Inside the Crosshairs (22 page)

Joseph T. Ward of the 5th Marine Regiment prepares to depart An Hoa on a mission in 1969. (J. T. Ward)

A 1st Marine Division sniper team in action on January 21, 1970. (U.S. Marine Corps)

On February 9, 1966, the officer in charge of the Marksmanship Training Unit responded to the commandant of the Marine Corps in a brief, well-thought-out response endorsed by the chief evaluator, Colonel Walter R. Walsh, a marksman of some renown who had helped establish the Marines’ World War II sniper training. “The indicated urgency for an early recommendation,” the letter began, “dictated that evaluation be limited to presently available commercial items.”

Because the original instructions had provided no specific guidance, the letter explained that the evaluators had operated under some self-imposed assumptions. The assumptions of the MTU reflected their thorough knowledge of the characteristics of a dependable sniping system. Under a section titled “Self-imposed Assumptions,” the letter listed the requirements for the selected sniper system to use the standard 7.62-mm ammunition and “be simple, sturdy, and explainable with minimum amount of instruction.” The study’s authors assumed that most targets would be at ranges of less than 600 yards but that snipers would require a well-sealed telescopic sight that could sustain operations in conditions of high humidity and be “capable of adjustment at ranges up to and including 1,000 yards.”

To meet the requirements, the MTU tested five rifles—including the Winchester Model 70, the Harrington and Richardson Ultra-Rifle, and three models of Remington—as well as seven different telescopes. The study discounted the Winchester Model 70 for its requirement of 30.06-caliber cartridges and eliminated the Harrington and Richardson because, as the evaluation reported, “These rifles are assembled from components of 3 manufacturers including a foreign made action.” They also rejected the Remington Models 600 and
700-ADL and BDL rifles as too light for military sniping operations. Only the Remington 700-40X merited positive comment: “This rifle is built on an action designed for the 7.62 mm cartridge. Trigger is internally adjustable. Relatively simple to bed.”

Of the various scopes tested, the MTU found problems of insufficient power, insufficient adjustment capability, and weak seals that allowed moisture in the sight. Only the Redfield Accu-Range 3X-9X received positive comment: “Well-sealed, adequate internal adjustment, built-in range finder to 600 yards.”

In analyzing the rifle and scope test data, the letter stated, “Based upon physical examination and use of the above equipment, coupled with personal experience of testing personnel with the above and similar equipment, it is believed that the Remington Rifle Model 700-40X, in combination with the Redfield Accu-Range 3X-9X variable power telescopic sight in Redfield mount, is the most suitable equipment now available for the purpose expressed.”

Walsh and his fellow marksmanship instructors knew that the Winchester Model 70 had supporters at many levels within the Marine Corps, so they added a paragraph before their recommendations to head off objections to their findings: “The presence in the Marine Corps Supply System of a number of Winchester Model 70 rifles was considered. However, these are all chambered for the .30-06 cartridge. Modification to the 7.62 mm cartridge could be accomplished, but would be expensive and not especially desirable. Additionally, rifles that are nominally Winchester Model 70s are now found, due to factory modifications made over the years, in 3 different types. Many of these parts are not interchangeable.”

The MTU letter also recommended “a hard carrying-shipping case with protective foam-padding containing desiccant and fungicide be provided for each rifle/scope unit.”

The corps’s leadership acted with remarkable speed. On April 7, 1966, the Marine Corps adopted the rifle, scope, and mount as recommended, designating the system as the M40, although for the remainder of the Vietnam War some
would refer to it as the Remington 700, Model 700, or Remington M40.

Remington had marketed several types of 700s, including the two other models that the MTU found to be “too light,” as hunting rifles for several years, and had found wide acceptance of the Model 40X as a competition rifle before its selection by the MTU as a sniper weapon.

On May 17, 1966, the Marine Corps issued a supply contract to Remington detailing the specifications of the Model 40s and an order for delivery. By the end of the year Remington had completed 700 rifles and then produced nearly 300 additional weapons over the next five years. Remington modified the finish and added military swivels (for a sling) at its Custom Shop in Ilion, New York, and redesignated the rifle the Model 40 to comply with Marine specifications.

The M40 shared several characteristics with the Winchester Model 70 that it replaced. Both had a five-round magazine and a bolt action. Some critics at the time noted that bolt-action rifles required additional physical motions by the shooter to eject a spent shell and to reload a round into the chamber—movements that might compromise a sniper’s “hide” position—and they argued that semiautomatic rifles made better special marksman weapons.

Others countered that the additional moving parts in semiautomatic rifles made them less steady and therefore less accurate than bolt-action weapons. Marine marksmen admitted the slight weakness of “bolt-guns,” but believed both the Winchester Model 70 and the Remington M40 to be superior to any other bolt-action or semiautomatic rifle available.

The supply contract for the Remingtons also spelled out the specifications for the Redfield scopes and mounts to match the new rifles. The Redfield 3X-9X variable power telescope had entered the commercial market in 1962. At slightly less than thirteen inches long, the scope weighed only three quarters of a pound and proved to be rugged as well as resistant to humidity and moisture. More important, a simple power-selection ring allowed the marksman to enlarge or reduce the image between a magnification of 3.3X and 9.1X. Movement
of the power-selector ring also adjusted internal stadia wires that provided the range-to-target measurement on an internal indicator scale.

Of all its characteristics and capabilities, the Redfield scope’s ability to accurately indicate range proved the most vital. Snipers, even those with extensive “trigger time,” had difficulty in determining the distance to the target. Adoption of the Redfield scope ended the sniper’s having to make his own range estimate.

The Marines sent 150 of the sniper systems to the Camp Pendleton scout-sniper school. A few of the rifles and scopes arrived in Vietnam during the final days of 1966, and by the end of the first quarter of 1967 adequate systems were in-country to arm the instructors and field snipers.

The final subparagraph of the MTU’s letter to the commandant of the Marine Corps recommended that “action be taken to insure availability of match-grade ammunition for use in the rifle.” Thus, along with the M40 sniper rifles came special ammunition manufactured for the marksmen’s use on the range and the battlefield.

Target shooters and snipers alike knew that, regardless of the sophistication of their rifles and scopes, much of their accuracy depended on the quality of their ammunition. The optimum ammunition contained no variance in the amount of propellent, the size or weight of the bullet, or the shape of the cartridge. Each round should have the same characteristics and strike at the same place when fired under the same conditions.

At the time of the Vietnam War, ammunition manufacture had become extremely standardized, producing highly accurate cartridges. The tolerances of mass production, however, allowed
slight
variation, and while that had little influence on the fire of conventional riflemen, it did affect the consistency and accuracy of target shooters and combat snipers.

In the later part of the nineteenth century, ammunition manufacturers began to produce limited numbers of cartridges made with special care to ensure that each possessed identical characteristics and capabilities. Specific demand for such
special-made ammunition increased with the Olympic and other international shooting competitions that became popular after the turn of the century. Since those rounds were specifically made for and used in competition shooting, they became known as “match ammunition.”

Ammunition, including match, is manufactured in lots, that is, the rounds made in a single run on the cartridge plant assembly line. The manufacturer then assigns a lot number to each such batch and records the number on every ammunition container. Each round in a lot, especially those manufactured under match conditions, theoretically performs in the same manner. A sniper who zeroes his weapon with rounds of one lot can expect the remaining cartridges in the same lot to act identically.

Although the U.S. military had considered match ammunition for combat marksmen as early as World War II, it had not acted to acquire that type of round. Postwar marksmanship teams used match ammunition exclusively, but until Vietnam the most accurate rounds were limited to use on the target range. Logisticians resisted adding the more costly ammunition to already overburdened supply systems.

When Russell and Land established Marine sniper schools in Vietnam with the Winchester Model 70s, they never considered reverting to standard-issue cartridges. Instead they added match ammo to resupply requests. Because of the small number of snipers and the small number of rounds they fired, ammunition sources in the States had no problem keeping up with demand.

The Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Independence, Missouri, manufactured the match ammunition used in Vietnam. Built during World War II, the plant operated under management by the Remington Arms Company through a contract with the U.S. government, which actually owned the facility. Lake City first made .30-caliber ball ammunition for the Winchester 70s in 1957, and in 1962 became the sole supplier of the match-grade cartridges designated M72s. In 1964, the plant began manufacturing 7.62-mm NATO match ammunition as M118s.

Quality control requirements for both the M72 and M118 match rounds were the same. The Lake City plant tested each lot of match ammunition at its 3,400-acre facility, which hosted ranges that extended to 2,400 yards.
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According to the military contract for match ammunition, “The acceptance test requirement is a mean radius of 3.5 inches for nine 10-shot groups from each of three test rifles at a range of 600 yards. The mean radius represents the average distance of each shot in the group from the group center.”

The U.S. Army approached its selection of a sniper rifle and scope in a manner similar to that of the Marine Corps, the primary difference being that it conducted the evaluation in combat in Vietnam rather than back in the States at a marksmanship training facility. When the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) began its study of sniper operations and equipment in 1967, it worked under specific instructions to test and evaluate rifles and scopes to determine which models the army should adopt as the official sniper system.

The ACTIV operated under the same restrictions as the Marine MTU. The immediate need for a sniper system meant it had to come from present inventory or via “off the shelf” civilian procurement. Time to develop a new rifle simply did not exist during the escalation of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

Between April and June 1967, the ACTIV, with assistance of the USAMTU at Fort Benning, secured four different sniper systems for evaluation. These included the M14 accurized rifle with a 2.5X M84 scope, the M14 National Match rifle with a 3X-9X adjustable range telescope (ART), the M16 rifle with 3X Realist commercial telescope, and the Winchester Model 70 with a 3X Weaver scope.

Selection of the four weapon systems resulted from their availability and from the biases of the evaluators. For ease of
procurement and maintenance, the members of the ACTIV favored adaptation of a rifle already in the supply system. In fact, it is unlikely that the Winchester Model 70 would have been included at all but for the fact that eight of the rifles were already in the possession of the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam.
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Except for a brief mention buried deep in Annex A of the ACTIV’s final report, there is no evidence that the army ever considered testing the rifle the Marines had chosen for their sniper system. The comment in the Annex about the Remington 700s stated that it and the Winchester Model 70 possessed “very close to the same potential” as the M14 National Match Service rifle and, therefore, “would not warrant their purchase.”

The M16s used in the evaluation were standard issue, without modifications. No plans had ever been made to use the M16 in competition shooting so no match ammunition had ever been manufactured for it. As a result, regular-issue 5.56-mm rounds were used during the test. The Realist 3X scopes, commercially manufactured by the Colt Arms Company, also came without modifications for military use.

Little difference existed between the “accurized” and the National Match M14s except for adaptations to the former for mounting the M84 telescope and the latter for the ART system. Both rifles had been modified to prevent automatic fire, and parts had been selected and fitted to increase accuracy. Stocks of the M14s were bedded with a glass fiber and epoxy resin to make them impervious to water and the swelling or warping that would decrease accuracy. The army supply system made available 7.62-mm M118 match ammunition manufactured by the Lake City plant for use in the rifle’s twenty-round magazine.