Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (18 page)

The dilemmas and challenges were expressed by David Taw, a leader of the KNU peace delegations in 2004:

Nowadays we are struggling for our identity. This means equal status. That will be enough. If we can achieve this, all the peoples of this country can live very easily together. But now we have come to feel like second-class citizens. It does not matter where you live. In a war-zone, people get killed. And in urban areas, you feel you always face discrimination in both education and job opportunities. This has to be resolved.
⁷⁶

In 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro stated in a report to the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva:

Every political transition in the world is a process, sometimes a torturous and slow one, and it would be unrealistic and naive to expect an instant regime change in Myanmar. Instead of continuing to complain that little has changed ... the international community must have its eyes wide open to see the nuclei of change.
⁷⁷

The vital question then is whether enough groundwork and confidence-building has been achieved for the country to move on. Since 1988 Myanmar has certainly come a long way. But after so many years of struggle, the consensus is becoming overwhelming that it is time for inclusive reform to truly begin.

¹
   In this paper, the term “ethnic minority” is used to distinguish non-Burman
(non-Bamar)
nationality groups or identity.

²
   For recent reports that highlight different aspects of these challenges, see, for example, International Crisis Group,
Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas
(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004); Transnational Institute, “Drugs and Conflict in Burma (Myanmar): Dilemmas for Policy Responses”, in
Drugs and Conflict,
TNI Debate Papers No. 9 (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2003); F. Kahrl, H. Weyerthaeuser, and S. Yufang,
Navigating the Border: An Analysis of the China-Myanmar Timber Trade
(Washington: Forest Trends, 2004); EarthRights International,
Another Yadana: The Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Burma-Bangladesh-India)
(Washington: ERI, 2004); Burmese Border Consortium,
Burmese Border Consortium Relief Programme: January to June 2004
(Bangkok: BBC, 2004); and Nwe Nwe Aye with Katie Maher,
Field Notes from Myanmar: Developing Children and Young People’s Participation in the Border Areas
(Bangkok: Save the Children (UK), 2003).

³
   Awareness of the burgeoning importance of regional and border relations appears to be reciprocated by the SPDC. In October 2004, within days of replacing Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, the SPDC chairman, Senior General Than Shwe, made the first official state visit to India by the country’s top-most leader in twenty-four years, to discuss border, counter-insurgency, and bilateral economic issues.
Agence France Presse,
29 October 2004. Similarly, the new prime minister, Lt-General Soe Win, made his first official trip to China just one week later, to attend the China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit.

⁴
   M. Rajaretnam (Convener),
Quality of Partnership: Myanmar, ASEAN and the World Community
(Singapore: Asian Dialogue Society, 2003), p. 2.

⁵
   For a history of political and armed opposition movements, see, for example, M. Smith,
Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity
(London: Zed Books, 1999).

⁶
   See, for example, United Nations General Assembly,
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary-General
(New York: UNGA, 59th session, 16 August 2004), p. 2.

⁷
   
New Light of Myanmar,
27 February 1998.

⁸
   Ibid., 27 March 2004.

⁹
   Interview with KNU Vice-President, General Bo Mya, 12 February 2004.

¹⁰
   UN Country Team, Yangon, “A Review of the Humanitarian Situation in Myanmar”, unpublished monograph, February 2003, p. 11.

¹¹
   “UN warns of child malnutrition in Myanmar”,
Agence France Presse,
14 September 2004.

¹²
   See, for example, J. Silverstein,
Burmese Politics: the Dilemma of National Unity
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980), pp. 185–205; Smith,
Burma: Insurgency,
pp. 71–87.

¹³
   
The Times
(London), 3 March 1962. See also, Smith,
Burma: Insurgency,
pp. 195–97.
In fact, in 1958 Ne Win had perceived communist supporters to be the main threat — not ethnic parties. For new analyses of both the 1962 coup and Ne Win’s ‘Military Caretaker’ Administration (1958–60) that are based on armed forces’ sources, see M. Callahan,
Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 184–206.

¹⁴
   
Working People’s Daily,
10 January 1990. As in any conflict, the bulk of casualties included civilians, armed opposition troops and supporters, and the many auxiliary or paramilitary formations, but no reliable figures appear in official statistics. However, to give substance to his claim, Saw Maung mentioned that in 1989, within the armed forces alone, there were 28,000 families still receiving pensions for soldiers who had been killed since 1953, and 40,000 for disabled veterans.

¹⁵
   See, for example, Smith,
Burma: Insurgency,
pp. 258–62.

¹⁶
   For an eyewitness account of these years, see Chao Tzang Yawnghwe,
The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of an Exile
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987).

¹⁷
   Quoted in BBC,
Survey of World Broadcasts,
2 May 1989.

¹⁸
   See, for example,
Forward,
1 April 1969;
Loktha Pyeithu Nezin,
14 February 1975; and
Botahtaung,
18 May 1978. On 26 March 1987, for example, in accordance with instructions of the fifth BSPP congress to “eliminate the subversive insurgents”, state radio claimed that the armed forces had found 2,538 insurgent bodies during military operations in the preceding twelve months and captured another 463 alive.

¹⁹
   “From the UN Secretary-General”, UNIC/Press Release/233-2004, 17 August 2004.

²⁰
   See, for example, Zarni and May Oo,
Common Problems, Shared Responsibilities: Citizens’ Quest for National Reconciliation in Burma/Myanmar
(New York: Free Burma Coalition, 2004).

²¹
   See, for example, Aye Aye Win, “Hundreds Register for the NC, but NLD Undecided”,
Associated Press,
13 May 2004.

²²
   Interview with Dr Tu Ja, 27 July 2004.

²³
   The links between such groups, in institutional terms, are complex. The NLD and UNA parties, for example, are linked by such bodies as the 1998 Committee Representing the People’s Parliament and the 21-party United Nationalities League for Democracy. Armed opposition groups such as the KNU are, in turn, allied in the 28-party National Council Union of Burma with the NLD “Liberated Areas”, Members of Parliament Union and other parties or activists that lobby for recognition of the 1990 general election result in the international community.

²⁴
   See, for example, Smith,
Burma: Insurgency,
pp. 406–11, 434–35, 440–44.

²⁵
   Interview with Maran Brang Seng, July 1990. For a perspective of his unfolding views as revealed in a series of interviews between 1987 and 1992, see M. Smith and L. Jagan, “Maran Brang Seng: In his Own Words”,
Burma Debate,
Vol. 1, No. 3, 1995, pp. 17–22. It was in a July 1990 interview that Brang Seng, while welcoming the 1990 election result and the NLD victory, first mentioned the concept of a “National Convention” so that “all parties can put up their ideas” in an inclusive process of dialogue and reform.

²⁶
   The most active, the All Burma Students Democratic Front, commemorated its sixteenth anniversary on 1 November 2004, but, following splits and retirements, it is a shadow of its initial size.

²⁷
   Interview with UWSP chairman, Bao You-Xiang, 15 March 2003.

²⁸
   The designation “legal” has caused some problems during the different ceasefire processes. The expression “to enter the legal fold” has been preferred by the SLORC-SPDC to describe the transition of armed opposition groups to a
de facto
status of political recognition and peace. However, the leaders of some armed opposition groups, notably the KNU, have resisted this term because they argue that their parties have never been “illegal” in the first place.

²⁹
   The reasons given by SPDC officials for the failure to hold talks or achieve ceasefires with the SSA-S and CNF are that the SSA-S is considered a breakaway group from an existing ceasefire group, the Mong Tai Amy, while the CNF’s struggle only really began in the post-1988 period. It is thus considered an opponent of the SLORC-SPDC, unlike parties such as the KNU and KNPP whose struggles were “inherited” from other eras of government.

³⁰
   The one exception in some respects has been the New Mon State Party (NMSP), where there was some involvement of Thailand, including in relation to questions of access and continuing humanitarian aid.

³¹
   See, for example, B. Lintner, “Drugs and Economic Growth in Burma Today”, in
Burma/Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State?
, edited by M. Pedersen, E. Rudland and R. May (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2000), pp. 164–94; L. Kean and D. Bernstein, “The Burma-Singapore Axis: Globalizing the Heroin Trade”,
Covert/Action Quarterly,
Washington, Spring 1998.

³²
   
Reuters,
2 October 1996.

³³
   Peace go-betweens include Rev. Saboi Jum of the Kachin Baptist Convention, the Catholic Bishop Sotero in Kayah State, and the Karens, Rev. Saw Mar Gay Gyi of the Myanmar Council of Churches and Professor Tun Aung Chain of Yangon University.

³⁴
   
New Light of Myanmar,
26 September 2004. See also, Lt-Gen. Thein Han (Director General of BADP), “Human Resource Development and Nation Building in Myanmar: Unity in Diversity”, in
Human Resource Development and Nation
Building in Myanmar,
produced by the Office of Strategic Studies (Yangon: Ministry of Defence, 1997), pp. 215–29.

³⁵
   UN Country Team,
Myanmar: A Silent Humanitarian Crisis in the Making
(Yangon: 30 June 2001), p. 2.

³⁶
   In
per capita
terms, the international aid budget for refugee or exile groups in Thailand has been much higher. For example, the proposed 2002 budget for the 138,117 refugees recorded in Thai camps was US$12.5 million. Burmese Border Consortium,
BBC Relief Programme: July to December 2001
(Bangkok: Burmese Border Consortium, 2002), p. 1.

³⁷
   Seng Raw, “Views from Myanmar: An Ethnic Minority Perspective”, in
Burma: Political Economy under Military Rule,
edited by R.H. Taylor (London: Hurst & Co, 2001), pp. 161–62.

³⁸
   International Crisis Group,
Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas,
p. i.

³⁹
   UNODC, “UN confirms steady reduction in opium cultivation in Myanmar”, Press Release, 11 October 2004.

⁴⁰
   Ibid.

⁴¹
   US Senator Sam Brownback, “Brownback, Gregg, McConnell Call on Global Fund to Cease Funding Burma”, Press Release, 5 October 2004.

⁴²
   Department for International Development,
Drivers of Change
(London: November 2003) and
Which Aspects of Governance Matter Most for Growth and Poverty Reduction?
(London: August 2003).

⁴³
   See, for example, M. Smith, “Ethnic Conflict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma”, in
Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs,
edited by T. Kramer and P. Vervest for Burma Center Netherlands & Transnational Institute (BCN/TNI), (Chiengmai: Silkworm Books, 1999), pp. 20–25.

⁴⁴
   Hugo Slim,
With or Against? Humanitarian Agencies and Coalition Counter-Insurgency
(Geneva: Humanitarian Dialogue Centre, 2004), p. 11.

⁴⁵
   See, for example, International Crisis Group,
Myanmar: the Politics of Humanitarian Aid
(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2002); also, International Crisis Group,
Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas.
For a counter view, see, for example, D.S. Mathieson, “The ICG, Burma, and the Politics of Diversion”,
The Irrawaddy,
Vol. 12, No. 9 (October 2004).