Hitler (157 page)

89. Ever since 1940 a National Planning Commission for the Design of German Soldiers' Cemeteries had been at work under the direction of Professor Wilhelm Kreis. The Commission's assignment was defined as follows: “Facing westward on the cliffs of the Atlantic coast magnificent structures will rise as an eternal memorial to the liberation of the Continent from dependency on the British and to the unification of Europe under the leadership of her German heartland nation. The austere, noble beauty of the soldiers' cemetery at Thermopylae serves as symbol for the German inheritance of the spirit of Hellas's classical culture. Towers soaring massively over the plains of the East will rise as symbols of the taming of the chaotic powers of the eastern steppes by the disciplined might of Teutonic forces for order—surrounded by the graves of the warrior generation of German blood who, as so often for the past two thousand years, saved the existence of Occidental civilization from the destructive tidal waves out of Central Asia.” Cited in Brenner,
Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus,
pp. 128 f.

90. These examples are taken from the collection of Himmler's letters by Helmut Heiber,
Reichsführer!...
and in order of quotation may be found on pp. 194, 222 f., 251, 145, 95. See also Heiber's foreword, especially pp. 22 f.

91. Zoller, p. 73, and
Libres propos,
p. 123. On Hitler's superstitiousness see
Tischgespräche,
pp. 166 f. and 333.

92.
Hitler e Mussolini,
pp. 165 f., cited from Bullock, p. 706. Schmidt,
Statist,
relates that Hitler gave Mussolini “a regular tongue-lashing.” Mussolini, Schmidt wrote, had been “so excited by the news of the air raid on Rome that after his return from Rome he urgently requested my notes on the conversations. He had not been able to follow them, we were told.”

93. Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
p. 231 (on May 20, 1943).

94. Speer, p. 301.

95. Goebbels,
Tagebücher 1942–43,
pp. 392 ff. For Hitler's remark to Ribbentrop see
Zwischen London und Moskau,
p. 265.

 

BOOK VIII

 

1. Himmler, referring to Hitler's orders. What must be achieved, he stated in a letter to SS leader and Police Chief Prützmann dated September 7, 1943, was a situation in which “no human being, no cattle, not a bag of grain, not a railroad track remains behind; not a house remains standing, not a mine exists that has not been wrecked for years to come, not a well that has not been poisoned. The enemy must really find a totally scorched and destroyed country.... Do everything that is humanly possible.” Quoted from Heiber,
ReichsFührer!
... p. 233.

2. For example, Helmuth James Graf von Moltke and the majority of his friends belonging to the Kreisau Circle. George F. Kennan called Count von Moltke “the greatest person, morally, and the largest and most enlightened in his concepts, that I met on either side of the battle lines”; George F. Kennan,
Memoirs 1925–1950,
p. 121.

3. See Schellenberg, pp. 279 ff. On Himmler's affidavit, see Felix Kersten,
Totenkopf und Treue,
pp. 209 ff. After reading this medical report (which, however, was prepared without an examination of the patient), Kersten concluded that Hitler belonged in a mental hospital, not in the Führer's headquarters. For the entire subject of the “resistance” within the SS, its motives and its various initiatives, see Höhne, pp. 448 ff.

4. Cited in Dietrich Ehlers,
Technik und Moral einer Verschwörung,
p. 102. It is a common misunderstanding, probably first voiced by Bullock, p. 736 f., that the Kreisau Circle consisted merely of thinkers and that its members were even proud of their contempt for all action; cf. especially Ger van Roon,
Neuordnung im Widerstand,
where ample evidence is presented to refute this notion.

5. See Ehlers, p. 93. For the principle arguments against the German nationalist conspirators see Hannah Arendt,
Eichmann in Jerusalem,
pp. 98 ff.

6. Inquiries among the workers, inspired by the Jesuit priest Alfred Delp, who belonged to the Kreisau Circle, yielded rather discouraging results. Von Trott's memoranda also speak of widespread passivity in the working class; cf. Hans Mommsen, “Gesellschaftsbild und Verfassungspläne des deutschen Widerstands,” in Schmitthenner and Buchheim, ed.,
Der Deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler,
p. 75. A Social Democratic opinion poll taken in 1942 came to the conclusion: “We will not be able to bring the masses out into the streets”; see Emil Henk,
Die Tragödie des 20. Juli 1944,
pp. 21 ff., and Allen Welsh Dulles,
Germany's Underground,
p. 108. During the war significant resistance by the radical Left existed only after the beginning of the attack on the Soviet Union. That resistance came to a focus in the “Rote Kapelle” headed by Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen and Administrative Secretary (Oberregierungsrat) Arvid Harnack; some of the members engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union. In August, 1942, some one hundred persons were arrested in connection with these activities; many of them were executed shortly afterward. Another group around Anton Saefkow was caught early in July, 1944; its fate, as we shall see below, played a part in precipitating Stauffenberg's decision to act.

7. Ehlers, p. 143. For the biography of Stauffenberg see now Christian Müller,
Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg.
Incidentally, when Stefan George died in Minusio near Locarno on December 4, 1933, Stauffenberg with his two brothers and eight other friends of George were at his bedside.

8. Fabian von Schlabrendorff,
Offiziere gegen Hitler,
p. 138.

9. Speidel, pp. 113 ff. Characteristically, Hitler had waited until a few hours before the meeting to inform the two field marshals that it would take place, and where.

10. A specific motive for Hitler's sudden departure has been occasionally mentioned. It is said that shortly after Rundstedt and Rommel left, a V-1 that had veered off course struck in the vicinity of the Führer's headquarters. Actually, we can regard this only as the pretext that Hitler used to avoid the confrontation; for why should a rocket accidentally striking in Margival have made a meeting in distant Roche-Guyon any more dangerous. On the incident itself see Speidel, p. 119.

11. Speidel, pp. 155 ff.

12. Communication to the author from Baroness von Below.

13. Zoller, p. 184. Hitler requested that the clothes “be sent to Fräulein Braun at the Berghof with instructions that she is to preserve them carefully.”

14. Schmidt,
Statist,
p. 582.

15. Domarus, p. 2127 f.

16. Operation Thunderstorm was initiated abruptly on August 22, 1944, and resulted in the arrest of some 5,000 deputies and functionaries of the former political parties, including such persons as Konrad Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher. See Walter Hammer, “Die Gewitteraktion vom 22. 8. 1944,” in
Freiheit und Recht,
1959:8–9, pp. 15 ff.

17. W. Scheidt,
Gespräche mit Hitler,
cited from Eberhard Zeller,
Geist der Freiheit,
p. 588; also Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
p. 588.

18. Quoted in Ehlers, p. 113; see also Zeller, p. 461.

19. The speech is printed in: VJHfZ 1953:4, pp. 357 ff.; the passage quoted is on pp. 384 f.

20. Domarus, p. 2127.

21. Sebastian Haffner in a review in the magazine
Konkret,
1964:2 of Kunrat von Hammerstein's book
Spähtrupp.

22. Adolf Heusinger,
Befehl im Widerstreit,
p. 367.

23. Schlabrendorff, p. 154.

24. Cited in Bullock, p. 757, n. 1.

25. Speer, p. 406.

26. Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 615, 620 (August 31, 1944).

27. Radio address of January 30, cited in Domarus, p. 2083.

28.
Tischgespräche,
p. 468; see also p. 376.

29. General Bayerlein, cited in Cartier, Vol. II, p. 274. The description of Hitler is General von Manteuffel's, cited from Shirer, p. 1091.

30. Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
pp. 721 ff.

31.
Ibid.,
p. 740.

32. Domarus, p. 2198.

33. Rauschning,
Gespräche,
p. 115.

34.
Le Testament politique de Hitler,
p. 67. The preceding quotation is based on a memo to the author from Otto Remer. Remer, in conversation, had reminded Hitler that a few weeks earlier he had called the Ardennes offensive the last chance in this war, and had said that if it failed the whole war was lost.

35. “Lagebesprechung” of April 27, 1945, printed in
Der Spiegel
1966:3, p. 42. On planning destruction see Speer, p. 403.

36. Cited in Trevor-Roper,
The Last Days of Hitler,
p. 72.

37. Cf. Speer, p. 425. On July 20, 1944, Hitler had told Mussolini that he was “determined to level London completely” by bombardment with V-2 rockets. They would “keep firing at London until the entire city is destroyed.” See Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
II, pp. 470 f. The order to defend Paris or reduce it to ashes was issued on August 23, 1944, but was disobeyed by General von Choltitz; see the account by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre,
Is Paris Burning?
The order itself is printed in Jacobsen,
1939–1945,
pp. 587 f.

38. Goebbels, cited in Trevor-Roper,
The Last Days of Hitler,
p. 51.

39. Printed in KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1701 ff. Cf. the description in Gerhard Boldt,
Die letzten Tage,
p. 15.

40. Zoller, p. 150.

41. Guderian, p. 376; also Boldt, pp. 26 f. The doctor mentioned was Dr. Giesing; cf. the account in Maser,
Hitler,
pp. 350 f.

42. Zoller, p. 230. “From time to time,” the report continues, “he raised his eyes to the portrait of Frederick the Great that hung above his desk and repeated his saying: ‘Ever since I have come to know men, I love dogs.' ”

43.
Ibid.,
pp. 204, 232.

44. Speer, p. 399.

45. Zoller, pp. 29 f. During a military conference in January Hitler wondered “whether a new shell ought not to be made now, after all” (Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
p. 867), and when General Karl Wolff visited him on April 18, Hitler elaborated on his “plans for the near future.” See Eugen Dollmann,
Dolmetscher der Diktatoren,
p. 235.

46. Cited in Görlitz and Quint, p. 616; see also Domarus, pp. 2202 ff.

47. Speer, p. 426.

48. The “flag order” is printed in Jacobsen,
1939–1945,
pp. 591 f. The so-called Nero Command is printed in KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1580 f.

49. Trevor-Roper, ed.,
The Bormann Letters,
p. 198.

50. Speer, p. 440.

51.
Ibid.,
p. 453.

52. Bullock, pp. 780 f.

53. Statement by Frau Inge Haberzettel, one of the Propaganda Minister's secretaries. Cf. the description in Trevor-Roper,
Last Days,
p. 100. For Ley's death rays see Speer, p. 464.

54. Speer, p. 463. For the following description of Hitler, see p. 464.

55.
Ibid.,
p. 474. There are many witnesses to the attitude of Goebbels; the remark quoted here is taken from the “Lagebesprechung” of April 23, 1945; see
Der Spiegel,
1966:3, p. 34.

56. Speer, p. 475.

57.
Ibid.,
p. 459.

58. Karl Koller,
Der letzte Monat,
pp. 19 ff.

59. The witnesses to the course of events are chiefly: Keitel, Jodi, General Christian, Colonel von Freytag-Loringhoven, Lorenz, Colonel von Below, and Fräulein Krüger, who was Bormann's secretary. Our account largely follows that of Trevor-Roper, who checked the statements of these witnesses and extracted the points of essential agreement; see
Last Days,
pp. 118 f.; also the statement of Gerhard Herrgesell, one of the stenographers, in: KTB/OKW IV, 2, pp. 1696 f.

60. See the transcript of this account in Koller, p. 31.

61. Quoted by Trevor-Roper,
Last Days,
p. 127.

62. Speer, p. 480; but see also p. 485.

63. Quoted in Trevor-Roper,
Last Days,
p. 128.

64. Speer, p. 483.

65.
Le Testament politique de Hitler,
p. 61 (February 4, 1945).

66.
Ibid.,
pp. 57 ff. (February 4, 1945).

67.
Ibid.,
pp. 87 ff.; 129 if. (February 14 and 25, 1945). Hitler made very similar remarks in a military conference of March 5, 1943; see Heiber,
Lagebesprechungen,
p. 171; see also the comparable early comment in Rauschning,
Gespräche,
p. 115.

68.
Ibid.,
pp. 101 ff. (February 17, 1945). The opening of the campaign in the East actually was postponed for a few weeks, but this decision was not due solely to Mussolini's invasion of Greece. Questions of weather, of time for the deployment of allies, and so on, played a part. Cf. the study “Hat das britische Eingreifen in Griechenland den deutschen Angriff auf Russland verzögert oder nicht?” (on file at the Militärgeschichtliche Forschungsamt Freiburg im Breisgau). See also Hillgruber,
Strategie,
p. 506. Hitler himself, moreover, sometimes said just the opposite, at least to Mussolini; cf. the reference in Nolte,
Epoche,
p. 586.

69.
Le Testament politique de Hitler,
p. 78.

70.
Ibid.,
p. 108 (February 17, 1945). For Trevor-Roper's comment see pp. 46 f. Hitler's opinion agrees amazingly with a remark of the French writer Drieu la Rochelle, who toward the end of 1944, shortly before his suicide, explained the defeat as follows: “The reason for the collapse of German policy lies not in its lack of moderation, but in its lack of decisiveness. In no field was the German revolution pushed ahead far enough.... The German revolution dealt far too circumspectly with the old men in business and in the army; it spared too much of the old bureaucracy. This double mistake was exposed on July 20. Hitler should have struck harshly at the disloyal Left, but also shown no mercy to the disloyal Right. Because he did not strike, or did not strike hard enough, the irreparable consequences emerged, with an increasingly dire effect, in the course of the war. In all the occupied countries of Europe German policy proved to be burdened by all the prejudices of superannuated rules of warfare and outmoded diplomacy; it was unable to exploit the novelty and breadth of the magnificent mission that had been offered to it; it proved incapable of transforming an old-fashioned war of conquest into a revolutionary war. It believed it would be able to reduce the violence of warfare to a minimum in order to win over European public opinion—and was forced to see this opinion turning against itself because it was offering the European public nothing new and compelling.” Cited in Nolte,
Faschismus,
p. 380.