Inside the Crosshairs (25 page)

CHAPTER 11
 

T
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selection of personnel and the acquisition of weapons and equipment were key elements in the success of army and Marine snipers in Vietnam. However, quality men and material alone could not accomplish the mission of long-range shooting. Sniper candidates required specific training to master their rifles and the many other components of effective sniper operations.

Training, varying in time and content, began with the formal sniper schools, taught either at in-country training facilities or in the States. The objectives of the training were simple and specific. To successfully complete the course, each student had to develop the confidence, will, knowledge, and skills required to become an effective sniper. Along with those skills, he had to display the ability to apply, instinctively, correct procedures and techniques when functioning in combat as an individual and as a team member.

The learning process, however, did not end with completion of the formal schools. Snipers continued to add to their knowledge by gathering information and techniques from their teammates on the job and through their own personal experiences. Although refresher training courses—especially in marksmanship—became common in Vietnam, it was each mission that provided snipers, regardless of their time in the field and their number of personal kills, the opportunity to perfect their craft.

Marine sniper training during World War II had lasted five weeks, and in the 1960s most experienced shooters still believed that marksmen required at least three to five weeks of
intensive day and night training to become proficient snipers. In fact, when the Marine Corps published FMFM 1–3B, “Sniping,” in 1969, it included a syllabus for sniper training consisting of more than 200 hours of formal classes and practical exercises.
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Unfortunately, because the Marines and the army arrived in Vietnam with no sniper capability, they had to train their marksmen in the midst of combat operations. Time to structure the in-country sniping schools according to peacetime training guidelines or requirements simply did not exist. Other factors, such as limited access to ranges—experienced by Captain Russell when establishing the 3rd Marine Division sniper school—also curtailed the length and content of training.

Because of range limitations, the 3rd Marine Division offered only three days of training in its initial classes. That became a week when facilities became available. Captain Land likewise used a five-to-seven-day training schedule for the initial sniper classes in the 1st Marine Division. The length of both in-country Marine sniper programs eventually extended to eighteen to twenty-one days.

The army’s sniper training in Vietnam also was brief when first established. When it began sniper evaluation in 1967, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) provided to the infantry divisions and separate brigades guidance for training programs averaging forty-six hours in length. Two years later, when he founded the 9th Infantry Division’s sniper school, Major Willis Powell used the eighteen-day curriculum that he had developed at the USAMTU at Fort Benning.

Because of the limited time available, the initial, week-long sniper schools focused almost exclusively on marksmanship and the care of rifles and scopes. Subjects included telescope orientation, range estimation, target detection, zeroing, wind effects, and weapon maintenance. Once the students mastered those skills, they began live firing.

Despite the abbreviated schedule, most soldiers and Marines
believed that the training provided sufficient practice for them to master the basics of long-range marksmanship. According to ACTIV surveys, about 85 percent of those trained for the army test expressed satisfaction with their instruction. Marines who went through the early sniper-training schools in both divisions expressed an even greater degree of approval of their training, frequently commenting positively on the skills and experience of their instructors. Ed Kugler, who joined the 4th Marine Regiment Sniper Platoon in March 1966, states, “My training was excellent. It was real, it was hard, but it was effective. No hype, just do it.”

Powell’s 9th Infantry Division students, as well as those in the Marine schools, recognized the experience of their instructors and respected their expertise. An article in the January–March 1969 issue of the 9th Division’s
Octofoil
quoted one of Powell’s early students: “ ’I couldn’t believe how great the NCOs were. They really know their business and treated us like professionals.’ ”

Ultimately, all sniper training, in-country and Stateside, followed basically the same program. Training began with an orientation on the sniper weapon system, its ammunition, and its care and maintenance. Following lectures and demonstrations the cadre moved the students to the firing range, an area that dominated the entire course. Other instruction included classes on techniques in camouflage and concealment, individual movement, escape and evasion, land navigation, communications, intelligence gathering and reporting, and air and artillery fire request and control.

Depending on time and available facilities, instructors modified or combined subjects, frequently teaching fieldcraft and other nonshooting skills to students awaiting their turn on the range. The concurrent instruction allowed everyone to maximize the limited number of training hours.

Regardless of hours available or content modification, marksmanship remained the focus of all the sniper-training courses. Other portions of the schools might be shortened or combined, but range firing remained a priority because many
students, even though they had scored expert with their individual weapons, had little or no experience with scoped military weapons or firing at long-range targets.

The all-important marksmanship training began with the basics of sighting and aiming, trigger control, and sight adjustment in dry-fire mode. Only then did the students begin to place rounds downrange to learn how to zero—to adjust the weapon sights so the bullet struck where aimed—their weapon systems. Once satisfied with their zero, the student fired from both supported and unsupported prone, kneeling, and standing positions. Even though the prone position with the weapon supported by a bipod, sandbag, or other steadying device provided the most accuracy, snipers had to be able to fire quickly from unprepared positions as well. Students fired at targets at ranges of 150, 300, 600, and 900 meters.

Due to the lack of standard silhouette targets in Vietnam, both the Marines and the army used the expended canisters of 155-mm artillery rounds as targets. Mounted on short poles, the readily available canisters served as reasonable facsimiles of the body area of enemy targets, held up well in all types of weather and after repeated strikes, and they rewarded snipers with a satisfying
ping
when bullets struck the target.

Marine and army sniper schools included night training as part of their curriculum. Marine snipers received limited instruction on how to shoot under the artificial light provided by aerial flares and searchlights. Because of their greater use of the AN/PVS-2 Starlight scope with the XM21 weapon system, army sniper students spent more time shooting during hours of darkness.

During training the sniper cadre attempted to instill a hunter’s mind-set into the students and to prepare them for the extremely personal aspects of killing. Because of the sniper-selection process, most candidates arrived at their training prepared to pull the trigger. Many were veterans of extensive combat before volunteering for sniper school and had already developed mechanisms for dealing with killing. Instructors and students alike maintained the attitude that sniping, albeit
more personal, was just one more method of killing the enemy. “A sniper feels nothing but the recoil,” became a common saying among the Vietnam marksmen.

While nonsnipers in Vietnam sometimes referred to the marksmen as “Murder, Inc.,” snipers, who understood their role in the conflict, on occasion promoted such attitudes. A sign at the 1st Marine Division sniper school, near Da Nang, proclaimed, “War Our Business, Death Our Only Product.”

Sniper training did not end with graduation from the schools; completion of the formal training merely signified the beginning of the sniper’s learning and perfecting of the skills of a superior marksman. New graduates returned to their units to continue their education by gleaning information from other veterans and by learning from their own firsthand experience. Each mission provided additional opportunities for improvement. All one had to do to add to his sniper skills was to survive.

The Marine Corps and the army in Vietnam did offer refresher courses that varied in depth. Some programs provided only unit armorers to maintain and adjust sniper weapon systems and shooting ranges for confirming zeroes; others provided full refresher training lasting as long as a week.

The 3rd Marine Division established the most lengthy and sophisticated of the programs on September 3, 1968. Division Order 1510.5, “Scout-Sniper Refresher Training Course,” provided information and instructions for a five-day program at Quang Tri. According to the order, the refresher training focused primarily on newly arriving snipers trained at Camp Pendleton before their deployment to Vietnam and on infantrymen serving in sniper platoons who had not undergone formal sniper training.

The refresher course included the same subjects contained in the basic schools: land navigation; communications procedures; and air, artillery, and medical evacuation support.
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As with other sniper instruction, the curriculum emphasized
range training with the rifle and scope system, and actual firing.

While their training shared similar objectives and used the same basic training schedules, the Marines and the army employed the sniper graduates in very different manners. Early draft copies of FMFM 1–3B, which contained what would become the official Marine sniper organization, were widely distributed shortly after the divisions organized their schools. The manual called for infantry regiment sniper platoons composed of a platoon commander, a platoon sergeant, a rifle team equipment repairman, and three sniper squads. Each squad consisted of a squad leader and five two-man sniper teams for a platoon total of one officer and thirty-five enlisted Marines.

The regimental sniper platoons were under the command and administrative control of the regiment’s headquarters company. Operational control remained directly under the regimental commander.

FMFM 1–3B also called for reconnaissance battalion sniper platoons, which were to operate with a similar but slightly smaller organization. Personnel included a platoon commander, a platoon sergeant, a rifle team equipment repairman, and four squads, each with a leader and three two-man teams. The thirty enlisted Marines and one officer served under the command and control of the reconnaissance battalion’s headquarters and supply company and the operational control of the battalion commander.

Responsibilities for personnel in the regimental and reconnaissance battalion sniper platoons were the same. The regiment or battalion commander, with the assistance of his operations officer, detached sniper teams to subordinate units. The sniper platoon commander provided input on these decisions and advised subordinate unit commanders on their employment. He remained responsible for the operational efficiency of his platoon, provided liaison for attached elements, and scheduled rotation of personnel to permit rifle rezeroing, training, and rest.

The sniper platoon sergeant assisted the platoon commander in coordinating the detachment of squads and teams to
other units. He also was responsible for the discipline, training, and welfare of the platoon and for the care and condition of weapons and equipment. The rifle team equipment repairman assisted in the latter task while also ensuring the security of weapons and special equipment in rear areas.

Each squad leader carried out orders issued by the platoon commander and assumed the responsibility for the care and condition of his men and their weapons and equipment. When detached to other units in the regiment or recon battalion, the squad leader assisted the commander of the supported unit in the control of the sniper teams and made recommendations about their employment. He also provided liaison between the supported unit and his sniper platoon commander and frequently performed as a sniper on missions as a part of a team.

Team leaders reported to their squad leader and carried out his orders. Their responsibilities included the supervision of the second member of the team and the care of their weapons and equipment. The team leader performed the actual sniping while his spotter provided observation, adjustment, and security.

FMFM 1–3B provides a simple statement of sniper duty. According to the manual, “The primary mission of a sniper in combat is to support combat operations by delivering precision fire on selected targets from concealed positions.”

The two-man team represented the heart and soul of the sniper platoons. Capable of attachment to any size unit or of limited independent operations, the two-man team represented the basic operational sniper element. The platoon chain of command did its best to keep teams together for as long as possible because the longer the two men worked together, the more efficient they became.