See USSBS,
The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German Economy.
Also confidential report of the Economic Conference of February 26, 1943, BAK 115/1942; see also BAK NS 19/1963. For the preceding remark of Hitler, see Rauschning,
Gespräche,
p. 22.

67. This was a visit to Army Group South (von Manstein). Earlier that year there had been a total of two visits to front-line headquarters: on February 17 to Army Group South and on March 13 to Army Group Center (von Kluge). A visit was planned for June 19, 1944, to the invasion front, that is, to Rommel's headquarters in Roche-Guyon Palace, but this plan was canceled at short notice. See Hans Speidel,
invasion 1944,
pp. 112 ff.

68. Speer, pp. 245, 295 f., 299 f.

69. Krebs,
Tendenzen und Gestalten,
pp. 124 ff.

70. Hans Buchheim, “Befehl und Gehorsam,” in:
Anatomie des SS-Staates
I, pp. 338 f.

71.
Ibid.,
p. 329.

72. Rauschning,
Gespräche,
p. 129. For the remark of Goebbels see
Tagebücher 1942—43,
date of March 27, 1942.

73.
Mein Kampf,
p. 679.

74. IMT XXVI, p. 266 (710-PS). Rosenberg's remark is cited from Robert M. W. Kempner,
Eichmann und Komplicen,
p. 97. On the question of the specific decision for the “final solution” see Krausnick, “Judenverfolgung,” pp. 360 ff. The concept “final solution” first appeared around the same time, in a decree of the
Reichssicherheitshauptumt
dated May 20, 1941; see IMT NG-3104.

75. See the report of SS Obergruppenführer Erich v.d. Bach-Zelewski, ND, NO-2653.

76. Part of the statement of the engineer Hermann Friedrich Gräbe on the mass shooting of some 5,000 Jews in Dubno (Ukraine) on October 5, 1942, by SS and Ukrainian militiamen; see IMT XXXI, pp. 446 ff. (2992-PS).

77. Cited from Bracher,
Diktatur
, p. 463. On fhe number of Jews killed in the big extermination camps of the East, see Heinz Höhne,
Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf,
p. 349. The remark of Rudolf Höss is quoted in his autobiographical account,
Kommandant in Auschwitz,
p. 120—where, incidentally, in a curious perversion of ambition he claims some 3 million victims for Auschwitz alone.

78.
Hitler's Table Talk,
p. 426.

79.
Tischgespräche,
pp. 190, 271 f., 469. In the same spirit Himmler, in a memorandum on the General Plan for the East dated April 27, 1942, suggested retraining the midwives in the Eastern territories as abortionists. See Heiber, “Der Generalplan Ost,” in: VJHfZ 1958:3, p. 292.

80. Cf. the document in VJHfZ 1958:3, p. 299. For Otto Hofmann's statement see ND, NO-4113.

81. IMT XXXVII, p. 517; also
Tischgespräche,
p. 253.

82.
Mein Kampf,
p. 383.

83.
Tischgespräche,
p. 288, and Zoller, p. 105.

84. A statement by Kaltenbrunner, who was echoing similar ideas in the top leadership of the SS; cf. IMT XXXII, p. 297 (3462-PS). For this context cf. Martin Bormann's memorandum of January 29, 1944, cited in Jacobsen and Jochmann,
Ausgewählte Dokumente,
under that date.

85.
Hitler's Table Talk,
pp. 110, 621. See also the note on Rosenberg's conversation with Hitler of December 14, 1941, in: IMT XXVII, p. 272 (1517-PS). The name “Tauria” was Rosenberg's idea; Hitler preferred “Gotenland.”

86. Dallin, pp. 281 f.

87.
Tischgespräche,
p. 320. The metaphor of the “trophy cup” bobbed up elsewhere, for example, in the course of Hitler's nocturnal monologue on January 30, 1933. See Görlitz and Quint,
Adolf Hitler,
p. 367.

88. From the draft by State Secretary Stuckart; see the records of the interrogation of Stuckart's associate H. Globke on September 25, 1945, RF-602, IMT IV, pp. 472 ff.; also ND, NG-3572, NG-3455, and the file notation on the predatory discussion in Göring's headquarters on June 19, 1940, printed in IMT XXVII, pp. 29 ff. (1155-PS). According to Erich Kordt,
Nicht aus den Akten,
p. 393, Calais and Boulogne were to remain in German possession as bases. For Hitler's comment on the Channel positions see
Tischgespräche,
p. 336.