Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (15 page)

For the KIO, the most important thing is that we become a legal political party during this period of constitutional change. We have already lived through three different periods of government since 1961, so we know what it is like to be forgotten ... But we have the real mass support of the people, so at least we want to get our voice into the historical record. That is our duty.
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A related development, quickly noted by ethnic minority leaders, was that after the volatile events of 1988, insurgent movements among the ethnic Burman-majority began to decline rapidly during the SLORC-SPDC era. The CPB, which was mostly Burman-led, became almost defunct following the 1989 ethnic mutinies, while none of the plethora of new armed groups that attempted to form up within the shelter of NDF territories in the late 1980s proved sustainable.
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Ethnic leaders noted that, in contrast, the NLD, which rapidly became the main focus of pro-democracy sentiment in the country, from its inception in 1988 rejected armed struggle as a means of achieving political change. This non-violent stand — combined with the decisive nature of the 1990 general election result, the country’s first in three decades — had strong resonance among veteran ethnic leaders who had watched the epoch-making events during 1988–90 from the hills. Many saw little reason to continue fighting if a reform process was truly about to begin. Moreover, they could not remain immune to growing demands for peace among communities in the front line, demands that had undoubtedly been a major factor behind the CPB’s collapse.
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Finally, if any doubts remained about the changing geo-political realities, the neighbouring governments of China, India, and Thailand privately made it clear to ethnic nationality leaders that the years of insurgent groups being allowed cross-border access to arms and supplies would be over. With the near-simultaneous demise of the BSPP and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, much in this Asian sub-region was about to change. Within a few years, improved government-to-government relations had become the new priority in all the neighbouring countries, exemplified by Thailand’s “battlefields to marketplace” philosophy.

Already facing considerable pressures on the internal front, many armed opposition leaders quickly realized that border-world tactics would have to be adjusted if they were not to face even further marginalization in the years ahead. At that moment, therefore, the SLORC’s unexpected offer of ceasefires provided an opportune process by which armed opposition groups could enter the country’s transitional landscape as “legal” entities, as well as deal with the mounting challenges that they felt gathering all around them.
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Against this backdrop, and while government fighting continued against the KNU and its allies in southeast Myanmar, the ceasefires with some of the ethnic groups began. In general, the ceasefire parties came from two main groups. The first group was led by the UWSP and others
who had mutinied and left the CPB in 1989. But over the years the ceasefire movement spread to a second important group, including such former allies of the KNU and members of the NDF as the Shan State Army (North), the Pao National Organization (PNO), the Kachin Independence Organization, and the New Mon State Party. In subsequent years there were splits and factionalism, while the SLORC-SPDC also agreed ceasefires with a number of small defector groups from non-ceasefire parties, including from the KNU. This meant that a remarkable twenty-eight ceasefire groups were represented at the National Convention when it resumed in 2004. It is generally considered that about seventeen ceasefire parties have a legacy of some history or political-military substance. By the late 1990s there were only four armed opposition groups of any real size that had not agreed to a ceasefire with the government — the Karen National Union, which resumed peace talks in December 2003; the Karenni National Progressive Party (whose 1995 ceasefire broke down); the Chin National Front (CNF); and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) (see
Chart 3.1
).
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By any international standards, the achievement of ceasefires with so many insurgent groups, in one of the most conflict-torn countries in Asia, has to date been unexpectedly smooth and stable. In most cases, there has been no substantive international involvement.
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It therefore needs to be stressed that a major factor behind the relative ease with which the ceasefires spread, in unpromising circumstances, was their simplicity. Reflecting the “Year Zero” level of governmental outreach in many parts of the country after 1988, the ceasefire terms were, in essence, very basic: the ceasefire groups would be allowed to continue holding their arms and territory, but would concentrate on peace-building and development projects until a new constitution was introduced.

Such terms may have appeared at the time to be skeletal, the result of a strategy quickly put together by a military government that needed to win itself credibility and time. International analysts also argued that the ceasefires were providing a cover for narcotics traffickers to increase production. Certainly, illicit production of opium and, later, methamphetamine accelerated rapidly in both the China and Thai borderlands.
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However, in many front-line communities themselves, perceptions were rather different. Rather, the lack of local strings in the ceasefire agreements, the
de facto
recognition of autonomy, and the chance to end fighting quickly found popular support.

In addition, if any doubts remained, the clear-cut result of the 1990 election encouraged armed ethnic opposition groups, many of which had close contact with the newly-formed parties in the towns, in their desire to become integral players in any discussions about the country’s future. Ceasefire leaders in the northeast of the country were especially encouraged, and, along with the NLD and electoral Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (which won most seats in the Shan state), some of the early ceasefire groups, such as the UWSP and PNO, were represented at the first inception of the National Convention during 1993–96.

It was at this point in the early 1990s, as military truces were agreed with more and more groups, that some leaders began to consider more seriously strategies for building peace during the period from the conclusion of the ceasefires (which, by definition, are transitory affairs) to the achievement of the goal of inclusive political reforms. The dilemmas and outlook were summarized after the 1995 ceasefire with the New Mon State Party (NMSP) by its late president, Nai Shwe Kyin:

We want to establish peace in our country. It is not a time to confront each other because we need national reconciliation. We have reached ceasefire agreements and the next step is political dialogue. We must establish trust. After bloodbaths lasting nearly half a century, we must establish trust with the view that one day reconciliation will come about.
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What evolved in the following years was a strategy that ceasefire leaders characterized as “peace through development”. Crucially, in many areas this was supported by community-based leaders, including members of the Buddhist Sangha and Christian churches who, in some cases, acted as go-betweens in the peace talks.
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In the field, many dissatisfactions remained; other than the welcome halt to fighting, the ceasefires had not heralded a dramatic transformation nor altered the political realities. In addition, critics complained that certain armed groups and powerful vested interests were using the ceasefires to enrich themselves by exploiting natural resources between themselves. As in other countries in conflict, the problems of “warlordism” run deep. However, in many front-line areas, long-suffering communities were eager to embrace the peace if it would provide a sustainable platform to introduce real change. In
consequence, as the 1990s progressed, this new emphasis on social issues and community-based improvements became an important locomotive in the unexpected stability of the ceasefires.

In recent years ethnic nationality leaders have often expressed frustration that there has not been greater international support, in terms of both humanitarian aid and development assistance, for their long-divided communities as they struggle to rebuild from conflict. For the government’s part, after the first ceasefires were concluded in 1989 the SLORC-SPDC initiated a Border Areas Development Programme which was upgraded into the Ministry for the Progress of Border Areas and National Races in 1992. Health, education, and infrastructure projects were initiated in the Ministry’s eighteen administrative areas, with a claimed expenditure of Kyats 58,399.34 million (quoted at US$550 million) in its first fifteen years.
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From the mid-1990s, UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also gained permission from Yangon to access an increasing number of border and ceasefire areas. However, to date international commitments of aid have been minimal. Indeed official development assistance to the whole of Myanmar was estimated at just US$1
per capita
in 2001 which contrasted with, for example, US$35 for Cambodia and US$68 for Laos.
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Given the scale of humanitarian needs, this is a very low figure by any international standards.
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As a result, community leaders in Myanmar believe that many international bodies missed an important opportunity in the mid-1990s to support a different kind of socio-economic momentum for change in the country that was offered by the ceasefires. According to Daw Seng Raw, director of the Metta Development Foundation, an indigenous NGO established after the Kachin ceasefires:

Many ethnic minority groups feel extremely disappointed that in general foreign governments are not responding to the progress of the ceasefires or indeed even understand their significance or context... . It ignores realities in areas long affected by war. To revitalize these communities and bring about real reform, health, social and economic development must run in tandem with political progress.
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In recent years, such a view has been supported by an increasing number of international NGOs and humanitarian agencies that take a long-term view of the challenges of socio-political transition in Myanmar. For example, according to a 2004 report by the International Crisis Group:

While the international community focuses on the need for regime change in Yangon, it has tended to disregard the need to integrate ethnic minorities into the broader society and economy. Foreign aid for Border Areas should be seen and pursued as complementary to diplomatic efforts to restore democracy and help unite the long-divided country.
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Such an opinion is reflected by different UN agencies. Most recently, Antonio Maria Costa, executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), reiterated that humanitarian engagement is needed to support the UN’s goals of “democratization and national reconciliation in Myanmar”.
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In particular, he argued that without alternative sources of income, ethnic minority communities dependent on opium cultivation would “remain vulnerable to human rights abuses, human trafficking and forced relocation”.
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However, it needs to be stressed that in recent years it is not only in Myanmar that the issues of humanitarian aid or intervention in situations of conflict, insurgency and post-insurgency have become questions of deep controversy between governments and international agencies. In such contexts, the provision of aid — whether for humanitarian or development purposes — can become hostage to the different agendas of the various donor countries or to the polarized debates between competing groups in a particular donor country. Recently, for example, a group of US senators called on the United Nations Development Programme and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria to cease additional funding to Myanmar because of its military government.
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In contrast, the United Kingdom government, which is also a strong critic of the SPDC, announced in a 2003 change of policy by its Department for International Development (DFID) that it would contribute US$15.7 million to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS in Myanmar. In addition, a new country plan for closer on-the-ground engagement was developed as part of DFID’s “Drivers of Change” philosophy, to better target health and poverty-related issues.

As such dilemmas and DFID strategy papers highlight,
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recent experience in other strife-torn countries of the world suggests that the processes of conflict resolution and effective aid delivery are hardly exact sciences or necessarily prescriptive.
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It is not uncommon that participants on different sides in a situation of conflict proclaim the same multi-agenda goals of both humanitarian assistance and long-term reform. As Hugo Slim recently commented, in reference to the present transitional crises in Afghanistan and Iraq: “There is often considerable moral overlap of ends
between insurgents, counter-insurgents, humanitarian, human rights and development agencies.”
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This very much remains the case in Myanmar where, for the moment, no general consensus between international donors has been achieved and where the debate over aid has often been contentious.
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