regime as well as its chosen personnel were being abandoned. The mobilisation of troops against strikers at the great Le Creusot steel and mining complex and against republican demonstrators in Paris indicated a growing and warmly welcomed
determination to preserve social order. So, too, did a wave of arrests of
revolutionary militants.
Indeed, for many social conservatives, including some moderate republicans, liberalisation had gone far enough. They had wanted the extension of
parliamentary government and increased freedom for the press, but really only for their own sort to enjoy. According to their conception, liberty was now being abused and needed to be regulated once again. The statements made in the press of the extreme left and at public meetings in Paris, given full publicity by conservative newspapers, together with their exaggerated description of every minor disorder, contributed to the re-creation of a red scare like those of 1848 and 1851. This had the further effect of deepening an economic depression caused both by fear of internal unrest and the anxiety aroused by an unstable international situation following Prussian victory over Austria in 1866. From as early as 1867, a process of political polarisation had been underway, similar to that of 1848, and as a result of which the republicans began to assume the role of the only whole-hearted opponents of the regime. Its liberal and clerical critics increasingly subordinated their particular viewpoints to the needs of a broadly-based conservative alliance in defence of the
status quo
. According to the police
commissaire
at the southern port of Toulon (Var), ‘everyone understands that the struggle which is beginning is a social conflict between those who possess and those who have nothing’. There increasingly appeared to be no alternative to support for the regime as the guarantor of social order and religion, a point reinforced by pro-government publicity during both the 1869 electoral and the 1870 plebiscite campaigns. The results of the plebiscite held on 8 May 1870 on the question concerning whether ‘the people approve the liberal reforms introduced since 1860’ gave some idea of the strength of this fear of social revolution.
The plebiscite campaign was relatively free of government interference,
although the regime possessed considerable advantages. The Minister of the
Interior, Chevandier de Valdrôme, instructed officials to employ a ‘devouring activity’ in support of the ‘yes’ vote, but not to use either pressure or threats. An unofficial
comité central plébiscitaire
presided over by the Duc d’Albufera, was established to organise the campaign. At local level, however, the habit of exerting pressure was frequently difficult to break and as always all kinds of promises of 55
favours like new schools, roads or railway stations or threats of their denial were deployed. Private individuals and organisations also contributed. The
Est
railway company, for example, sent each of its stationmasters a copy of the Emperor’s proclamation together with sufficient ‘yes’ ballot papers for all their staff. Typical of the official propaganda was the pro-’yes’ poster distributed in the eastern department of Bas-Rhin which portrayed a peasant brandishing a tricolour flag in the one hand and rejecting a red flag with the other. The slogan, widely professed, was ‘Emperor, Order and Liberty’. In general, it was the danger of revolution rather than the regime’s positive achievements and liberal reforms which were stressed.
Somewhat less enthusiastic, but nevertheless supporting an affirmative vote, were such newspapers as the clerical German language newspaper
Der Elsässiche
Volksbote
(‘The Alsatian People’s Courier’) published in Rixheim, which insisted that its recommendation did not represent approval of all the regime’s past actions: We vote ‘yes’ because all the revolutionaries, all those who hate religion, all the oppressors of the people, all the freemasons, all the heroes of compulsory
education, recommend a ‘no’ vote or abstention. . . . Our ‘yes’ is to strengthen the Emperor against the reds.
In the Gers, the
Conservateur
(26 April 1870) similarly warned that the republic which would result from a negative vote would mean ‘disorder, insurrection and civil war . . . the re-establishment of the Terror . . . the 45 centime tax in permanence1
. . . the ruin of the countryside for the profit of the towns, where the right to work acclaimed by the socialists will lead to the re-opening of the National Workshops’.
Still potent memories of the revolutionary events of 1848 were thus deployed and with considerable effect.
The plebiscite was an overwhelming success for the regime. The state
prosecutor at Colmar saw it as giving ‘a new baptism to the Napoleonic dynasty’.
There can be little doubt, in spite of the ambiguities of the plebiscatory process, that the liberal empire corresponded to the wishes of most of the population, offering as it did greater political liberty, the repression of revolutionary republicanism and, particularly to peasant voters, the promise of renewed prosperity. If most of the support for the regime came from the propertied classes and rural population, it also gained substantial support from the urban middle and working classes so 1 A 45 per cent supplement to the land tax introduced by the republican Provisional Government in 1848.
56
frequently classified among its opponents. There were a variety of reasons for this including, of course, pressure from officials or employers, but more positively because of an appreciation of improving living standards. In the case of the textile centre of Armentières in the industrial Nord, and in marked contrast with nearby Lille, there was the still attractive prospect of a ‘democratic caesarism’ among a working population made up largely of quite recent migrants from the countryside.
The influence of the Church should not be discounted either. Whatever their misgivings about the Emperor’s Italian policy, the bishops and most parish clergy felt bound to support a regime committed to social order and to protecting them from the republican menace which had spelled disaster in the past. Moreover, they had failed dismally in their efforts to attract mass support for the Papal cause. In the last analysis, although the representatives of the various conservative political groupings were divided in their response to the plebiscite, most monarchists, liberals and clericals voted ‘yes’ and most, but not all, moderate republicans ‘no’.
Nationally, there were 7, 350, 000 affirmative votes against 1, 538, 000 negative and 1, 900, 000 abstentions. The centres of opposition remained the cities. Along with Paris and the department of the Seine, Marseille and Bouches-du Rhône was the only department to produce a majority of ‘no’ votes. In Paris, 59 per cent of the votes were negative – a much less decisive rejection of the regime than in the 1869
elections. The figure rose to 72–77 per cent in the predominantly working-class
arrondissements
of the north-east (11th, 18th, 19th, 20th) and to 57–71 per cent in the old revolutionary quarters of central Paris. Elsewhere, the opposition vote was substantial in the eight departments of the south-east where less than 55 per cent voted ‘yes’. Support for a negative response came from all social groups, but with a heavy worker and lower-middle class preponderance. Generally, it did appear to be waning. In the relatively industrialised Nord, 75.6 per cent voted ‘yes’, 5.9 per cent ‘no’, and 16.5 per cent abstained. Even in Lille, the proportion of ‘no’s only reached 5
1
per cent (Girard 1960). Fear of social revolution had been particularly intense in the Nord and former liberal critics of the regime had been particularly active in supporting an affirmative vote. Indeed, two of their most prominent leaders, Plichon and Brame, were soon to enter the government. Everywhere
republicans were bitterly disappointed. The results, nationally, indicated that a substantial majority of the population supported the regime. Whereas opposition candidates in 1869 had received 40–43 per cent of the votes cast, in the plebiscite only 17.6 per cent voted against the liberal empire. These were, of course, very different kinds of vote, but even Gambetta felt bound to admit that ‘the Empire is 57
stronger than ever’. The only viable prospect seemed to be a lengthy campaign to persuade the bourgeoisie and the rural populations that the republic did not mean revolution. The combination of concessions by the regime to its liberal and clerical critics and the appeal to their fear of revolution had successfully taken advantage of the fundamental disagreements between the various opposition groups and
resulted in a major political re-alignment. The regime had escaped from the political isolation which had threatened it, and although the Bonapartist right saw the result as an opportunity for a return to an authoritarian agenda, the Emperor on 19 May, with far greater realism, re-affirmed his commitment to liberalisation.
58
5
Defeat and collapse
In this situation, the final collapse of the regime was to be caused by the incompetent management of foreign policy. Official and public concern about Prussian aspirations had been growing as a result of its government’s hostility to French intervention in Italy in 1859, due to its support for Russian repression of the Polish revolt of 1863 and as a result of the war with Denmark in 1864. The rapidity with which Austria was defeated in 1866, however, had come as a considerable shock to the French establishment. It undoubtedly represented a major upset of the balance of power and a challenge to what had been assumed to be France’s
predominant position in Europe. Subsequently, relations continued to deteriorate.
Napoléon III had hoped for territorial compensation for France on the left bank of the Rhine in return for his role as a mediator between Austria and Prussia, and subsequently for the cessation of Luxembourg. Failure to achieve these much publicised aspirations severely weakened the regime’s internal and international reputation. Politically and militarily the balance of power was altered further, and greatly to the detriment of France, by the establishment of a Prussian dominated confederation of north German states in 1867. The subsequent negotiation of alliances between Prussia and the south German states, previously seen by French diplomats as potential allies against Prussian ambition, shifted the balance further.
The outbreak of war was coming to be seen as inevitable by much of French public opinion. However, there was a clear reduction in international tension in 1869 and particularly following the establishment of the liberal Empire in 1870. Ollivier was well known for his commitment to improving relations with Prussia.
59
Logically a belief in the likelihood of war should have promoted an effort to ensure that the army was ready. Napoléon was fully aware of the need for military reform following the chaotic mobilisation in 1859. Prussian success in 1866
suggested an urgent need to increase the size of both the regular army and its reserves, as well as for better organisation and equipment. The question of conscription was crucial. In France, young men drew lots to determine who should join the annual contingent and serve for up to seven years. The numbers called depended on assessments of military requirements and especially budgetary
constraints. It was possible, moreover, for those families who could afford the fees to purchase a replacement for unlucky participants in the ballot. On paper the system provided for an army of around 650, 000 men, but because of the regime’s reluctance to increase taxation the number of conscripts called was invariably well below the army’s requirements. In practice, the army in the mid-1860s was made up of 385, 000 men, of whom only around 250, 000 would have been available for front line service against a Prussian enemy. Alarmingly, in 1866 the Prussians had been able to rapidly mobilise a force of 750, 000. The problem was all too obvious.
Napoléon’s solution, announced in September 1866, was the Prussian one of
requiring quasi-universal military service. The system of drawing lots would have been maintained with the unfortunates serving for six years followed by a period in the reserve, but with the remainder now required to serve in a reserve for six years and undergo periodic training. The objective was to create a force which, with its trained reserves, would number 1, 200, 000 (Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau 1995: 44). The proposals aroused massive opposition from the upper classes who would no longer be able to purchase exemption and the workers and peasants who had previously enjoyed the very real prospect of escaping from any kind of military obligation by drawing a
bon numéro
in the ballot. In the
Corps législatif
in December 1867, Thiers defended the principle of the professional army – well-trained and rigorously disciplined – which he claimed was more than a match for a poorly trained mass army. The left, in contrast, especially Favre and Simon, attacked the principle of permanent, repressive armies and looked back to the improvisation of 1792 for inspiration. In the face of massive parliamentary and popular opposition, faithfully reported by his own officials, Napoléon felt obliged to compromise. Those who were fortunate in the ballot would still be required to undergo some military training in a
garde nationale mobile
, but their obligations were much reduced. In practice, the disorders which resulted early in 1868 from efforts to convoke this formation for training led to the virtual abandonment of the 60
scheme. There is an obvious paradox between the strong attachment to memories of military glory and to the achievements of the
Grande nation
, reinforced by the growing nationalist sentiment enshrined in popular education, together with the public hostility towards Prussia and the widespread belief that war was inevitable and the unwillingness to meet either the financial or personal obligations necessary to strengthen the army.
The decision to engage in a hazardous war was nevertheless the Emperor’s
responsibility, although the role of public opinion should not be ignored. The crisis when it arose would be unexpected, short and intense. The conservative press responded in bellicose terms to the announcement on 3 July of the candidature of the Prussian Prince Leopold for the Spanish throne. Hohenzollern monarchs on the Rhine and Pyrenean frontiers appeared to threaten encirclement. Although the Emperor and Ollivier might have been willing to accept a simple Prussian