Hitler's Jet Plane (11 page)

Petersen, who in common with most others at the conference had never been informed by Goering or Milch of this Hitler requirement, felt his mind reeling. He heard Saur reciting the individual weights for the Me 262 armour and weapons, adding that they exceeded 500 kg. Hitler hardly allowed him to finish before barking: ‘This aircraft is so fast that it doesn’t need armour or guns. They can all be taken out!’
³

With that he turned directly to Petersen and said ‘Is that so or not?’ Still dazed by events Petersen, who was sure that a long dissertation would be pointless if not dangerous, merely answered, ‘Yes, that goes without saying.’ Milch, despairing as never before, attempted to interest Hitler in other opinions, but Galland, holding forth on the theme that no more time remained for modifications, was shouted down so brusquely by the Führer that he relapsed into silence.

Milch resumed by explaining calmly to Hitler that to have the Me 262 as a successful two-seater bomber represented a substantial reconstruction for which time was simply too short. Hitler rode over him rough-shod and with such violence of tone that Milch lost his head and shouted back, ‘Mein Führer, every child can see that that is not a bomber but a fighter!’

Following this outburst Hitler turned his back on Milch without replying. Petersen’s neighbour leaned towards him and said, ‘And that’s shot him down in flames.’ It was the most apt description of this tragic collision of wills. A door had closed and would not re-open. Nobody knew this better than Milch who merely stood in silence as Hitler turned away from him. At this juncture Milch felt sure that he had reached the end of his career, but it did not depress him; whatever happened next, there was nothing he could do about it.

On 24 May 1944 a further conference was convened under Goering’s chairmanship where the main topics were the Me 262 and Hitler’s angry outbursts of the day before. Goering was as graceless as only he knew how to be even though the tone of the meeting was one of sober objectivity. From statements made by Petersen and Knemeyer, Goering and Milch learned for the first time that the 262 armour and guns had a total weight of about 600 kg, all of it forward of the aircraft’s centre of gravity. It was therefore quite out of the question to do what Hitler had demanded and just jettison it to make way for a bomb of that weight slung below the fuselage. On the contrary, it would need an expensive modification to the whole design just to comply with this one order.

According to Irving, Goering raged: ‘You gentlemen all seem to be deaf. I have repeated over and over the Führer’s perfectly clear order that he doesn’t give a hoot for the Me 262 as a fighter, he wants it exclusively as a fighter bomber... the Führer must have got a very peculiar idea about you. Everybody, Messerschmitt included, told him from the beginning that there is no doubt it can be done. Messerschmitt told the Führer in my presence at Insterburg, it was planned at the design stage that it can be made into a fighter bomber. Now suddenly it can’t.’

Here Petersen interjected to rightly point out that the present engines were not suitable for bomber operations and required major modification. In view of the precarious situation the deployment of the Me 262 as a lightweight fighter was probably the best course although even then sacrifices would have to be reckoned with. A bomber variant was simply not on offer at the moment.

Goering’s answer, again supplied by Irving: ‘I would have been grateful if you had made ten per cent of these statements yesterday. ’ When Knemeyer confirmed Petersen’s observations and also spoke out against a bomber variant, Goering interrupted him: ‘The Führer says, as a fighter, as far as I’m concerned, you can burn it. What he needs is a bomber so fast that it can simply roar through the great mass of fighters which will be escorting the invasion force.’ Goering now made a remark about the ‘undisciplined load of military pigs’ who had defrauded and deceived the Führer and himself. That he was the leader of these pigs was a point he appeared to have forgotten.

He now contented himself with the bitter reflection that after Messerschmitt’s lightly given assurance at Insterburg, nobody had bothered to concern himself with what it involved, least of all Messerschmitt himself. It was primarily Messerschmitt’s job to draft an opinion of what it entailed to fulfil Hitler’s wish and set a time scale. Next down the line was Generalfeldmarschall Milch whose responsibility it had been to set it all out and at least advise his immediate superior, Goering, unequivocally about the technical situation. Milch had the competent men in his offices to do it. Both of them, Messerschmitt and Milch, had side-stepped their responsibility. It could only be explained by neither having taken Hitler’s demand very seriously at the outset, or that they considered it a dangerous proposition to explain all the difficulties which Hitler was bound not to want to hear. Whatever the reason, the child was down the well and a precious year had been lost.

General Galland mentioned in his book
Die Ersten und die Letzten
another conference to which he was summoned together with Milch, Bodenschatz, Messerschmitt, Petersen and Saur. This was held on 29 May 1944, the date of Hitler’s edict that the Me 262 and Ar 234 jets were to be built exclusively as bombers and not fighters. Goering informed the assembled officers that in order to avoid any misleading impressions in future the Me 262 was only to be spoken of as the ‘Blitzbomber’ and no longer as a fighter bomber. The meeting ended on a negative note. Messerschmitt – according to Galland – came out very strongly in support of the fighter generals and all gained the idea that Goering was not unimpressed by Galland’s argument. But Goering was not willing to take it higher. At that level the subject was closed. After all that had gone before he knew what the reaction would be if he attempted to re-open it. With that, he took the Me 262 out of Galland’s hands and gave it to Peltz.

It was at the end of May 1944 that all Me 262 development operations at Lechfeld, Leipheim, Schwäbisch Hall and other localities, with very few exceptions, were ordered to be suspended and the majority of pilots, most by now fully or semi-retrained for jets, were transferred out or returned to their former units to resume flying Me 109s and Fw 190s.

Günther Wegmann, one of the six III/ZG26 pilots, recalled the sense of shock and the mood of depression at the incomprehensible turn of events. It affected everybody and transformed their zeal into grim indifference. Pilots sat around in groups for hours mulling over the possible reasons for such an inconceivable instruction. Even the least experienced of them could imagine the hundreds of enemy fighters circling over the invasion force licking their chops as the Me 262 ‘fast bombers’ arrived, the bombload hung below the fuselage depriving them of their priceless speed advantage. And those that escaped after dropping their bombs and survived the return flight to base could expect a worrying few minutes at their most vulnerable, sweeping in to land.

So began the last cruel act in the drama.

7

Kommando Nowotny – The Sop to Galland

‘W
e can carry out this operation on the English coast just the once while they are loading up on the beaches. After that, when they are unloading on the other side, between the landing craft and the beaches and against tanks just come ashore and so on. As I visualise it, the aircraft roar over the beaches and smash up all those heaps of material which are lying around in great confusion. That’s how the Führer sees the operational use and that’s how we are to prepare.’

Hermann Goering’s words – quoted from Galland’s book – referred to the Me 262 in the fast-bomber role acting against Allied invasion troops. In accordance with the will of the Führer, the Reichsmarschall had determined that the aircraft had no future as a fighter.

Galland, of course, was not prepared to take this lying down. The landing-craft notion was pure nonsense. Pilots and machines would be sacrificed without rhyme or reason. Scarcely a bomb would find its mark. Those dropped from a great height would all miss. The machine could not be used as a dive-bomber and at low level was easy meat for enemy fighters. That the latter would be present in large numbers to protect the landing craft was guaranteed. But the order had been given and presumably the disaster could no longer be averted.

The tremendous prospects for success which the Me 262 promised were demonstrated in the testing period by Thierfelder himself and the experienced former III/ZG26 pilots. The undisputed star was Leutnant Alfred Schreiber. Shortly after completing his conversion course he supplied the unequivocal proof for the efficacy of the jet aircraft in combat. In his first engagements he shot down five enemy aircraft one after the other, mostly RAF Mosquitos, the fastest enemy machine. He was summoned at once before a surprised Goering to make his report. If the Reichsmarschall conveyed notice of these successes with a covering memorandum, or whether they were mentioned in the daily situation conferences at Führer HQ, is not known, but apparently they influenced Goering’s opinion strongly. Schreiber was later killed in action and is buried at Schwabstadl near Lechfeld.

Galland’s staff included such proven fighting airmen as Gordon Gollob, Hannes Trautloft, Eduard Neumann and later Walther Dahl, and all now set to the task of making what they could of the Lechfeld successes. Nobody worried if a few intentional inaccuracies crept in. The end justified the means. Enemy fighter pilots captured after parachuting down from combat with an Me 262 were unanimous in confirming the absolute superiority of the German jet. Galland even came into possession of a report signed by General Spaatz, US Strategic Air Forces supreme commander, in which he spoke of ‘the deadly German jet fighter’. The document was sent to Hitler with a covering memorandum.

Some of this propaganda may have borne fruit immediately after the Allied landings when, on 7 June 1944 in a conversation with Saur, Hitler modified his stance on the Blitzbomber question. While the initial production of the Me 262 had to remain limited to the bomber version, the testing of the fighter version by the Kommando at Lechfeld and the Rechlin Test Centre could continue so long as it did not interfere with bomber production. It was at this time that Hitler issued the order that operational Blitzbombers were forbidden to descend below 12,000 feet over enemy territory, an altitude at which, with no bombsight, they were next to useless as bomber aircraft.

Another method Galland used in the attempt to change Hitler’s mind was to ask officers who were attending Führer HQ to receive awards from Hitler to bring the subject of conversation round to the Me 262, recommending its inclusion in the Reich air defences.

A typical conversation is recorded by Galland in his book:

There was no beating about the bush with his answer when Hitler asked the commodore of JG Richthofen, Oberstleutnant Kurt Buhligen, if German fighters were inferior to those of the British and Americans: ‘For two years we have been numerically inferior. Relatively speaking, our aircraft have now become slower. American and British fighters are about 70 kph faster than ours.’ Hitler snapped back, ‘What do you want then, a new aircraft?’ At this, Johannes Steinhoff, whom Hitler had just decorated with the Swords to add to his Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, butted in, ‘Jawohl, the jet fighter!’ Hitler gave a start and retorted brusquely, ‘Fighter jet, fighter jet, it’s a spook going round your heads. I won’t hear any more of it! That is not a fighter and you will not be able to fight with it. My doctor has told me that in the sharp turns you have to make in dogfights, parts of the brain will simply separate. This aircraft is not yet mature and the fighter arm will not get it until it is. For you, I have instead healthier aircraft which have been developed on the basis of established technical experience.’ Steinhoff, who would suffer severe burns a few months later during a failed Me 262 take-off, tried once more but was silenced with a single sentence. The consequence of this exchange was an order issued by both Hitler and Goering which strictly forbade any further mention of the words ‘Me 262’ and ‘fighter’ in the same breath.

With this, Galland had to accept that he could expect no further sympathy from Hitler for his concerns about the direction the air-war was taking. But he was still not yet prepared to yield. Given the situation on the various fronts and faced with an invasion of Europe which was probably imminent, he saw only one way to stop the rot or at least diminish it: fighters, fighters and more fighters. In this he knew that his staff stood with him shoulder to shoulder.

First he succeeded in obtaining the support of Armaments Minister Speer who agreed to divert to the fighter arm on a regular basis, and without Hitler’s knowledge, a proportion of the Me 262 bomber output.

Galland’s attempt to convince Reichsführer-SS Himmler of the decisive superiority of the Me 262 also bore fruit. Himmler, by now one of the most powerful men in the Third Reich, had for some time been aware that Goering was unable to provide the Luftwaffe with leadership in these critical months. That Goering’s influence on Hitler had sunk to a minimum he knew already. The Waffen-SS was responsible for the V-weapons programme and large areas of aircraft production in bomb-proof underground installations and Himmler was keen to extend his influence into operational control of the Luftwaffe. Co-opting Himmler’s aid was not received gladly in Luftwaffe circles, but for German fighter command affairs had deteriorated to the sorry pass where even Himmler was a welcome bedfellow in the campaign to exert pressure on Hitler to operate the Me 262 as a fighter.

When Goering saw Himmler’s shadow beginning to eclipse him, he also began to speak out for a strengthening of Reich air defences by including the Me 262 within fighter ranks.

In the Messerschmitt factories and SS-run bomb-proof assembly plants there now began the hectic programme to follow the new plans for turning out the Me 262 fighter as a fast bomber. To extend its range two supplementary fuel tanks of 250 litres each were fitted beneath the pilot’s seat. In the fuselage a 600-litre tank went behind what had been previously the main tank. This additional tank was the counterweight for the two 250-kg bombs slung below forward of the fuselage. Under normal circumstances aircrew would probably refuse to fly an aircraft cobbled together in this manner, even if the air force found it an acceptable addition to the fleet. Even without the possibility of encountering enemy aircraft it was problematic to fly the Me 262 bomber. Meticulous attention had to be paid to how the aircraft was manipulated. The particular problem was the rear 600-litre fuel tank. If this tank was full the aircraft was dangerously unstable without the bombs because the centre of gravity was too far back. Before dropping the bombs, however, the pilot had to ensure that the tank was empty. If he forgot this in the excitement of the moment or was forced to jettison the bombs in an emergency, the Me 262 became very tail-heavy and assumed an attitude out of the horizontal in which control could be lost. In turn the speed would drop to 700 kph or less, at which the aircraft was easy prey for a fighter. It was weakly armed in any case because two of the four machine-guns in the nose had been removed for weight reasons. Finally the Me 262 bomber had no bombsight and the pilot had to use the reflecting gunsight (
Reflexvisier
or REVI) for bomb-aiming in horizontal flight or a shallow dive. The instrument would have been useful in a steep dive but this form of attack was too dangerous to attempt. These circumstances were certain to lead to disaster – and they did.