Inside the Crosshairs (12 page)

CHAPTER 6
 

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March 8, 1965, lead elements of the 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division arrived at Da Nang as the first American combat troops in support of South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and their Vietcong (VC) allies. From the time they landed in Da Nang until their withdrawal from the war zone more than five years later, Marines recognized that Vietnam was a different kind of war that required constant adaptation and innovation.

Except for the brief periods of the three unsuccessful major offensives, the VC and NVA mostly avoided combat and fought only if they absolutely had to or if all factors favored a quick firefight victory with ample time and suitable terrain in which to escape. It was the type of war that brought the sniper and his skills to the forefront of effectiveness.

For their part, the Communists adopted a simple strategy. In 1952, the Lao Dong Party, which governed North Vietnam, announced its objective: “The ultimate aim of the Vietnamese Communist leadership is to install Communist regimes in the whole of Vietnam, in Laos, and in Cambodia.”

In 1957, the Viet Minh—both those who had remained in the south after the division of the country and those who had gone north and later returned—began an armed revolt against the Diem government. Those “revolutionaries”—referring to themselves as the National Liberation Front; the anti-Communists called them Vietcong—escalated their attacks throughout the late 1950s.

The year 1959 marked a turning point. In January of that year North Vietnam’s Central Executive Committee issued 74
Resolution Number 15, which changed its strategy toward South Vietnam from “political struggle” to “armed struggle.” The following May the North Vietnamese government began to develop a supply route, later known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to South Vietnam along a series of roads and paths in Laos and Cambodia.

To accomplish their aim, Ho Chi Minh and his North Vietnamese government continued the same strategy that the Viet Minh had used to topple the French—a three-phase methodology originally developed by Mao Tse-tung for the Communist takeover of China. General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, described the three-phase offensive in his book
A Soldier Reports
. According to Westmoreland, “In Phase One the insurgents remain on the defensive but work to establish control of the population and conduct terrorist and guerrilla operations. In Phase Two, regular military forces are formed, guerrilla attacks increased, and isolated government forces engaged. In the climactic Phase Three, large insurgent military units go on the offensive to defeat the government’s large units and to establish control of the population. A particularly Vietnamese aspect of the final stage is the ‘khoi nghai,’ the general uprising, wherein the people theoretically arise and overthrow the government.”

Two other major factors influenced the Communists’ three-phase plan. First, instead of allowing the Vietcong to conduct the war in South Vietnam by themselves, the North Vietnamese began sending advisers in 1963 and regular NVA forces in 1964. The second important influence on the VC/NVA strategy was the Communists’ patience and tenacity. From the beginning of the war, Ho Chi Minh stated that the Communists would willingly fight a “twenty-year war” and that the revolution was not a short-term undertaking.

Throughout the conflict, the Communists did indeed remain patient as they consistently were successful in executing phases one and two of their strategy. Despite overwhelming U.S. and South Vietnamese superiority in firepower, mobility, and technology, the Communists conducted guerrilla warfare
at will and frequently massed for small-scale attacks against units and bases. Whenever they felt threatened, they either withdrew to sanctuaries across the border in Cambodia or Laos or changed into civilian clothing and blended in with the local population.

Despite their patience before the Americans withdrew and left the war to the South Vietnamese, the Communists did attempt on three occasions to escalate their offensive into phase three. In the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the Tet Offensive of 1968, and the Easter Offensive of 1972, the Communists found that they could not defeat the Americans in sustained open warfare and that the general population did not rise up to help them. After each defeat, the Communists dispersed, withdrew, and waited for more opportune times. Each defeat reinforced the need for patience and the belief by the North Vietnamese leaders that they would be willing to accept defeat longer than the Americans would remain dedicated to the defense of South Vietnam.

To meet the tactics of the enemy and to adapt to the demanding terrain and weather, Marine units at all levels began making adjustments to their methods of operations immediately upon their arrival in Vietnam. From squad to force level, the Marines changed their style of operation in order to provide security for themselves and their South Vietnamese allies while at the same time taking all measures to neutralize as many of the enemy as possible. In a war of attrition, where success came to be measured in enemy body count, the Marines quickly began to contribute to the combined allied total number of VC and NVA killed.

The two divisions, two additional regimental landing teams, and a reinforced air wing of Marines ultimately assigned to Vietnam served in I Corps. Logically, the Marines, trained in amphibious warfare, would have served best in the Mekong Delta region of IV Corps, far to the south. However, true to the spirit of Vietnam’s being “a different kind of war,” the Marines spent the entire conflict in the thick jungles and mountains of the north.

The reasons were simple—if illogical. In 1965, the Honolulu-based
Pacific Command Headquarters developed contingency plans for “temporary” support operations in the Pacific that called for an initial Marine, rather than army, landing force. The shortage of deep-water ports in I Corps reinforced that plan since the Marines could be resupplied “over the beach.” In the rapid buildup of U.S. forces in Vietnam during the two years after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, no one had time or impetus to transfer units from one end of the country to the other.

Once operations began, the two Force Reconnaissance Companies and the two Division Reconnaissance Battalions made quick adjustments in “outguerrillaing the guerrillas” by conducting small patrols and adopting many of the enemy’s own tactics. Along with the regular infantry companies, the recon units relied heavily on artillery and airpower to support their operations and to engage enemy targets beyond the range of their organic small arms.

Only when the VC and NVA attempted to escalate their offensive into phase three did Marine battalions and regiments fight as unified elements in what closely resembled conventional warfare. Otherwise, small unit counterguerrilla operations, in which squad leaders and platoon commanders operated with great independence, marked the long periods of the enemy’s remaining in phases one and two of their strategy.

During those operations, the Marines discovered that they lacked the ability to quickly engage exposed targets at distances of more than 500 to 600 meters. The M14s, the basic infantry weapon of the first Marine units in-country, had a maximum effective range of 460 meters. The M16, initially issued in 1966 to completely replace the M14 by 1967, supposedly had the same maximum effective range, but true to its design, it proved much more effective in combat at 200 meters or less than it ever did at greater distances.

The massive amount of artillery and air support dedicated to the war zone came from those assets assembled to fight a possible massive land war in Europe against the Soviets. While that almost unlimited source of extremely deadly and reasonably accurate means of engaging enemy forces beyond
the range of organic infantry weapons was available, it was also wasteful.
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Virtually no target was too insignificant to merit artillery and/or air attack. Ground commanders, artillery forward observers, and forward air observers adhered to no budget and had few qualms about expending hundreds of artillery rounds on a single enemy soldier. Multiple sorties of helicopter gunships and fixed winged fighter aircraft likewise delivered rockets, bombs, napalm, and machine gun fire.

The problem with artillery and air support, aside from their “overkill” results, did not lie in their availability, accuracy, or willingness to respond to the needs of the ground commanders. Rather, the problem lay in the response time required to get the weaponry on target. Frequent delays occurred in getting clearances from adjacent units, air space controllers, and South Vietnamese officials. Further compounding the response time was the safety requirement that ground commanders call for marking smoke—a single round or rocket from the artillery, helicopters, or forward air controllers—to be sure targets were properly identified and targeted. While that usually took only minutes, it often provided the enemy ample time to disperse and disappear into the surrounding jungle or countryside.

The VC and NVA, with their very survival at stake, quickly learned to gauge the effective range of the Marines’ basic rifles and to use the brief warnings prior to assault by artillery and air to avoid being caught in impact zones. Marines at all levels became more and more frustrated at observing the enemy at distances beyond normal rifle range but having no effective means to immediately engage and neutralize him. It did not take long for the “old hands” to recall the effectiveness of snipers in previous conflicts and to once again seek the skills of the long-range killers.

As more Marine units poured into Vietnam in the spring of
1965, it became evident that snipers could contribute in the fight against the Communists. By early summer, Marine commanders were requesting sniper equipment for forward combat units.
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Colonel Frank E. Garretson, commander of the 9th Marine Regiment, became one of the first senior officer advocates of reintroducing snipers to the ranks. His commander, Major General Lewis W. Walt, concurred, and in late summer directed that a sniper program be formed in the 3rd Marine Division.
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The best account of the first Marine snipers in Vietnam comes from Major Robert A. Russell, then assigned to the Ground Combat Division of the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center at Quantico, Virginia. In an address during visits to Marine and army schools and training centers shortly after his return home from Vietnam in 1967, Russell explained that General Walt selected him to establish sniper training and directed the division staff to assist in securing rifles, scopes, and other equipment.

According to Russell, except for expediting the supply system to provide equipment and asking the headquarters at Quantico to develop sniper doctrine, General Walt left the sniper program up to him. In his later speeches, Russell recalled that, despite being only a captain at the time, he was left mostly on his own. His guidance from the 3rd Marine Division Operations officer, Colonel Don P. Wyckoff, was
simple and direct: “You’re Russell, huh? Fine. Start a sniper school. Let me know when you’re ready to go.”

Walt had selected exactly the right officer to “start a sniper school.” Russell, a native of Vista, California, and a veteran of three wars, had spent much of his twenty-two years in the corps on firing ranges as a member of various shooting teams. In several later interviews, Russell exclaimed, “For years I’ve been emphasizing the fact that the purpose of the Marine Corps’s Competition-in-Arms (annual shooting matches) is to make a Marine more proficient in combat.”

In Vietnam, Russell had his chance to prove that skills learned in competition shooting could be successfully adapted to the battlefield. While the division staff expedited requisitions for equipment, Russell used his carte blanche authority to requisition personnel for his team. According to Russell, “I couldn’t have been more fortunate. There happened to be five of the finest Distinguished Marksmen in the Marine Corps serving in various infantry outfits throughout the division. I knew them well, knew their capabilities, and I knew at that point, we were in business.”

The senior sergeant of the five, and therefore the NCO in charge of the sniper school, was Master Sergeant George H. Hurt, forty-two, of Bristol, Virginia, a veteran of seventeen years of competitive rifle and pistol shooting. Joining Hurt were Gunnery Sergeant Marvin C. Lange, thirty-five; Staff Sergeant Donald G. Barker, thirty-four; Sergeant James R. Bowen, twenty-eight; and Sergeant Robert L. Goller, twenty-six. All four had won individual and team shooting honors at national and international shooting matches. Lange wore the Bronze Star with Combat “V” for valor from the Korean War.