standards of the masses remained extremely poor by twentieth-century standards and harsh working and living conditions continued to result in widespread poor health, chronic insecurity and premature death, the Second Empire should still be seen as a period when the good years outnumbered the bad, when the France of Balzac was transformed into that described with equal literary brilliance by Emile Zola.
It was during the first decade, certainly until 1857, that the personal power of Napoléon III was at its peak. Ministers were convoked twice a week to discuss an agenda drawn up by the Emperor. They provided information, he took decisions.
The tradition of ministerial responsibility to parliament (developed since 1814) was annulled and the
Corps législatif
rendered largely quiescent. These were years in which continued political repression and close cooperation with reactionary and clerical forces characterised the regime. Even during this period, however, implementation of governmental decisions was to be obstructed by a complex of often conflicting vested interest groups, as well as the practical difficulties of administrative control and finance, and by vacillation on the part of the head of state himself. Additionally, the new regime was dependent inescapably upon the
aristocratic and wealthy
grands bourgeois
servants of previous regimes. Most ministers were conservative ex-Orleanists (e.g. Magne, Fould, Rouher) or
representatives of the former dynastic opposition (Baroche). Of men who might be considered genuine Bonapartists, there were remarkably few. Napoléon’s
frustrations are said to have led to the exasperated comment: ‘What a government is mine! The Empress is Legitimist; Napoléon-Jérôme republican; Morny
Orleanist; I am myself a socialist. The only Bonapartist is Persigny and he is mad’
(Plessis 1985: 54). Implementation of policy decisions depended upon the
efficiency and goodwill of these men and of administrators drawn from similar backgrounds, and the Emperor was inevitably forced to make compromises.
The political system of Napoléon I
II
The power of an apparently monolithic, centralised, hierarchical administration was reduced substantially by a combination of vested interests, localism,
established habits and respect for the rule of law. The linchpin of the system – the Prefect, responsible for the whole range of government activities at departmental level – was himself subject to complex pressures from ministers, deputies,
competing administrative hierarchies, mayors and the local notables who gathered 28
regularly on an informal basis, at agricultural shows and at meetings of chambers of commerce and of the departmental councils (
conseils généraux
). Dependent on their routine collaboration, especially during elections, the Prefect could not afford to ignore their wishes. The intention expressed by genuine Bonapartists, like the prefect of the Haute-Garonne Pietri in 1854, of replacing the patronage and influence of the old elites by that of the Prefect, as the direct representative of the Emperor himself, was rarely realised. To a substantial degree, prefects were assessed by their superiors according to their success in managing elections.
Election campaigns were the means of mobilising support. Electoral victory was vitally important for a regime which insisted upon its roots in popular sovereignty.
It was an essential source of legitimacy. Thus, every election took on a plebiscatory character and involved a judgement of the regime and its policies. This was not only the case in general elections, but also frequently those at departmental and municipal level, whenever the personality of the candidate or local circumstances gave the contest a political colouring. Until 1869, the essential distinguishing feature of the electoral system was the official candidature, far more systematically organised than under previous regimes. The government, through the agency of the Minister of the Interior and the prefects subordinate to him, took it upon itself to declare support for some candidates and to announce its hostility to others. Once selected, usually at the suggestion of the Prefect, the government’s candidate could expect active support from the entire administrative machine by means of the creative redrawing of constituency boundaries, the distribution of the official candidates ballot papers along with registration cards, and of oral and printed propaganda. Initially, this insisted upon the Emperor’s role in protecting France from the ‘red menace’, and then from around 1857 used the theme of prosperity, the progress of public works (particularly roads and railways) and the efforts of the regime to attenuate the misery caused by poor harvests. At the same time,
opponents were discriminated against. Their posters were torn down, the printers of opposition manifestos risked losing their all-important licenses, meetings were banned and potential candidates and their supporters were intimidated. Moderate opposition was tolerated, most notably in the republican and anti-clerical
newspaper
Le Siècle
, and at the opposite pole in the ultra- montane Catholic
Univers
edited by Louis Veuillot, but on condition that the regime itself was not challenged.
A major political problem, even in the 1850s, was the selection of official candidates. These needed to satisfy two main criteria – devotion to the regime and 29
possession of the local influence necessary for electoral success, although it was always possible that an excess of local influence might allow deputies like the right-wing Bonapartist Granier de Cassagnac in the Gers to become too
independent of the government. The number of suitably qualified candidates was generally limited. In practice, given the absence of a Bonapartist party, they were mainly former Orleanist or Legitimist notables. Additionally, the very act of selecting a particular individual was all too likely to cause disaffection among disappointed aspirants, with a cumulative effect over time. Thus, the authoritarian political system was always in danger of breaking down due to its inability to escape from dependence upon the established elites. Moreover, once these elites had recovered from their fear of ‘red’ revolution, they would demand the restitution of the share of political power they had enjoyed under the July Monarchy and the liberal institutions through which this could be manifested. As the former Orleanist prime minister Guizot warned:
an insurrection can be repressed with soldiers; an election won with peasants.
But the support of soldiers and peasants is not sufficient to rule. The cooperation of the upper classes who are naturally rulers is essential.
Napoléon appears to have hoped that the elites would genuinely rally to the new regime once its stability was assured. He was to be disappointed. Indeed, his very success in re-establishing social order would soon make the authoritarian regime appear redundant.
In the early years, political stability and strong government accompanied by growing economic prosperity certainly attracted considerable support. The
Emperor was able to pose as the ‘saviour of society’. Even Guizot had accepted that the regime was ‘inevitable and necessary’ (letter of 12 January 1852). In such diverse worlds as the relatively backward and overwhelmingly rural west with its Legitimist and clerical traditions, or the north with its advanced farming and rapidly developing industry, the mid-century crisis had reinforced the influence of local elites. They possessed multifaceted means of exercising social power, based upon control of access to the land, to employment and to the charity upon which so many people came to depend in a period of intense depression. However, they were willing to collaborate with an administration committed to protecting their status.
Typically, in the department of the Nord, most politicians assumed that to do anything else would result in their political isolation, given the widespread appreciation of the improved economic and social situation of the 1850s. In the 30
west and parts of the south, many Legitimist notables faced a sharp moral dilemma as a result of the re-establishment of the Empire. Traditional family loyalties could hardly be ignored. Most, however, were ‘realists’ and even if the majority did not rally with any real enthusiasm, their criticism of the new regime would, for some time, remain muted. In the Gard, for example, the spirit of cooperation was rewarded by the selection for the February 1852 elections of three Legitimists – the Duc d’Uzès and the Marquis de Calvières (with interests in both the land and industrial development) and the merchant Léonce Curnier – as official candidates.
The clergy also assumed that their interests would be served best by maintaining a close alliance with a regime which appeared to want to encourage the extension of clerical influence in education and society as a whole, as a means of inculcating sound moral principles and safe-guarding social order. This policy was given symbolic value through the attendance of government representatives at all public religious ceremonies, practical significance by means of increased stipends for priests, and substantial subsidies for church construction and repairs. For the government, this policy had the useful consequence of reducing the ability of the Legitimists, acting through the clergy, to speak to a mass audience. A much remarked upon manifestation of this weakening of popular Legitimism was
provided by the enthusiastic reception given to the imperial couple by parish priests and their flocks during their visit to Brittany in 1858.
Mass electoral support for the regime was partly the result of official election management degenerating at times into coercion and the ability to make use of the social influence of local elites and of the clergy. In most departments, given the small number of bureaucrats, the government acted through the existing elites and inadvertently strengthened their local authority. Rarely was use made of the predominantly middle-class electoral committees which were set up in many areas.
As a result, their members were soon discouraged. The opportunity to establish a committed Bonapartist party was missed. Napoléon himself, as well as his close advisors, were too closely integrated into ‘high’ society and committed to the established social order to be able to contemplate seriously the organisation of a
‘party’ as an alternative means of exercising influence. The brilliance of the imperial court at the Tuileries is evidence of a determination to reinforce these traditional links. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the party based systems of control introduced in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. In only a few areas, most notably former centres of
démoc-soc
strength in impoverished regions with relatively few resident notables (e.g. the Creuse or Basses-Alpes), was it judged 31
possible to appeal to the egalitarian instincts of the masses over the heads of established elites and on the basis of such issues as restrictions on peasant access to forests and the burden of usury. Bonapartism in these limited contexts might be seen as a democratising movement, a means of reducing the power of the ‘bigwigs’
(
gros
) over the ‘little people’ (
petits
). However, the key factor in winning and retaining support for the regime in most rural areas, and for all social groups, was to be the establishment of strong and stable government and the greater prosperity which appeared to follow. Even if most of the rural population continued to take little interest in politics they were grateful for this, and also aware of the dependence of the regime on their vote. Napoléon III was ‘their Emperor’.
Although the Emperor and officials at all levels frequently expressed sympathy for industrial workers, their limited efforts to alleviate working and living conditions had little practical impact, while the constant efforts to repress workers’
organisations and strikes in order to safeguard the ‘freedom’ of economic activity were clearly favourable to employers. Even so, and although republican
historiography has attempted to minimise its significance, many workers were also attracted by the regime, especially in the Nord, Rouen area and Alsace. In part, this was due to the Bonapartist legend and mass propaganda presenting Napoléon III as the ‘poor man’s friend’. Relative prosperity, in spite of some difficult years, lent weight to this, as did the efforts of the administration to alleviate the effects of poor harvests, rising food prices and unemployment between 1853 and 1857. It also reflected clerical influence in some of the declining textile centres in the south, or else paternalistic pressures, as among the employees of the textile entrepreneur Seydoux at Le Cateau (Nord) and those of the ironmasters Schneider at Le Creusot (Saône-et Loire) and de Wendel at Hayange (Moselle). The many workers
employed in rural manufacture tended to share the views of the peasants among whom they lived. In addition, the waging of successful war was to be an important source of prestige for the regime. Even in such major centres of opposition as Paris and Lyons, events like the Emperor’s departure for Italy with the army in 1859
appealed to a bellicose popular nationalism.
Foreign policy
Napoléon’s foreign policy was that of the republican left of the time. It involved rejection of the treaties imposed on France in 1815 following the defeat of the first Empire and, even more ambitiously, a recasting of the map of Europe based on the 32
principle of nationality, to involve in particular some sort of reconstitution of Poland, Italy and Germany as well as the territorial
aggrandisement
of France itself. As far as possible, these objectives were to be achieved through congresses of the powers but, if necessary, through engagement in limited war. The Crimean war in 1854 represented a first step, an alliance with Britain against Russia, the most reactionary of European states. Eventual military success considerably increased French prestige, although the Congress of Paris in 1856 did not result in revision of the treaties. War with the old rival Austria in 1859 brought further military successes at Magenta and Solferino in Northern Italy and a hastily concluded peace which united Lombardy to the Kingdom of Piedmont-Savoy and