Hitler's Jet Plane (27 page)

At the end of October 1944, Schenk’s operational wing was reabsorbed into I/KG51 when the latter transferred to Rheine and Schenk himself took over as Squadron commander from Oberstleutnant Meister. I/KG51 remained continuously operational until the capitulation with a muster of 40 aircraft based at Rheine and Hopsten/Westphalia, then Giebelstadt, Rheine and Hopsten again, back to Giebelstadt and finally Leipheim. Fatalities were 1%, i.e., a pilot’s life expectancy was 100 missions.

When I/KG51 went operational, the Führer-edict was rescinded to the extent that targets could be pin-pointed in a shallow-angled dive. The surviving pilots of the Schenk wing who had been trained in dive-bombing obtained the best results during practice since none of the pilots who joined later had had the benefit of instruction.

Tactical targets were selected locally as appeared appropriate at the particular time. This occurred because no targets were ever allocated to I Group by Luftwaffe High Command. Whether German ground forces had no faith in the aircrew’s ability to bomb anything accurately as a result of how the Schenk wing had performed and thus never bothered to request Luftwaffe assistance, or Luftwaffe High Command simply did not order it for reasons of their own, was never determined. In November 1944 II/KG51 was formed at Schwäbisch Hall but the command structure within II/Group was unsuitable material for the task and its performance suffered accordingly.

2
The reasons why the Führer decided that the Me 262 was not a fighter but a bomber are not fully known. Probably they are to be found in Adolf Hitler’s destructive offensive spirit.
¹⁰
Also, the advisers in his more immediate circle, in particular Oberst Christian, seem to have fed him completely false information about the machine. Oberst Christian was the man appointed to advise Adolf Hitler in Luftwaffe affairs. Christian was conspicuous by his absence from operational airfields and Luftwaffe factories. Probably he always told Adolf Hitler what he wanted to hear. I base these assumptions on the opinion of senior Luftwaffe officers who discussed the subject with Adolf Hitler (such as Oberst Steinhoff).
¹¹

3
At the same time as Schenk’s bomber operations began in the summer of 1944, individual fighter sorties were flown against reconnaissance aircraft by units of Thierfelder’s Erprobungskommando (EKdo) 262 from Lechfeld in Bavaria. These flights, although few and far between and made by aircraft without supplementary tanks, were extremely successful.

As a result Hauptmann Nowotny was ordered by the Reichsmarschall to obtain as soon as practicable with an operational wing the proof that the Me 262 was more suited for use as a fighter against large enemy bomber formations than continuing in the bomber role. The Kommando Nowotny was formed at the beginning of October 1944 and based at Achmer and Hesepe near Rheine, Westphalia. The pilots were either experienced and drawn from various single-engine fighter Groups or raw fliers direct from training school. Nearly all were thrown into operations without receiving any jet training worthy of the name at Achmer or Hesepe. There were two short duty rosters and overall the operation was never well enough prepared to have had a chance of full success. Additionally the first encounters were with very strong USAAF formations. Although the wing received thirty aircraft during the four weeks of its existence, only three or four aircraft were ever in the air at any one time. The huge numerical superiority of the enemy and the inexperience of the younger Me 262 pilots combined to produce relatively poor results, many aircraft being destroyed by enemy fighters while taking off or landing. Others made crash-landings on the basis of incorrect instructions.

Nowotny himself had little experience with the Me 262. He had not flown recently and on the occasion of a visit by General der Jagdflieger Galland on 8 November 1944 decided to take an aircraft up. After destroying a four-engined enemy bomber he was ambushed on the approach to the home airfield by thirty enemy fighters and shot down.

Of the wing’s thirty Me 262 aircraft, only three were undamaged, and seven pilots had been killed for 22 enemy aircraft destroyed. Following Nowotny’s death, Galland ordered all pilots of the wing back to Lechfeld from where they did not return to operations until having completed a basic retraining course.

4
At Lechfeld, JG7 reformed as an Me 262 fighter squadron under Oberst Steinhoff. Nowotny’s former wing was absorbed in III/JG7. After all pilots of III/JG7 had flown ten hours at Lechfeld, the unit was transferred to Brandenburg-Briest, at first without aircraft. It was the winter of December 1944/January 1945 and the weather conditions prevented aircraft movements over southern Germany. Transfers to northern Germany, if possible at all, were severely restricted. As a result the aircraft were not flown up but brought by rail to Brandenburg-Briest where a team from Messerschmitt Technical External Service supervised the assembly work by JG7 ground personnel and then test-flew the aircraft. This work was also hampered by the winter weather.

At the beginning of February 1945, the supply firm Hr Dr Weber relieved the Messerschmitt team. This was an error of judgement because neither their labour force nor the supervision had any expertise with this type of aircraft. Additional to this further serious delay, the following modifications had been found necessary as a result of reports from pilots at the front:

1. Cabin heating, primarily to keep the cabin perspex ice-free during rapid changes in altitude.
   
2. Strengthened gun rings and new cartridge ejection chutes.
   
3. Adjustable control stick giving better purchase to override forces on control surfaces.
   

At the beginning of January 1945, Oberst Steinhoff had been relieved of command in line with general policy to reduce the average age of squadron commodores. His replacement was Hauptmann Weissenberger, commander of non-operational Group I/JG7. It was at about this time that the first aircraft came by rail for III/JG7.

In co-operation with Major Rudolf Sinner, commander III/JG7, the Group came to a good state of operational readiness. The required strength of engineer officers for the ground staff was achieved. Flight safety drill was practised using radio location equipment and to round off the whole Group exercised in formation. In mid-February III/JG7 together with the Squadron Staff flight became operational with a total of fifty jets. At this point there was a critical shortage of kerosene and few fighters besides the Me 262 were available for air-defence of the Reich. It had originally been planned that the jets would take on the enemy fighter screen leaving the bombers at the mercy of propeller-driven fighters, but these tactics were now impossible and had to be abandoned.

It was decided to ignore the fighters and attack the enemy heavy bombers from dead ahead or the rear. The head-on attack was less dangerous but was found unsuccessful on account of the fast closing speed: on the other hand, attacks from the rear proved very rewarding. The Technical External Service now learned of a new weapons system which had been tested by EKdo 25, later JG – X led by Major Christl. This was the R4M 5-cm rocket loaded in racks beneath each wing. With the help of Major Christl at Parchim, a JG7 machine was fitted with the gear and tested, after which a whole flight of III/JG7 was so equipped and the first missions flown at the end of February 1945. Victories rose appreciably and almost every jet making contact with an enemy formation managed to shoot down at least one heavy bomber. III/JG7 with a total strength of forty aircraft shot down forty-five bombers and fifteen fighters for the loss of six pilots. These fatalities were unavoidable as a rear approach brought the jet into the bomber’s strongest defensive arc of fire and hits were inevitable. A number of Me 262 losses were occasioned by the fighter being in too close proximity to a bomber as it exploded or unsuccessful attempts at landing on one engine after a fire in the other.

Even if the number of victories obtained by III/JG7 were, on the whole, not very high they were very significant proportional to the number of fighters deployed and taking into account the overwhelming enemy numerical superiority. In my opinion the enemy took note of these successes, of which the continual raids subsequently by his heavy bombers on Me 262 airfields and production centres is evidence.

I/JG7 was equipped at the same time as III/JG7 and operated from Kaltenkirchen north of Hamburg. Details of how this Group performed are not available. Pilots of II/JG7, the third of the newly formed Groups, were retrained at Lechfeld but never supplied with aircraft.

5
Concurrent with JG7, the first bomber squadron to be equipped with the Me 262 for fighter use, KG54, was ordered to operate as a bad-weather fighter wing. No pilot training was provided at either the Me 262 school nor later with Training Completion Group 262 Lechfeld and pilots were more or less left to teach themselves within the squadron. KG54 had no contact with the main fighter arm and even remained subordinated to the General der Kampfflieger. The outcome was that the squadron did not become operational until very late and their successes fell well short of those achieved by JG7.

The first pilots in particular, having a bomber training, were too cautious and demanded one modification after another to increase safety even though JG7 had provided plenty of proof that victories were attainable without all these improvements. Nevertheless, for poor-weather flying they demanded and got FuG 125 radar, the more accurate gyroscopic EZ 42 gunsight while blind-flying equipment was on order.

At about the end of January 1945, KG54 commodore Oberstleutnant von Riedesel led sixteen jets into the first operation. Weather was unfavourable, nine-tenths to fully overcast, cloud base at 2,000 feet, upper limit 13,500 feet. The machines dispersed to comb through the cloud, quickly came upon an enemy formation and attacked without regrouping. Two certain and two probable kills were claimed. German casualties were three total losses, the commodore and two flight lieutenants being killed and another three or four machines written off although their pilots escaped with light injuries or unharmed. An order was now received that this Group could operate their fighters in all weathers, but although they took delivery of no less than 145 aircraft, no further missions appear to have been flown.