Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (17 page)

For the moment, until any different news emerges, it is on the detail of recent processes of discussion that analysis has to be based. As during earlier eras of constitutional crisis, a diversity of nationality parties is currently active in Myanmar politics, highlighting the fact that ethnic politics remain far from moribund in the SLORC-SPDC era.

As outlined above, initial hopes had existed that, one way or another, that all ethnic and political parties would eventually become involved in the SPDC road map. This, however, was not to be the case.

During the resumed sessions of the National Convention held between May and July 2004, nationality parties in the country could generally be divided into two broad categories — those ethnic parties that attended the
Convention, and those that did not. In the first category were ethnic ceasefire groups and some of the political parties included in the first stage of the National Convention between 1993 and 1996, while in the absentee category were parties that were either not invited or decided not to attend, as well as the non-ceasefire groups.

Once again, this is not to suggest that these analytical groupings are in any ways formal or concrete.
⁶⁷
But all groups, in differing ways, had been focusing on the imminence of the National Convention and their response to it. For example, of the electoral parties in the United Nationalities Alliance, only the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy is believed to have actually been invited to the National Convention, but all concurred in the decision that conditions were not acceptable for them to attend once their political ally, the NLD, had decided not to take part.
⁶⁸
Similarly, although the KNU was still involved in conducting peace talks, it was considered that the KNU could remain informed of discussions at the Convention by other Karen delegates.

Despite such absentees, the unusual importance attached to ethnic nationality questions in 2004 continued to be highlighted in the way that the National Convention was configured when it restarted. Ethnic minority representatives made up over half the 1,088 delegates invited, and also formed a majority in three of the eight National Convention category groups: political parties, national races, and specially invited guests (the other categories are: elected representatives, peasants, workers, intellectuals and public servants). Each of the eight category groups, which elected their own chairmen, listened to submission papers from delegates or groups within their individual categories, which were then debated and reformulated by consensus into a final report from each category. These eight reports are reportedly, in turn, being further reformulated by some of the category chairmen and the National Convention Convening Working Committee into a final version, which will then be added to the “104 detailed basic principles” that were relayed forward from the earlier sessions of the National Convention between 1993 and 1996.

With the National Convention only part-way through its deliberations, the diversity of papers and categories makes it impossible to determine what will be the points of controversy, or what will ultimately become the key conclusions. It is too early to tell, and participants say that, as in any process of debate, different ideas have been put up, with no party expecting that they will get everything their own way.

Nevertheless, from the discussions so far, a number of future trends appear likely, unless there are major or unpredicted changes. The first is that the concept of “power-sharing” with the armed forces in government will be accepted by the National Convention. In essence, this will mean that the six basic principles of the SLORC-SPDC are recognized, that 25 per cent of seats in a future parliament will be reserved for the armed forces, and that control over certain ministries (notably defence and foreign affairs) will remain with the armed forces. It seems that in the context of the country’s complex challenges of transition, many parties believe it is worth making these compromises, as a first step, so long as such changes are accompanied by a constitutional guarantee that there will be a return to a civilian system of democratic government involving the sharing of power with other representative parties and interests. “Seventy-five per cent is better than nothing,” has been a buzz phrase in recent months, and comparisons about how transition has proceeded have been made with such Asian countries as Thailand or South Korea that have also emerged from long periods under armed forces’ influence or government.

The ethnic nationality groups made their views quite clear in this process. In particular, the performance of the ethnic ceasefire groups in the “other specially invited guests” category received most comment and attention at the time. By all accounts, there was a lively debate. It had been of crucial importance to the ceasefire groups that they had the right to choose their own delegates, which they did, and that they had the right to raise any issue, which they also generally did.

In total, eleven papers were submitted by different ceasefire parties or groupings. Most were submitted by small splinter factions that carry little weight,
⁶⁹
and it was the two joint submissions from the older and larger ceasefire parties that received most attention. The smaller of these was a three-party submission by what are often referred to as the “Wa-Kokang-Mongla” groups (that is, the United Wa State Party, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the National Democratic Alliance Army), while the main submission, presented on 9 June, came from a thirteen-party grouping of many of the best-known armed opposition parties, including such former members of the NDF as the Shan State Army (SSA), the KIO and the NMSP.
⁷⁰

Underlying the differences in these two submissions were the differences in the ethno-political backgrounds of these two alliances. The Wa-Kokang-Mongla grouping has its origins in their common CPB past, with each of these groups still practising politburo or central committee
systems of party administration — although officially they pursue pro-business and pro-democracy philosophies today. The ethnic autonomous regions in neighbouring China also provide a model, although leaders of all three parties say that their historic rights to independent status should be legally stronger in Myanmar. At the National Convention, however, the main controversy was not about models for autonomy, but about their proposal for sub-states of their own that would, in essence, mean a separation from Shan State. Objections to this delineation came not only from ethnic Shan parties but also from other local minority groups. The proposal appears to have been withdrawn as a result, and it is expected that the Wa-Kokang-Mongla grouping will work more closely with the other ceasefire groups in future sessions.

In contrast, the proposals of the thirteen-party grouping presented an articulate espousal of what are essentially federalist ideas. Indeed, the clarity of these proposals took many observers by surprise, and they were accorded considerable attention, causing members of parties that had stayed away from the National Convention to consider whether they had made the right decision.

These ceasefire proposals are still under review by the National Convention, so no definitive judgments can be attempted. However, according to reports, as the Convention progressed it became clear that there were differences on many points of detail, the result of a divergence in outlook between those espousing a “unitary” system (largely supporters of the military government) and those advocating a union system (supported by the ethnic and pro-democracy parties). Furthermore, the ethnic parties in general want to move more powers away from the armed forces and into civilian sectors of government (for example, nuclear issues should be under “energy” rather than “defence”), while increasing residual powers for the ethnic minority states.

At one stage deadlock ensued, and it seemed that there would be no way to find wording on a number of issues that could be agreed between the nationality parties and the National Convention Working Committee.
⁷¹
In the end, however, it was informally “agreed to disagree”, with the proposals by the ceasefire groups remaining in the official records, including those ideas that were not included in the final draft. This means that, in theory, they can be revived at a later time if the situation allows.

In essence, there were seven main areas of disagreement, which concerned the extent or definition of the following legal issues in relation to the ethnic states: the legislative powers of the states, residuary rights,
state constitutions,
⁷²
ethnic and cultural rights, defence and security, foreign affairs,
⁷³
and resources and taxation. At the same time, nationality leaders point out that compromise was also reached on about thirteen areas of constitutional discussion, such as the right of elected representatives within the ethnic states to choose their own prime ministers, or the right of the states to regulate power generation up to medium-range capacities.

How the remaining differences will be resolved in the future is unclear. There are more issues to be discussed when the National Convention resumes in 2005, including the powers of the executive and judiciary (the 2004 sessions mainly concentrated on the principles for power-sharing in the legislature). But providing that the momentum towards substantive reform and peaceful development is certain, many of the ethnic nationality leaders and ceasefire parties contend that they will continue with the present process. Among such groups, hopes are still privately expressed that other political parties could yet become involved, including the NLD, the UNA parties and the non-ceasefire groups which currently remain as bystanders. These groups, too, are also closely watching developments, and in October 2004 representatives of both the UNA and United Nationalities League for Democracy in Yangon and the mostly-exile Ethnic Nationalities Council on the Thai border urged the ceasefire groups to continue to propose federalist ideas.
⁷⁴
But for the moment, any influence from such groups remains on the periphery of the central course of discussions.

What does seem incontrovertible now is that, while the future form of democracy in Myanmar remains contentious, in the coming years the country’s political map will once again be reshaped, and that as long as peace remains, there will be greater devolution. This means that at the very least there will be new territories designated for nationalities that are not currently recognized in politics. On the basis of population numbers and region, there is likely to be a “self-administered division” for the Wa and “self-administered districts” (or zones) for the Danu, Kokang, Lahu, Palaung, and Pao in the Shan State and also a “self-administered district” for the Naga in Sagaing Division. In addition, it is likely that nationalities will be able to put up a representative for areas where they constitute a sizeable minority in other states or political territories (such as the Pao in Karen State).

However beyond these conjectures, it is premature to make predictions in detail. A number of leaders of different nationalities say that the
demarcation of new ethnic territories will not be a problem so long as they represent political inclusiveness and not ethnic separation or marginalization. But other than such local understandings, much still remains to be discussed and achieved.

Huge challenges lie ahead in the accomplishment of socio-political and ethnic reform in Myanmar. The National Convention has yet to be completed, and a referendum on the constitution and future general elections will then have to be held. Both of these events will raise questions about inclusiveness and about the responses of parties that have not so far been involved in the constitutional discussions. During this period, the difficult question of the transformation of ceasefire forces will also have to be addressed, because the current general condition that ceasefire groups have the right to maintain independent arms and territories will only exist until a new constitution is introduced. As in any country in conflict, this will raise the difficult issue of disarming former insurgent groups. But in Myanmar’s case this process may be especially sensitive because of the long-standing durability of many of the ethnic struggles, which means that, to maintain confidence, demilitarization will have to run parallel to the implementation of democratic reform.
⁷⁵

Even as military transformation is being addressed, the perspectives of different international governments and actors, including neighbouring countries that are critically affected by the stability of Myanmar’s borderlands as well as the United Nations and Western governments further afield, will have to be considered. All can play a vital supporting role in alleviating humanitarian suffering and in encouraging and sustaining the processes of reform, provided that they can see the landscape changing.

In the final analysis, however, the course of events must always be determined by the will and actions of the peoples of Myanmar themselves. In this respect, the common calls for democracy, the non-violent stand of political parties, and the ethnic ceasefires of the past fifteen years have shown that national consensus and reconciliation may be possible. Experience is showing that there are other ways to resolve conflict, and, if nothing else, the tragic experiences of the past five decades have proven that no side can unilaterally win or impose its own vision. The ethnic
make-up and landscape of Myanmar is too complex and the legacy of past failures too great.

Looking to the future, it is clear that, however the constitution is configured, the essential issues of political rights and equality for all citizens wherever they live in the country are likely to be the main keys to peaceful and constructive socio-political development. After over five decades of struggle, such basic freedoms as the right to security, to development, to ownership of land, to language and culture, to freedom of religion, to health and education, to freedom of expression, and the right to have democratically-elected leaders, will be fundamental if Myanmar is ever to find sustainable peace. Until such issues are addressed, ethnic nationality leaders contend that there will always be grievances.