Inside the Crosshairs (31 page)

After the completion of the ACTIV tests, only the 9th Infantry Division maintained records on the accomplishments of its snipers to any degree. According to its report, “Sniper Training and Employment,” the division’s snipers were “first assigned to maneuver battalions on 7 November 1968 and obtained their first kill on 10 November 1968. During the period from November 1968 to April 1969 seventy snipers were employed in the division. They had 286 contacts and accumulated a total of 475 confirmed kills, or 1.67 kills per contact.”

A few months later the 9th Division—less the 3rd Brigade, which remained in-country for one more year—left the war zone as one of the first American units to withdraw from Vietnam. The final confirmed number of kills by the division, including the 3rd Brigade, totaled a little more than 1,200.

No other army division or separate brigade snipers came anywhere near the total kills amassed by the 9th. Most of the
army commands integrated their trained snipers back into their infantry platoons and their kills were merely added to the unit body counts. It would be extremely optimistic to estimate that the sniper kill total of all the other army units in Vietnam together equaled that of the 9th Infantry Division.

Based on those considerations, the combined army and Marine sniper kill total for the Vietnam War is about 13,000. Considering that only about 1,250 soldiers and Marines served as precision marksmen during the conflict, and that they expended fewer than two rounds of ammunition per contact to produce a body count of 13,000, it is difficult to evaluate the sniper program as anything but a successful contributor to the war effort.

Yet those figures are small compared to the overall number of VC/NVA casualties during the long conflict that incorporated the most sophisticated small arms, artillery, and air support of any war to that point. A conservative estimate of VC/NVA deaths as a result of combat is 666,000, though some place the figure as high as 924,000. Using the rough average of 800,000 VC/NVA deaths, 13,000 sniper kills accounts for less than 2 percent of the total enemy killed.

That minimal impact on the progress and outcome of the war is one reason for the lack of any mention of army and Marine snipers in the various almanacs and encyclopedias about the Vietnam War. The exclusion of snipers began with the publication of the groundbreaking
Vietnam War Almanac
by Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., USA (Ret.), in 1985 and with
The Vietnam War: An Almanac
edited by John S. Bowman the same year. Despite the increased interest in snipers in more recent years, the 1997 edition of
Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War
edited by Stanley I. Kutler makes no mention of them.

Shelby Stanton’s
Vietnam Order of Battle
, published in 1981, is the most comprehensive reference book on U.S. Army forces deployed to Vietnam during the war. Yet even that detailed work offers only two photos of XM21 sniper rifles and the explanation that the weapon was “the standard army sniping rifle during the Vietnam War.”

Another source that usually provides insight into the effectiveness of a unit, tactic, or weapon system is the enemy himself. In Vietnam, however, that resource revealed little about the American snipers. A few VC/NVA prisoners during wartime interviews mentioned snipers but none made any reference to any great impact by the long-range marksmen. Of course, with the amount of artillery and air ordnance delivered on suspected enemy locations, it is little wonder that single shots from rifles, regardless of their accuracy, did not make an impression.

One of the most often referenced indications of the impact of American snipers on enemy operations is also one of the most controversial. Practically every book and article on American snipers mentions Communist commanders’ offering huge bounties—up to a year’s pay—on snipers “dead or alive.” While the stories were often repeated and believed by both the snipers and their commanders, there is no conclusive evidence that a single reward for the demise of a sniper was ever offered by the VC or NVA.

Not a single reward poster, printed announcement, or prisoner interrogation manuscript exists in any archive to support the bounty claims. More telling is the fact that every elite unit—army LRRPs, Marine force reconnaissance, and the various Special Forces units in Vietnam—also claim to have had bounties placed on them. The stories even extended to helicopter crews, armored cavalry squadrons, and artillery batteries as well as to the ranks of the ordinary infantrymen.

But there is
no
hard evidence that formal rewards for snipers were ever issued by the VC/NVA. Perhaps, someday, one or more of the rumors will be verified, but that has not yet happened.
^‖

Another often misunderstood or misrepresented aspect of American snipers in Vietnam is their casualty rate. The VC/NVA rarely had sufficient mortar and artillery support to “pile on” firepower against a single sniper or team. The tactic most commonly used by the Communists against the American snipers was the same tactic they used in their other operations—when engaged the VC/NVA withdrew as soon as possible.

The enemy’s lack of significant countersniper measures, combined with the excellent training of the U.S. marksmen, meant that few American snipers were killed or wounded. Although there are no official statistics on U.S. sniper casualties in the war, the available information indicates that the percentage of marksmen killed or wounded is far below that of infantry and reconnaissance units. An article in the April 21, 1986, edition of
U.S. News & World Report
states that of 600 snipers trained by Carlos Hathcock in Vietnam, only one was killed in combat.

Many of the snipers who did die did so heroically. On June 6, 1967, Corporal John R. Burke of the 26th Marine Sniper Platoon joined the regiment’s 1st Battalion defense of an outpost on Hill 950, near Khe Sanh, that came under attack by a numerically superior enemy force. Burke, a twenty-three-year-old from Clearwater, Florida, suffered grenade fragment wounds early in the battle. Ignoring his wounds, Burke administered first aid to several other wounded Marines and moved them to safer positions under heavy enemy fire. When it appeared the attack was about to overrun the outpost, Burke armed himself with grenades, shouted encouragement to his fellow Marines, and charged the enemy in a valiant one-man assault. The Marine sniper fell mortally wounded but his actions stopped the enemy attack.

Burke posthumously received the Navy Cross, the second highest award for combat valor. His actions, like those of other snipers, would receive little notice at the time but added to the postwar reputation of the precision marksmen.

With their minute contributions to the total body count, their general tendency to keep operations secret, the lack of
enemy concern about them, and few references in official and unofficial publications, it would seem that post-Vietnam sniper service would follow the precedent of previous wars and quickly disappear, that snipers would disband into the “civilities” of peacetime. That was not to be.

As the first conflict brought into the living rooms of America via television, Vietnam took away the mystique and glamour of war for most viewers. For the first time Americans saw the blood, carnage, and death of battle on their TV screens. Some were sickened by the display and turned to or increased their pacifism and antimilitary bias. Others embraced the openness and sought more information on the lethal methods of warfare and its warriors.

Among the people interested in the Vietnam War were legitimate history buffs, fans of all things military, and “wannabes”—those who lived vicariously through combat stories and even invented their own. Weapons and marksmanship appealed to those groups, and among them the sniper gained a positive profile, becoming an object of interest—and in some cases, envy.

The image of the sniper in the post-Vietnam period received a further boost when police departments incorporated special marksmen into their forces as members of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams to counter the growing number of criminals armed with high-power rifles and automatic weapons. In the minds of many, policemen combating serious crime with scope-mounted rifles legitimized the sniper and added to his reputation as a “special” individual.

Henderson’s 1986 book on Carlos Hathcock greatly increased the visibility of Vietnam snipers. Much of the legendary reputation of snipers in Vietnam comes from this description of how Hathcock earned his 93 confirmed kills. Accounts of army sergeant Adelbert F. Waldron’s 109 kills and more recent revelations of Marine Chuck Mawhinney’s 103 kills have greatly added to the legend of the Vietnam-era sniper.

Although the accomplishments of those magnificent marksmen are worthy of books and admiration, they are not typical
of the ordinary Marine and soldier sniper in Vietnam. Few snipers in the war built a body count into the double figures, and many of the trained marksmen never acquired a single confirmed kill.

A study of the first fifty-four snipers trained by the 9th Infantry Division reveals that during their initial five months of operations eighteen, or one third, had no confirmed kills; half, or twenty-seven, had 1 to 4 kills: seven, or 13 percent, accounted for 5 to 9 kills each. One of the snipers had 12 confirmed kills, and Waldron had accumulated 92 on the way to his final total of 109.

Many action-adventure novels of the late 1980s and the 1990s featured Vietnam-trained snipers performing various daring, and at times dastardly, acts. By the time the movie
Sniper
, starring Tom Berenger, was released in 1993, in some circles the sniper had reached a superhero status more akin to comic book heroics than actual combat.
^a
The proliferation of the Internet in the 1990s has increased interest, and there are thousands of sniper home pages containing everything from marksmen conspiracy theories to catalogs from which to order T-shirts with logos about death from a distance.

The accomplishments of individual snipers in Vietnam are certainly commendable, but they had little obvious effect on the war or its outcome. However, their performance in combat, with a few men producing large numbers of enemy casualties, reconfirmed the importance of long-range marksmanship and, more important, provided a legitimacy and acceptance of their craft that would survive into the postwar peacetime.

Like many aspects of the Vietnam War, as well as the overall conflict itself, snipers have sparked a controversy. In
Sharpening the Combat Edge
, General Ewell, who had the greatest influence on the development of army marksmen in
Vietnam, said, “The sniper program of the 9th Infantry Division was one of the most successful programs that we undertook. It took over a year from its inception in the States to its peak of performance in Vietnam. It also took plenty of hard work and belief in the concept and in our snipers. But more than anything it restored the faith of the infantryman in his rifle and in his capabilities.”

In a letter dated November 26, 1996, Ewell repeated his praise for the snipers of two decades earlier, and added, “The program was most worthwhile. Our snipers (70–80) produced as many kills as a typical battalion plus encouraging the ordinary rifleman.” In later correspondence, Ewell added, “Setting up and carrying out the program was a major effort as we had to start from scratch. The payoff was substantial.”
^b

Lieutenant General Elvy B. Roberts, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division from May 1969 to May 1970, also had praise for his snipers. Roberts recalls, “Snipers in the 1st Cav were very, very effective. We used them to target VC and NVA using trails in our area of operations and the snipers’ accurate fire greatly limited the enemy’s movement.”

Lieutenant General Ormond R. Simpson, USMC (Ret.), provides a more balanced response—and perhaps the best overall evaluation of sniper operations in Vietnam. In a letter dated November 8, 1996, Simpson wrote, “When I assumed command of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) at Da Nang, Vietnam in December, 1968, the sniper program had been operating for some time. I was satisfied with what I found and continued the program during my tenure.

“It is difficult to accurately measure the effectiveness of a program such as that of snipers,” Simpson continued, “there is little if any feedback. The number of confirmed KIA/WIA was impressive and this is certainly a plus. But the war cannot be won by such numbers. The few POWs that we got we asked about this. Most professed to know nothing, a few
showed some knowledge and indicated that it was demoralizing to the units concerned but only for a short time.”

When asked about the major accomplishment of his division’s snipers, Simpson responded, “Who knows? Judging from the number of kills, we assumed the program was effective but always, of course, within a very narrow scope as far as the overall division mission was concerned.”

Simpson had nothing but praise for the individuals behind the crosshairs. When asked about the quality of his shooters, Simpson noted, “I recall no major shortcomings. These men were all superb marksmen with the sniper rifle.”

Other Marine commanders share Simpson’s praise for their snipers. Lieutenant General William K. Jones, USMC (Ret.), who commanded the 3rd Marine Division in 1969, recalls that his “outstanding rifle marksmen” were “very effective.”

Not all senior army and Marine commanders shared the praise of generals Ewell, Roberts, Simpson, and Jones for snipers in Vietnam. Major General Ellis W. Williamson, USA (Ret.), included in a letter dated November 7, 1996, his observations of snipers in three wars. Williamson, who commanded the 173rd Airborne Brigade during 1965 and 1966 and the 25th Infantry Division during 1968 and 1969, said, “I am not a good witness for the sniper program. I observed this activity under many circumstances to include World War II, Korea, and two tours in Vietnam. I have not been convinced that it is a worthwhile activity. There is no doubt that many riflemen have done well; however, it did seem to me to be a waste of some well-qualified men to set this type program up as a full-time activity.”

General Frederick J. Kroesen Jr., USA (Ret.), who assumed command of the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division in July 1971, wrote, “My experience with snipers was not good.” Before Kroesen assumed command of the 23rd, the division’s sniper-training program had been abandoned, and the general recalls, “I did not renew it.”