Just 2 Seconds (7 page)

Time Can Work for You

In the TAD exercises described above, protectors have been told to expect the attack to occur within 30 seconds. There is another TAD exercise in which attackers can shoot at any point within a 10-minute period. Students often assume that with the longer time period, their performance will decrease, reasoning that they can't remain as attentive for 10 minutes as they can for 30 seconds.

Perhaps surprisingly, TAD protectors are usually
more
successful in the 10-minute exercises. Why? Because given more time, the protector gets to know the attacker and the environment; he is able to establish a baseline against which to measure change. As in a poker game, the protector learns the attacker's
tells,
the small signals sent as he mentally and physically gets ready to attack. Perhaps there's a small but telltale change in his eyes, a change in respiration, a movement of facial muscles, or a slight shift of weight right before the attack. Whatever it is, we know it's beneficial when protectors can orient themselves and become familiar with the people in their environment for a period of time in advance of the protectee's arrival. Conversely, an attack that commences the instant a protectee comes into view gives fewer chances for protectors to detect the Pre-Incident iNdicators (PINs -- See The Gift of Fear for much more on PINS).

Twenty-Five Feet

Stage Two of the TAD exercise repeats most of the series described above with the addition of a close-coverage protector positioned closer to the protectee and given the job of moving and/or blocking the protectee as soon as the attack is recognized. The exercise is first done with the protector 7 feet from his protectee, and then repeated with the protector within arm's reach of the protectee.

The addition of a close-coverage protector substantially enhances protector success rates. With one protector focused on the protectee and another protector on the suspect, protectors will prevail virtually every time.

However, when the protector is too far from the protectee, his ability to act effectively is profoundly reduced. Those words are not strong enough, because the fact is that if the protector is 25 or more feet from the protectee, he will have no impact on the outcome of an attack. TAD attackers are able to fire six perfectly aimed shots before the protector can cross those 25 feet and reach the protectee. The protector is simply too far away to get there in time to make a constructive difference.

Let's clearly define this situation that offers attackers a success rate of 100%:

• Protectee at center stage
  
• One or more bodyguards in the wings at side-stage
  
• No protectors near the attacker
  

Those three conditions describe one of the most common real-world scenarios -- and they offer a nearly perfect situation for an attacker to succeed. Public appearances often occur at the center of large stages that result in forty feet of distance between the protectee and the nearest protector. Further, it's common that nobody is assigned near the general public at the front of the audience. Protectors, even many of them, might be posted in the wings, around the backstage area, and at other locations of secondary importance -- while the concern about appearances has compelled all but a few protected persons to resist allowing protectors to have front-stage posting.

Since this situation offers attackers almost certain success, it leads to a critical tenet of effective protection:
Have a protector at least as close to the protectee as is the nearest member of the general public.
Stated differently, no member of the general public should ever be closer to a protectee than is a protector. Though the wisdom of this tenet is clear, it is frequently violated because protectees and their assorted advisors are so concerned about how things look.

Risk can be substantially reduced if decision-makers are persuaded to have the speaker's podium set up at the far left or far right of the stage instead of in the center, allowing acceptable proximity to protectors positioned in the wings, and still having protectors out of view of the audience. This is completely practical for speeches. For protectees who are performers, it might sometimes be impractical since most perform from center-stage, or, even worse from our point of view, all over the stage. Still, we need to make it known that from a safety point of view, it's best to appear at the side rather than the center of the stage.

When conditions dictate that protectors cannot be close to their protectees (as in the on-stage example), then the entire reliance is upon those protectors assigned to observe, assess, and respond to people who might attack from within crowds and audiences. As will be explored more later, safety is nearly assured when the set-up keeps the nearest members of the public more than 25 feet away from the protectee. So, 25 feet emerges in three critical tenets:

1. Always strive for 25 feet of distance between protectee and public;
   
2. Always strive for much less than 25 feet between you and protectee;
   
3. Always strive for much less than 25 feet between protectors and public.
   

We have a favorite solution to the on-stage challenge when stages are elevated to a height that allows our people to walk underneath. In our preferred situation, the front of the stage directly facing the front-row audience members is made of plywood painted flat black; however, we remove four sections of plywood and hang black curtains. Protectors are posted behind those curtains, and able to see the audience perfectly through fabric screens sewn into one-foot sections of the curtains at head-height. Since the area under the stage is completely dark, audience members are never aware that protectors, just a few feet in front of them, can observe any approaches to the stage. In the event of an alarming approach, protectors can simply walk through the curtain and intervene from a location that no attacker is likely to be aware is manned. This arrangement provides a situation in which security is literally invisible to audience members -- and thus has no impact upon the show or performance. In venues that can physically accommodate this option, it really ought to be the standard approach. Alas, what ought to be done for protected persons and what is done are rarely the same.

Protector Lessons

Those playing the role of protector in TAD exercises offer us some important strategies for improving performance:

• Be present. Thinking about being ready impedes action. This is not the time for preparing to be ready -- it is the time to Be Ready, to Be Pre-sent.
  
• Don't dive. Diving through the air rarely gets you there any faster, and diving lessens the likelihood of connecting with any precision (i.e., you might miss altogether).
  
• One foot ahead of the other. Pre-attack stance is important; have sure footing with one foot ahead of the other.
  

  Photos by Gavin de Becker & Associates
  

• First things First. Disruption of aim is the primary goal.
  
• Gaining control of the gun is a secondary goal, for which there is lots of time, relatively speaking, whereas disruption of aim must be accomplished right now.
  
• Grabbing the gun (or grabbing anything) is not a necessary component of success.
  
• Mid-arm! Connecting with the mid-arm offers your best chance at success. If you seek to disrupt aim by aiming for the gun itself, you are choosing a small target that is easy to miss.
  
• Start close. Get close. Where you begin decides who'll win. If you and the attacker start the race from the same place (you standing right near the attacker), you need spend no travel time to meet him -- and you'll win the contest. It takes hardly any energy to disrupt aim once you reach the attacker.
  
• Keep your protectee moving. Attackers lose accuracy when required to track. Hence, moving the protectee somewhere (rather than just down) will improve chances of successful protection.
  

Attacker Lessons

While TAD is not intended to improve the performance of assassins, those trainees who play the role of attacker do learn strategies that help us better understand the overall dynamic.

• TAD attackers found that beginning a countdown or other mental routine before they drew their weapon made their internal commitment less obvious to others, thus reducing the likelihood of telegraphing intent.
  
• TAD attackers found that it was better to begin their attacks as early as possible, giving protectors less time to observe them and less time to get the "lay of the land" prior to the attack.
  
• TAD attackers found they were more successful when they weren't in the front row of people in a rope line. This way, protectors could not fully see and observe them prior to the attack.
  
• The attacker's first two shots usually matter most, but...
  
• TAD attackers keep shooting as long as they are able.
  
• Once they commit, they don't hesitate even for an instant. If they hesitate, they fail.
  
• TAD attackers had to ignore all that was going on around them. They had to stay on mission and not be intimidated by the rapid approach of protectors. After a lot of practice, attackers came to learn that even a lightning-fast protector response doesn't mean a thing until he actually touches them. In effect, the lesson was: Don't flinch -- it uses up too much time.
  

The last two lessons apply equally to protectors and attackers.

Toward the goal of better understanding attacks, here is a summary of the ideal instruction for an assassin:

The moment you have all the ingredients in place for your attack, Act. Don't wait. If your target is in clear view, and no protector is close enough to be effective, and the weapon is in hand, Act.

Assuming some proficiency with the weapon, the ingredients for successful attack are relatively few:

Access + Commitment + Target + Time

When attackers have these ingredients and yet do not act, they start thinking too much, allowing thoughts and distractions to get in their way.
Is that person a guard or an aide? I wonder if he'll turn around and face me soon? Am I close enough? Is my target wearing a bullet-resistant vest?
These examples of thinking show us something of equal relevance to our mission (and important enough that it merits the entire next chapter): The act of thinking is not an act at all. Thinking invites all kinds of information to get in your way.

Playing either role (protector or attacker) teaches this essential lesson again and again: If an attentive protector is close, all of the attacker's advantages quickly evaporate once he presents a gun. From then on, time starts passing very quickly. It brings to mind the old saying "Time flies when you're having fun" -- only now, it's "Time flies when you're waving a gun."

In Thomas Perry's book
Sleeping Dogs,
a mafia hit man gives an instructive account:

Once you're in, you're like an egg in a frying pan. You get two seconds to get in, see him and pop him. You stand still more than a second at any step, you heat up and fry.

Protective and Projective Roles

Speaking broadly, there are two categories for protectors:

1. Projective:
   Those who are closest to an audience, crowd, bystanders, onlookers, or site perimeter. They assume responsibility for offensive actions, such as blocking, disruption of aim, charging, overpowering and neutralizing attackers, taking custody, etc. We call this category "Projective" because their mission is to project energy and force outward, away from the protectee.
   
2. Protective:
   Those closest to the protectee and expected to take defensive actions, such as shielding, covering, moving, and evacuating. Their mission is to defend the protectee.