Hitler's Jet Plane (7 page)

On 12 November 1943 Milch asked the Technical Office Chief of Staff, General Vorwald, for his opinion of the Me 262:

The only doubt we still have is the question of whether the turbojets have been tested sufficiently so that we can go into full production in the coming year. What is your opinion on that?

Vorwald expressed no doubts himself but Major Knemeyer of the Rechlin Test Centre warned of the catastrophic situation at Messerschmitt AG ‘where everything had run into a bottleneck’. His opinion was based on a bitter complaint by the Chief of Procurement and Supply about the worrying extensions to agreed production periods and the juggling with figures, statistics and delivery dates by the Company.

Since his first jet flight, six months had passed during which time General der Jagdflieger Adolf Galland had spared no effort attempting to have the Me 262 fighter scheduled for series production. He considered it highly favourable therefore when Goering arranged to present Hitler with an exhibition of the latest aircraft and weapons at Insterburg in East Prussia on 26 November 1943. With a great hoo-ha and in the presence of a great host of high officials, officers and NSDAP (
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party) people, the Reichsmarschall appointed himself – and not without the odd
faux pas
– master of ceremonies.

When the assembly arrived at the Me 262 aircraft and Goering had ended his introduction, Hitler asked suddenly, ‘Can this aircraft also carry bombs?’ As to the response there are various accounts. David Irving wrote in his book
Die Tragödie der Luftwaffe
:

Hitler repeated his question if this fighter could also carry bombs. Before the others could stop him, Messerschmitt stepped forward and said, ‘Jawohl, mein Führer, it can take a 1000-kg or two 500-kg bombs without a problem.’ Hitler thanked him: ‘This is finally the Blitzbomber, this is finally the aircraft, that I have been asking the Luftwaffe to provide for years. Here it is, and only one man has recognised it!’
¹

A slightly different version appears in General Galland’s book
Die Ersten und die Letzten
:

. . . the Me 262 jet fighter attracted special attention. I was standing close to Hitler when he surprised Goering with the question: ‘Can this aircraft carry bombs?’ Goering had already discussed the matter with Messerschmitt and left it to the Professor to answer: ‘Jawohl, mein Führer, in principle yes. As regards a 500-kg payload certainly, maybe even 1000-kg if strengthened.’

Galland commented:

It was a carefully formulated and straightforward response to which one could hardly object. Among airmen this answer would have raised no eyebrows. For every expert knew that it was purely hypothetical. The Me 262 was not equipped with retaining or release gear for bombs, nor fusing installation, nor bombsights. Its flight characteristics and the panorama from the cockpit made it unsuitable for aimed bombing. The only possible bombing tactic was some sort of dive, but this would have involved the aircraft exceeding its permitted maximum speed. Above 950 kph the aircraft was no longer controllable. At low altitude the fuel consumption was so great that no useful penetration over enemy territory was possible, therefore low-flying attacks did not enter into it. All that actually remained was horizontal bombing from altitude. However, under the given circumstances the target needed to be the size of a large town to be certain of obtaining a hit.

But who would have wanted to offer a dissertation of this kind to Hitler at such a moment? How would one know that the argument had even been understood, let alone accepted? I admit that the Reichsmarschall, with whom Hitler had been speaking previously, might have had the duty to make him aware of all this. If he actually did do so I have no idea. In any case, Hitler allowed Messerschmitt and the rest of us no opportunity for explanations but continued, ‘For years I have been asking the Luftwaffe for the fast bomber which, whatever the enemy fighter defences, is certain to reach its target. In this aircraft, which you tell me is a fighter, I see the Blitzbomber with which I will repulse the invasion in its initial and weakest phase. Ignoring the enemy air umbrella it will strike into the masses of material and troops which have just come ashore and sow panic, death and destruction. That is finally the Blitzbomber! And naturally, nobody has thought of it as such!’

A third account appears in copious file notes made by Professor Messerschmitt himself following a telephone conversation with his brother-in-law Professor Madelung in 1971. They were discussing David Irving’s version (the notes in square parentheses clarifying Messerschmitt’s remarks are the author’s).

Messerschmitt:
The 262 was not built to be a fighter. When Hitler asked me in East Prussia if the 262 could also carry bombs I said, ‘Of course.’ Firstly I fitted [probably he means here ‘I was the first to fit’] bomb retention gear to a fighter [Me 109]. From the very beginning the 262 was always thought of as suitable for modification into a fighter bomber. During the Polish campaign I had the idea of hanging a couple of bombs [to the Me 109] and went with Voigt [Chief of Projects Office] to Berlin and visited Udet, who was then chief of the Technical Office, Lucht [General Staff Engineer at the Reich Air Ministry] and Reichenbach [General-Engineer in charge of Development at the Ministry of Aircraft Production]. When I suggested what I had in mind they thought I was joking. On the way home I said to Voigt, ‘We will just make a little something, it won’t cost much and we’ll hang a 50-kg bomb below an Me 109.’ We did it and a few weeks later tried it out and it was a complete success. Then we rang Berlin and said we wanted to demonstrate it. Suddenly we got the contract to fit bombs to all Me 109s. With the 262 we envisaged it from the very beginning, it was included in the design sketches. I thought of putting the bombs in front of the retraction mechanism [the undercarriage shaft] for the wheels a little forward of the centre of gravity.

Madelung:
Where was Hitler’s error?
Messerschmitt:
I don’t know. It was purely an operational question. I didn’t convert the machine and if anyone says I did that is a distortion and a lie. Where the machines we built went to I have no idea.

Madelung:
Up to now it has always been said that Hitler prevented the proper use of the 262 because he ordered it to be converted to a bomber.

Messerschmitt:
One can’t speak of conversion because the fighter was planned as a fighter bomber from the outset. My 200 [Ha 200, a light fighter and trainer developed by Messerschmitt in Spain after the war] and the 300 [Ha 300, a modern fighter aircraft developed by Messerschmitt in Spain, the prototypes of which were sold by Franco to Nasser in Egypt; further work was carried out on the type under Messerschmitt’s supervision] were also designed as such.

This account by Professor Messerschmitt contains many true statements but also errors and lapses of memory. That there were early trials of the Me 109 as a fighter bomber is a fact. That the Me 262 could also have been used as such in the ground-attack role is proved by the later addition of the R4M rockets beneath the wings as is mentioned later. But in the opinion of all pilots and engineers involved, the Me 262 was definitely never designed nor fitted to be a bomber capable of carrying even a medium load. Messerschmitt’s response to Hitler that the 262 could carry a payload of between 500kg and a tonne can only be understood as the claim of an industrialist scenting an additional order. That was his right, of course, for operational matters were never his business. Had Hitler perhaps posed the question in the form ‘how long it would take to equip the Me 262 to carry a one-tonne bomb’, Messerschmitt would have had to say at least a year. Seen from that perspective, the Me 262 would have been a different, almost a new aircraft. Building the prototype, testing the machine and the bomb gear and sights in flight and preparing it for operational readiness would have taken at least another twelve months after the conversion to a two-seater. Galland, Petersen and, of course, Goering knew that. It will remain an unsolved mystery why – with the exception of Milch – nobody attempted to make Hitler aware of the fact. As Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief and Reichsmarschall it was unquestionably Goering’s duty to do so, for there were no ‘proper channels’ for him to go through. But it is obvious that we have here an ‘unplugged hole’ that cannot be explained away by the fear of Hitler’s allergy to counter-argument respecting the Me 262 in the fast bomber role. Certainly if there had been an energetic resistance hats would have rolled if not heads. Yet twelve months later when the ineffective officers’ revolt reported by Steinhoff and Galland took place it went unpunished. The bull must occasionally be taken by the horns and the admirable operations of Jagdverband 44 which followed the said ‘revolt’ were by far more dangerous to health than tackling Hitler respectfully about the Me 262.

The real guilty party was Goering. He had fallen from grace and lacked the courage to chance Hitler’s now undisguised disfavour. He who barely eight months previously had refused Milch the use of fighter aircraft was now not only silent but – according to Irving – actually approved a variation of the jet-fighter project which meant a setback of months. Galland also kept a still tongue although at least he and his office were not inactive behind the scenes.

The Arado aircraft firm was turning out the Ar 234, a jet bomber not far behind the Me 262 in development. This would have been the right machine for Hitler’s bomber idea, but the pressures of time, difficulties in obtaining materials and fuel, crew training, the deteriorating situations on the various fronts and – as before – Hitler’s sensibilities, all combined to ensure that nothing came of it. In the event, in a telex dated 5 December 1943, Hitler ordered the Ar 234 to be used in the fast reconnaissance role for which it would be at operational readiness by the autumn of 1944. It was also turned out as a bomber designated Ar 234-B2, but this version did not make its appearance until the end of 1944. By the war’s end only about 200 Ar 234 jets had been built and used operationally. Many went to training units, others to bomber squadron KG76 and some were probably used as stop-gaps in the fighter ranks.

Hearing Messerschmitt’s reply to Hitler’s question regarding the possibility of making the Me 262 into the Blitzbomber, Oberst Petersen of the Rechlin Test Centre remarked in an undertone to his neighbour, ‘That’s torn it!’, and he was proved right.

Hitler, whom nobody in his entourage dared contradict, remained adamant that the Me 262 must be used as a fast bomber. Whatever difficulties and objections there might be did not interest him. He had, after all, solved more awkward problems. Aside from the weapons of reprisal, he had nothing more to add on the subject of the appalling and ever increasing bombardment of Germany’s cities and industry.

Thousands of tons of explosives rained down on Germany day and night. In the week when German fighters shot down 300 enemy bombers, the enemy took note of this fact and exacted revenge by destroying 700 Me 109s on the production line, together with large areas of the various assembly works. But the Me 262, which as the only superfast fighter in the world could have brought to a halt these lethal depredations, was not available. There was evidence that the Allies could not continue to operate over Reich air space at a 10 per cent loss rate in aircraft per raid. The first delivery of mass-produced Me 262 fighters was scheduled for May 1944. If this date had been kept, it would not have brought the turning of the tide overnight but it would – as would later be proved – have put a large dent in the air supremacy which the Allies enjoyed from the summer of 1944.

In this connection mention must be made of the Me 163 rocket fighter. This most modern fighter could also have been operational earlier if its final development stage to operational readiness had been given a higher priority from the beginning. Because of its very limited range the Me 163 escaped consideration for the Blitzbomber role. The Walter rocket engine had tanks for two tonnes of fuel which lasted five minutes. The aircraft could reach ten kilometres altitude in ninety seconds or so. This was sufficient for a brief attack on any enemy formation sighted from the airfield. Speeds of 900 kph were obtained giving the Me 163 the same superiority as the Me 262 if only very temporarily. It was planned that operational Me 163 units would be dotted all along Germany’s western border from the sea to Switzerland, from where they would shoot up to intercept incoming enemy bombers with their fighter escorts. It was not a bad plan so long as the weather held good. With a low overcast the practice would be for the pilot to abandon the aircraft after the attack and descend by parachute. In good visibility, conditions of high cloud or clear skies, the Me 163 had to glide back to the airfield once its fuel was spent. In a glide the Me 163 was at the mercy of any passing enemy aircraft as was the Me 262 when landing.

Consideration was given to using the Me 163 as a ram fighter but nothing ever came of the idea. The strength of the German fighter arm was entrusted to the Me 109 and its famed successor, Kurt Tank’s Fw 190. The consequence of the visit by Milch and Udet to Augsburg in August 1941 had been a new aircraft production programme whereby the planned output of the Fw 190 exceeded by 250 per cent that of the Me 109.

5

The Me 262 as Bomber The Crucial Lost Year

T
ens of thousands of bombs fell on German cities and centres of industry in the six months between General Galland’s first flight in the Me 262 jet and the Insterburg airfield exhibition of November 1943. The German people were exposed to a rain of fire which claimed its victims young and old without mercy. The neglected Reich air defences were poorly equipped to prevent it. Many former leading senior Luftwaffe command and fighter-arm officers maintain today that the deployment of the Me 262 could have reduced substantially the extent of the catastrophe, and not a few of them consider that it would have turned the tide. The jet fighter success in the last months of the war proved that the Me 262 might have brought the incessant flow of Allied bombers over the Reich largely to a halt.