Hitler's Jet Plane (17 page)

On 2 November two Me 262s attacked the 2nd B-24 Bomber Wing over Bielefeld at between 21,000 to 24,000 feet. This was the first known attack using the R4M rocket battery. A Thunderbolt of 56th Group was shot down. This seemed a mere sideshow, for 400 German propeller fighters had made their appearance late that morning and a massive air-battle developed with the 8th Air Force bombers and fighter escort.

On 4 November 8th Air Force Thunderbolts and Mustangs flying bomber protection reported being attacked by various Me 262s operating in pairs which went for the fighter escort and ignored the bombers. The Americans claimed no victories on this day although the Luftwaffe admitted the loss of an Me 262 (works number 110483), shot down by an RAF fighter near Lüneburg. Thus perished the brave Oberfahnrich Willi Banzhaff.

On 6 November two German jets were shot down by Captain Charles E Yeager (the pilot accredited with being the first through the sound barrier in 1947) and Lieutenant William J Quinn. The latter was wingman to Captain Montgomery over Germany when two Me 262s were sighted 6,000 feet below. ‘One of the two German aircraft banked towards me suddenly,’ Quinn reported, ‘and I opened fire immediately and hit his cockpit. Parts of the machine broke off before it fell and crashed into the ground.’ This was the Me 262 (works number 110490) of Oberfeldwebel Helmut Lennartz, who got out safely. Captain Montgomery destroyed an Me 262 in a hangar, and Yeager two others on the ground. The aircraft shot down by Yeager (works number 110389) was Leutnant Spangenberg’s; he survived.

8 November 1944 was the last day of operations for Kommando Nowotny. Four of its jets were shot down. The first casualty was Wegmann’s wingman Oberfeldwebel Baudach, shot down flying works number 900036 by Anthony Maurice of 361st Fighter Group. Baudach lived to tell the tale. The second American victory was reported by 20th Fighter Group when Captain Ernest C Fiebelkorn and the Mustang pilot of another group attacked an Me 262 together as it was taking off. While the Americans were attempting to line up the target, the jet began to spin out of control and exploded without a shot having been fired. This was Schall’s wingman, Feldwebel Erich Büttner, flying works number 170293. Büttner baled out safely.

The third jet was lost in the following manner. Lieutenant James W Kenney, 357th Group/362nd Fighter Squadron, had been ordered to escort to their home airfield another Mustang whose pilot had become concerned at the roughness of his aircraft’s engine. On the return flight over western Germany in dense cloud they caught up with a formation of 13 Fortresses, and as these bombers had no fighter escort the two Mustangs took on the role for as long as the suspect Mustang engine would hold out. Oberleutnant Schall had just broken off from an engagement against the bombers and overtook the two fighters without noticing them. The Americans got him in their sights and opened fire.

Schall’s aircraft was hit in the port wing and engine but Schall interpreted this as a turbine malfunction. He was attempting to restart the engine when suddenly he spotted the two Mustangs on his tail. Flames began to issue from the damaged turbojet and Schall put the aircraft into a left-angled dive before parachuting free. His Me 262 with only one engine would have been easy pickings for the Mustangs. (Schall landed safely. He was killed on 10 April 1945 while attempting to land an Me 262 of JG7 on a bomb-damaged runway.)

The fourth Me 262 to be lost on 8 November 1944 was Nowotny’s (works number 110400). None of the thirty pilots who chased him claimed to have destroyed the jet initially but it seems to have been awarded as a probable to Lieutenant R W Stevens, 364th Fighter Group. It is known that Nowotny attacked a bomber stream escorted by Mustangs and had several of the latter on his tail. In his final radio message reported in an earlier chapter, he claimed three kills, said he had lost his port engine and was under attack. His next sentence was garbled, but seconds later his aircraft began its death dive with a loud screaming noise, burst into flames and hit the ground about 6 kilometres north of Bramsche before Nowotny could get out. (This account was supplied by the American writer Patrick J Cassidy Jr and coincides with a report in Luftwaffe files submitted by Oberleutnant Hans Dortenmann, V/JG54.)

9

The Loss of Nowotny

T
he aircraft of the Bindersleben 262 Kommando touched down at Achmer almost at the same time as Nowotny’s flight. Günther Wegmann handed over his unit and was appointed Nowotny’s adjutant immediately. The new, larger Kommando was now reorganised into 8th Squadron at Hesepe under Leutnant Schall and 9th Squadron under Oberleutnant Bley at Achmer. A mountain of work awaited everybody. Nowotny confirmed his reputation as an energetic organiser. All day and every day he occupied his time telephoning or visiting the local Gauleiter, the offices of General Galland, the Reich Air Ministry, the Messerschmitt people and equipment suppliers with a view to getting the unit operational as early as possible. His major demands were for more ground personnel, more aircraft, more modern equipment, more pilots. There was not a moment’s peace until the radar direction unit was set up in a small guesthouse between the two airfields and Viktor Preusker was installed there as master of ceremonies. It was recognised that it was likely that enemy intelligence knew about Nowotny’s Kommando from the outset. Its location lay below the path of the main bomber approach routes to Berlin and other cities and the low-flying Mustangs which controlled the local air space soon made their presence felt. The German unit received a bitter foretaste of just how dangerous this spot would be on its first day of operations.

On the afternoon of 7 October 1944 warning was given of large bomber formations approaching. Four Me 262s were sent up to intercept. Two were shot down by Mustangs while climbing away from the runway. The third and fourth got among the bombers, destroying three, possibly four. On their return both jets were low on fuel. One landed safely, the other was shot by Mustangs while landing. Despite a great hail of flak and the presence of German conventional fighters guarding the airfield approaches three Me 262s had been lost. Taking off and landing, the jets were at their most vulnerable to the ever-watchful Mustangs; it was not the first time it had happened in the history of the Me 262 but for Nowotny it was a savage blow. The problem was primarily having the airfield in the path of the enemy bomber streams; the Mustang advance guard waited for the jets to rise and simply gobbled them up.

The next operation came two days later. The Kommando got off more lightly but the circumstances were disquieting. After a successful mission Leutnant Schall was pursued home by a swarm of Mustangs and shot down. He baled out and was then ruthlessly machine-gunned by the American fighters while dangling from his parachute. This was against the rules of warfare
.
⁶

Schall was extraordinarily lucky and landed unharmed. Upon receiving his report, Nowotny was beside himself with rage: his personal code was one of strict compliance with the rules of warfare and he had never understood the need to continue a dogfight once the opposing pilot had been deprived of his machine. So overcome was he that when a Mustang pilot was brought in after parachuting from his aircraft two days later, Nowotny ordered his adjutant Wegmann to have the American taken out and shot. By now Wegmann understood Nowotny’s passionate temperament and decided that the order was rhetorical. The same day the American was safely behind the barbed wire of a PoW camp. During a relaxed talk in the officers’ mess on the evening of 5 November 1944 Nowotny thanked his adjutant for disobeying the order. Wegmann and Oberleutnant Schnörrer then discussed with the commander the disadvantages of having the joint airfields directly below the bomber path. Next the question was explored of improving the Me 262. Here the most urgent modifications were a lengthened control stick for more leverage to bring the aircraft out of a steep dive and better armament.

On account of his many belly-landings and parachute escapes twenty-five-year-old Karl Schnörrer was nicknamed ‘Quax’ after the Ruhmann cartoon character of the time ‘Quax the Crash Landing Pilot’. He had flown 500 missions, about half as Nowotny’s wingman, and the men were good friends. Quax and Wegmann had therefore both been ‘baptised in the waters of all fronts’ as the saying went. The stormy Nowotny set great store by Schnörrer’s judgment. After the war, the latter admitted that he was personally not comfortable with the Me 262, knowing it not to have been thoroughly tested and lacking essential equipment early on.

Once the various technical subjects had been talked over to exhaustion, Nowotny’s companions toasted his first Me 262 victory the previous day, the 257th kill of his career. After the glasses had been emptied, Nowotny’s mood became morose. ‘It’s a funny thing,’ he said at length, ‘but I keep having this dream about my next victory. Suddenly there’s one right behind me. You know the bomber I shot down yesterday? I had seen that happen in a dream beforehand too. Last night I didn’t dream at all.’ After a lengthy pause he added, more to himself than his two listeners, ‘Perhaps the next will be the last.’ It sounded so odd to hear Nowotny speak in this manner that both Wegmann and Schnörrer had to force a laugh.

‘Now, now, Nowi, don’t talk such utter rot,’ Schnörrer chided him, ‘You, of all people! If ever I spoke like that I’d have to have a pretty good reason for doing so, not a dream.’ He took the decanter and filled the empty glasses. ‘Now, let’s drink to the next half dozen!’

Nowotny was expecting the visit of the Inspector of Day-fighters, Oberst Hannes Trautloft, next day. Trautloft’s job was to monitor the standards of upkeep of the day-fighter units, of which the Me 262 now formed part. A successful fighter pilot since the beginning of the campaign in Spain in 1936, he had been one of the first Me 109 pilots and was thus an old hand who knew how to get things done better than anybody. He heard out Nowotny’s concerns sympathetically and then summoned a conference to listen to the requests of the Kommando’s pilots. Heading the list was the need for constant Fw 190 and Me 109 fighter protection above Hesepe and Achmer. Trautloft had been commodore of Nowotny’s training squadron and that evening they sat in pleasant reminiscences of better times. It was their last reunion.

During the early afternoon of the next day, 7 November 1944, General Galland and Generaloberst Alfred Keller arrived by air at short notice. Keller, a commander of very long experience, had had charge of IV Fliegerkorps over Holland and Belgium in May 1940. As General der Flieger he had attempted to dissuade Hitler from invading the Soviet Union. Afterwards he commanded Air Fleet 1 against Leningrad. At the time of his visit to Achmer he was responsible for producing the new generation of German military aviators and had had the opportunity to witness at first hand the Me 262 training problems by accompanying Galland. A direct man and a patriot, he was an admirer of Hitler and at the same time one of his sharpest critics.

After a thorough inspection of the two aerodromes and installations, the two generals settled down to a discussion with Nowotny and some of the more veteran pilots, including Wegmann, Schall, Preusker and Schnörrer, on flying the Me 262 operationally. Particular interest was shown in the dangers at take-off and landing. Keller wanted to know about dedication and fighting spirit, especially among the younger pilots. Nowotny invited Schnörrer to open the debate.

Quax, who had lost many friends in aerial battles, described the difference between a calculated attack and one made in blind passion. He knew the capabilities of the various fighters and their little idiosyncrasies and advanced the view that the maturity of an aircraft for battle was a precondition for success. Hitler had used exactly the same terms to Johannes Steinhoff as his justification for denying the jet to the fighter arm. Admitting it might be an eccentricity of his, Schnörrer observed nevertheless that in his opinion trust in the machine was essential for the fighting spirit of the pilot. After that he listed the known deficiencies of the Me 262 which remained uncorrected and which – as he knew – could not be remedied overnight.

All the pilots gathered in the group conceded privately that what Schnörrer had expressed was correct, but it was naturally also a question of personal mentality. Schnörrer’s considerations about the maturity of an aircraft were utterly incomprehensible to fighter pilots who trusted to luck. To them, the important factor was that the ‘power-house’ should be fast and well-armed, and the rest could look after itself. Among fighter pilots there were all levels of mental approach to these matters.

One pilot would fly by the seat of his pants while another could not rest easy until he had triangulated his course on a chart allowing for all known vagaries of the wind between points A and B. Keller took a middle course, whatever that was, and considered Schnörrer too cautious. Thus his reaction was sceptical. History, he concluded, gave enough examples where fighting spirit and courage had been more decisive than the keenness of the sword. But Keller was unaware of the extent of Quax’s experience. Schnörrer saw that he had said too much and fell silent. The conversation dried up for a spell and then re-opened along another avenue. Whether the tragic events of the following day were attributable to this conversation is an open question.

On the early morning of 8 November 1944 – Galland states 8 October in his book, but this is definitely an error – Galland, Keller, Nowotny and other officers of the Kommando Nowotny met at the Bramsche control centre for a short conference. The sun had still not risen when the radar post reported large concentrations of enemy bombers crossing the Zuider Zee. Another formation was over the Channel.

There are several versions of subsequent events. When enemy fighters were reported preceding the bombers, four Me 262s were ordered to intercept – Wegmann and Feldwebel Baudach from Achmer and Schall’s two machines from Hesepe. While conventional Fw 190 fighters circled the two airfields, the latter aircraft got away first, as Wegmann’s machines were still in the repair hangar and had to be towed out, thus delaying the procedure slightly. The battle began with the harsh staccato of flak from batteries distributed around both German airfields.