Inside the Crosshairs (27 page)

In his Trip Report, Lieutenant Colonel Fleming noted, “As yet, snipers seldom, if ever, constitute the primary weapon of a behind the lines force. This is true even in the marine division where the organization and doctrine is already spelled out.” Fleming explained that snipers usually accompanied a larger force that contained “reliable means of killing the enemy” on its own.

Besides the potential of capture, the “lone wolf” concept in the nonconventional combat zone did not make sense for another
important reason. Lieutenant General Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.), who assumed command of the 1st Marine Division in December 1968, commented on November 8, 1996, about the stories of single snipers who wandered far into enemy territory to “take out” a North Vietnamese Army division commander. According to Simpson, “First we
never
had a fix on a NVA Division Command Post. Second, if we had, we damn sure never would have sent
one
sniper when we had 176 tubes of artillery and all the possible air we needed. It makes good reading, I suppose, for those never in Vietnam, but it is pure fiction—and not very good fiction.”

The written procedures concerning sniper operations of the two Marine divisions that served in Vietnam provide detailed instructions on the employment of the special marksmen. Division Order 3590.3B, from the commanding general of the 3rd Marine Division to subordinate commanders with information copies to the 1st Marine Division, established the primary policy for Marine sniper employment for the remainder of the war.
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Paragraph 4c of the division order states, “A squad (10–14 marines) built around a sniper team is generally considered as the smallest unit which should be employed on missions beyond sight or direct communications from parent units. However, where the situation, terrain, and reaction capability permits the commander to reduce this force to exploit stealth and surprise, the calculated employment of smaller groups (4–8 marines) is authorized out to 2,000 meters from friendly positions. These forces may be made up primarily or even exclusively of scout-sniper personnel provided appropriate arms and equipment augmentation is provided.”

The same paragraph concludes with authorization for commanders to employ unsupported scout-sniper teams out to 500 meters from friendly positions. However, the guidance states
that commanders should take such measures only if the “situation, terrain, and reaction capability” were appropriate. Paragraph 4d follows with instructions that sniper units or teams were not to be employed without appropriate communications and dedicated indirect fire support.

In contrast, army units in Vietnam did not issue such clear and detailed guidance for army sniper operations. However, in practice the army adopted many of the same general policies. The most detailed document outlining the policies and procedures for army sniper operations is “Sniper Training and Employment in the 9th Infantry Division,” dated July 15, 1969.
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The 9th Division sniper policy stated that the best use of snipers was as part of an infantry platoon (thirty to thirty-five soldiers) ambush, or in a sniper hide position supported by a security element of five to eight soldiers. Again, as with the Marine Corps policy, snipers were always to be within range of radio communications and supporting fires.

Techniques for employment by the Marines and army were similar. One of the initial efforts to provide a written record of the employment of snipers in Southeast Asia appeared in a pamphlet published in late 1967 by the navy for the Marine Corps as NAVMC 2614, “Professional Knowledge Gained From Operational Experience in Vietnam” (below referred to as “Professional Knowledge”). According to the document, “Appropriate methods of employment for scout-sniper teams are as part of a blocking force, outpost security (daylight hours), as part of daylight patrols, as part of daylight ambushes, and as long-range covering fire for advancing units. Employment of sniper teams for patrols, outpost security, and as members of blocking forces constitute the most prevalent types of employment in RVN.”

By the time Division Order 3590.3B appeared, in June 1968, this basic guidance for sniper employment had been expanded and further defined. Under “Considerations of Employment,” the order listed appropriate employment as conventional offensive, conventional defensive, attachment to
patrols, extended daylight ambush, close daylight ambush, countersniper, and blocking positions.

In the conventional offensive section, the order noted the value of precision fire and the added benefit of better observation provided by the sniper’s 9-power telescope. The conventional defense subparagraph focused again on the added observation powers of the sniper and the sniper’s ability to break up, or channel, attacks by engaging the enemy at long range. Although the explanation of these employment techniques was fairly rigid, a sentence followed that stated, “Employment of snipers in both an offensive and defensive role is generally limited only by the imagination.”

The explanations of extended and close ambushes, counter-sniper operations, and blocking positions emphasized the sniper’s superior observation abilities and the influence of his accurate long-range fire. These explanations also included the importance of the sniper’s maintaining communications in order to direct artillery and air strikes against targets too numerous for an individual marksman to engage with rifle fire.

The 9th Infantry Division’s “Sniper Training and Employment” classified sniper operations in a manner similar to that of the Marine Corps. Under “Methods of Employment” it listed support of platoon ambush patrols, sniper ambushes accompanied by a five- to eight-man security element, and countersniper operations. It also noted that “stay behinds,” sniper teams with small security elements, could observe the back trail of patrols and engage enemy soldiers who might attempt to follow units.

The army covered two additional situations that the Marine documents did not mention: offset and night hunter operations. An offset operation was night firing with Starlight scopes augmented by high-powered xenon searchlights.

Night hunter operations in the 9th Infantry Division were the U.S. Army’s first integration of snipers with airpower. Colonel David H. Hackworth, USA (Ret.), described the night hunter operations in his autobiography,
About Face
. According to Hackworth. “Two snipers and three helicopters—a slick and two gunships—made up each Night Hunter team. The
choppers flew in blackout, the slick just a couple of hundred meters off the deck, its sniper passengers lying prone in the back, checking out the crisscrossing Delta canals and trails with Starlight scopes. The gunships, meanwhile, hovered maybe five hundred meters overhead. If through their scopes the snipers saw enemy below, they and the slick’s door gunners would take them under fire, with weapons loaded with tracer rounds. This showed the gunships exactly where in the pitch-black night the target was, and in turn, the gunships would hose the area down. The slick could also drop air force flares to light up the contact area, and a reaction force was always ready and waiting at the firebase if a target justified ‘piling on.’ ”

In a conversation with the author, Lawrence E. Tahler of Whitefish, Montana, provided additional information on the night hunters. According to Tahler, “I had just finished a six-month tour running a platoon for C Company and was working in the battalion Tactical Operations Center. Hack [Colonel Hackworth] had just taken over the battalion and called me over to talk about the new job he had in mind. His words were something like ‘Hey, Stud, I hear you won the Silver Star recently. I don’t want my studs to be in operations, I want them where they can do some good for the battalion. What about setting up a sniper program?’ ”

Tahler recalls, “It took me about three, maybe four seconds to respond, ‘Yes, Sir!’ The 4th Battalion 39th Infantry’s sniper program was born.”

Once the battalion’s new platoon was fully operational, Tahler experienced several problems common to other army and Marine sniper units in Vietnam. He found that many of the infantry company commanders did not understand how best to employ their snipers and that the other infantrymen in the battalion did not always appreciate the special marksmen. Tahler summarizes, “The snipers were the only ones in the battalion authorized to wear camouflaged fatigues and black berets with a red recondo patch on the front. The special outfit, the specialized weapons, the fact that snipers only reported to me (they were not under command of any of the line companies),
they did not stay out in the field like the grunts did; all combined to make the snipers very unpopular with the troops. However, I don’t remember ever being at a loss for troops who wanted to become snipers!”

Other army and Marine sniper units shared the operational problems experienced by Tahler. According to Ed Kugler, the biggest problem while he was a sniper in the 4th Marine Regiment was the small unit commander’s lack of knowledge about how to use the teams properly.

In his 1969 Trip Report about the sniper program in Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel Fleming noted that both the army and the Marine Corps were guilty of the misuse of their snipers. As an example, Fleming included the story of a Marine who built a body count of fifty-two enemy soldiers using sniper tactics and his scoped rifle only to be killed by a shot through the heart when misused by an infantry commander in a ground assault against a fortified position.

Captain John W. Pinkston, former officer in charge of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, snipers during 1969 and 1970, also encountered typical operational problems. In a 1971 study for the Fort Benning Infantry School, Pinkston wrote, “The sniper program in the 3rd Brigade was hindered by small unit commanders’ not being well versed on the utilization of snipers. During early employment, the sniper was forced to hump the rice paddies all day and perform sniper missions by night. Obviously, this constituted poor morale for the sniper and lowered his standards and performance.”

In addition, Pinkston noted that at times snipers took advantage of field commanders’ lack of information about their operations, writing, “There were some cases where snipers used their knowledge to deceive commanders, i.e., the sniper would move his weapon off zero to obtain a ‘sham’ trip to the rear for purposes of rezeroing his weapon. Had this specific commander understood the art of sniping and sniper equipment, he would have known that a corrective measure against this malpractice would have been to write his zero setting on paper and keep it in his records.”

Kugler agrees that some snipers took advantage and “weren’t motivated to do what they were trained to do.”

Fleming’s Trip Report points out another significant impact on sniper operations: “The most important finding from this trip is an answer to the question, ‘Why do so many teams rarely engage targets?’ ” Conversations with the snipers themselves clearly indicate that it is primarily the well known ‘don’t shoot, you’ll give our position away’
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syndrome of World War II and Korea.”

The Trip Report also noted, “A second and possible contributing cause for some trained snipers’ rarely engaging targets may well be an ‘executioner complex.’ Most officers and sergeants interviewed say that their men would not hesitate to kill an enemy ‘in cold blood.’ However, in the next breath they tell you that the first criterion for selecting a sniper should be: ‘a good soldier—a solid citizen.’ ”

With these factors in mind, Fleming theorized, “It would certainly seem likely that the same moral and religious upbringing that produced such a good soldier also produced a man with serious reservations about the morality of shooting an unwarned, unsuspecting fellow human being. An historical precedent morally may be the bounty hunter of the old west; many felt this type of person was reprehensible, although the cause could be just.”

Fleming included in his report that the solution to these problems was additional training and as much live-fire practice as possible. He concluded, “The more a man uses his weapon the more likely he is to use it in a combat situation.”

Operational techniques used by army and Marine snipers in Vietnam evolved and improved in the same manner as did their weapons systems and training. Some maneuvers and tactics carried over from previous wars; some originated in the rice paddies and jungles of Southeast Asia. Like other military
units in Vietnam, the snipers repeated what worked and discarded what did not work. Their experiences and accomplishments varied, but they established and reestablished sniper operational procedures that would outlast the long war itself.

CHAPTER 13