Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (34 page)

It is highly unlikely that national reconciliation will take the form of a treaty-like single event. Rather, it is likely to be a gradual process that involves the building of trust, and it will probably have to be reinforced or renegotiated over time. To achieve successful national reconciliation, a complex situation of conflicting interests — of ideas, institutions, and attitudes — will have to be mediated. Areas of conflict that will have to be dealt with include not only the most obvious contention between the military and the National League for Democracy, but also conflict between the military and the minorities, amongst the minorities themselves, and conflict over the determination of the leadership within each minority. In addition, the protagonists will have to find some way of getting the outcome of the reconciliation process accepted by the international community.

One device that has been used in other countries and that could possibly be of use in such a process is a “truth commission”, which would provide a mechanism for attempts to purge the tensions of the past. However, while truth commissions or the equivalent in Myanmar may be necessary or desirable, they are unlikely to satisfy many, and may lead to new forms of frustration. This is not to argue that they are inappropriate or unnecessary, but it is clear that everyone — people and government alike — must have realistic expectations about what they can and cannot achieve.
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Such a commission would have to be distinguished from the issue of retribution against excesses by the military, either personally or institutionally.

This writer perceives seven cleavages or tensions within contemporary Myanmar that need to be mediated and reduced if national reconciliation is to take place. These are:

1.   Conflict between Burman and minority nationalism — a critical variant of center-periphery relations;

2.   Conflict between civil and military sectors of society;

3.   Tension between the forces of globalization and nationalism;

4.   Tension between tendencies towards centralization and towards pluralism;

5.   Tension between orthodoxy and diversity of views;

6.   Conflict among religious groups;

7.   The international geopolitical rivalries that affect internal attitudes.
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Other, more abstract, tensions, that have to do with modes of behaviour, exist — between personalized and institutionalized decision-making, between transparency and secrecy, and between meritocratic advancement and personalized loyalty. These are intrinsic to the situation in Myanmar, and their modification will be fundamental to progress in any reconciliation process.

Some efforts towards mediation of these tensions — described below — have begun, but the very processes required have in most cases either stalled or have yet to be seriously attempted. Both international and indigenous elements of civil society have already indicated possible capacities and roles for their involvement in the reconciliation process. Even if the results are less than spectacular, the very precedent is important and the potential is evident. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva, Switzerland, and Yangon) has acted as a link between United Nations Special Envoy Razali Ismail, the government, and Aung San Suu Kyi, and its involvement over several years of quiet dialogue provides one example of efforts to seek reconciliation. That the effort has not produced palpable results is not a criticism of that organization, but rather constitutes evidence that extraneous factors have caused the process effectively to dissolve. There may be other opportunities for international NGOs to contribute to this process.

Internal NGOs have had limited but significant successes and activities. The Shalom Foundation was an important intermediary in bridging the gap between the military and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) which facilitated the ceasefire that is still in effect. The Foundation
has encouraged the KIO to participate in the National Convention, and seeks to promote the resolution of outstanding issues connected to the problems of the interaction between the Burman and Kachin communities, and between Buddhists and Christians. It encourages the employment of Kachin in various levels of government-sponsored institutions and other agencies to eliminate the hopelessness of youth so apparent in that community. It assists in leadership training as well.

The Metta Foundation has also been involved in leadership training for minorities, and it is perhaps this aspect of NGO activity — the building of capacities for both future public and private sector leadership — that is a critical contribution if national reconciliation is to have any hope for continuity. The revitalization of the education system, along with the growth of training to reflect the new requirements of modern government and non-governmental institutions, become critical elements for the reconciliation process.

Although the education and training of Burmese people must essentially be matters for internal resolution, external training in both newer disciplines and in analytical thinking, which in the past were discouraged and replaced by rote learning and the politicization of the educational process, is also necessary. From the perspective of Myanmar, the results of external training have been mixed, because many of those chosen for scholarships for external study have been reluctant to return to Myanmar. Not only does this jeopardize the state’s willingness to allow students to study abroad, but it means those students contribute little to Myanmar society as a whole.

Before the coup of 1962, Burma was renowned as one of the few developing countries that had virtually no brain drain. Since that time, however, because of political repression and the lack of meaningful employment, the country has lost perhaps one per cent of its population, and those who emigrate are an educated potential elite. These estimates include neither the one million or so illegal workers in Thailand and in other bordering countries, nor the approximately 120,000 Karen and Mon refugees in camps across the Thai border. This is a loss that no country can afford to sustain. For any sort of effective development effort, major internal and external education and training programmes will be required.

Civil society, because it is close to the grass-roots, is able to anticipate and articulate the needs of local areas that the state often overlooks or to which the state is insensitive. Civil society has a vital function in helping
any government to be responsive to local conditions and problems, and should therefore be viewed as necessary and supportive over the longer term, no matter how politically inconvenient it may appear at any one moment. Thus, rather than being perceived as a threat to any emerging political system, civil society should be considered as an early warning system (the proverbial canary in the coal mine) that could allow the state to make adjustments in the process of governance and development. The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) failed, as a very senior member of that government admitted, because the centralized system, although having a theoretical interest in reacting positively to local issues, was incapable of doing so because of subordinates’ fears of displeasing those in higher authority in the hierarchical political system.
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Civil society, simply because it lies outside the power structure, has a greater chance to affect positively the capacity of the state to serve the society and thus appear to be more efficacious; this could possibly extend any government’s longevity and its legitimacy as well.

Although Track II diplomacy has not yet proven to be effective in the Myanmar context, this is no reason not continue the process with established players, such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and other groups including think-tanks and research centres. There is no assurance of success, or even that positive effects will result, yet the process should not be abandoned; indeed, it should be expanded to bring as many as possible into the dialogue on all sides of the issues.
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In January 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted a major seminar in Yangon to explain the situation in the country to Asia-wide members of Track II institutions and the diplomatic corps in the country. This writer has suggested that any future meeting be more open and collaborative.

Ashley South seems not very sanguine about the present role of civil society within the area of his purview, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), with which the Myanmar government has a ceasefire. He wrote, “Mon community networks within Burma have generally developed beyond the sway of the NMSP’s political-cultural paradigms, which have tended to stifle the development of civil society in the party’s ‘liberated zones’ ”.
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Yet ceasefire groups may be able to “recreate” themselves as NGOs in the future if the constitutional process proceeds according to expectations. Their generally authoritarian structure may not allow for much grassroots participation,
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yet in some areas, such as the Kachin State, such local participation is encouraged.

In some ceasefire areas, the development of what might be termed civil society organizations may be slow. In some areas, such as the Kokang, Wa, Monghla, and Pao regions, the leadership does not give the impression of being willing to change its internal hierarchical organization (which seems to have been influenced by the Burma Communist Party authoritarian structure). In other areas, such as the Kachin region, there seems a genuine concern for grass-roots dialogue and participation. This means that among the minority groups will be found a mix of civil society organizations — some will be genuine, representative, grass-roots organizations, while others will mimic the state’s authoritarian structure.

The need for civil society groups is especially important in border areas among minority groups. The International Crisis Group has noted that there is a long way to go:

Nurturing the capacity of specific civil society organizations and networks is another important task. There is a relatively large and growing number of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) and particularly community-based organizations (CBOs) engaged in social welfare or development activities. There is also an intricate, insufficiently understood system of more informal social networks.
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One of the important roles for civil society organizations in any period of national reconciliation will be to rebuild the nation’s human resource base, which has been eroded by the outflow of intellectual and economic, as well as political, émigrés. In the recent past, some international NGOs have been able to attract good Burmese staff to their employ and have sent some abroad for further training. This process is likely to be important in developing the competence of civil society groups and increasing their internal effectiveness. However, as has occurred in many public sector foreign assistance programmes of both bilateral and multilateral institutions, talented individuals are attractive as employees for international NGOs, and in turn are attracted to international NGOs, for the ability to serve, for educational opportunities, and for higher salaries. In the short term this can create a problem, because it depletes the pool of human resources available both to indigenous NGOs and to governments at varying levels should they at some stage be willing to employ such people. This danger should be recognized and efforts sought to mitigate the problem.

International NGOs have another important function. Their operations give foreigners an intimate exposure to societies in which they may, as a
result, develop a continuing and professional interest, and on which they may become future specialists. Such specialists may go on to staff not only other international NGOs, but also governmental and public institutions, multilateral and bilateral, and they can bring to those positions sensitivities that are often lacking in official circles.

Civil society, as previously noted, is an attribute of, or helps create, social capital. It would be too sweeping a statement to say that there is little social capital in Myanmar. A recent study, based on a non-random sample of some five hundred people, indicated the complexity of the issue. Responses were varied, depending on the subject (institution or individual) and location. In response to the question of whether one trusts one fellow citizens, 20 per cent said yes, 23 per cent said no, and 45 per cent said it depends. But only 5 per cent indicated that they trusted the government, with 78 per cent saying no. At the same time, 33 per cent in villages believed that the SPDC cared about the individual, although 47 per cent said no. At the township level, only 9 per cent responded positively, and at the regional (state and division) level the positive figure was only 14 per cent. Trust in specific members of the SPDC varied widely, with General Khin Nyunt receiving the most favorable rating. Of the respondents, only about 10 per cent belonged to no civil organization, about 30 per cent to one, over 40 per cent to two, and about 18 per cent to three or more. The conclusions are that there is little social capital at the political level, but considerable on social issues. Since people cannot count on the state, they have to help each other.
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Since independence, there has been a discernable tendency for the government under any administration to attempt to centralize control. Even in the pre-independence period, this trend was evident in the writings of Aung San and his vision of a new Burmese state. In the civilian period under the AFPFL, authority was dispersed, mostly because the government was too weak to exert its imprimatur over the whole country, but the focus was on the center. As Geertz has written, “[the minorities] are catered to by a rather intricate and highly peculiar constitutional system that protects them in theory against the Burman domination that the party system tends to produce in fact.”
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The fictionalized union envisaged under the
constitution of 1947 was dissolved following the coup of 1962, and has yet to be reinstituted in any form. When in 1969 a group of eminent Burmese leaders was asked by General Ne Win to recommend whether the state should be pluralistic or unitary, they opted for pluralism, but Ne Win implemented the reverse, with disastrous but predictable results. Whether the new constitution will make provision for some more decentralized approach at state or township level, or within the executive branch, or between the executive and legislative branches (let alone the judicial sector), in some manner deemed adequate or acceptable to the diverse minority groups, or even to the majority Burmans, is perhaps the most important question facing the state.