Nelson: Britannia's God of War (50 page)

This was, he admitted a guess, but it was based on careful calculation.
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Other problems were looming, especially the possibility of war with Spain – not that he was behind in his preparations, having exploited a Spanish request to convey a cardinal from Majorca to Rome to obtain a full report on the defences and resources of the island. Pitt, satisfied that Spanish payments to France were a breach of neutrality, decided to force the issue. Orders to seize Spanish treasure ships were issued in mid-September, and on 5 October a brief action between four frigates from each nation in the approaches to Cadiz ended when one Spanish ship blew up and the others surrendered. Nelson did not think the situation had been adequately thought through, and would have preferred to be ready with an adequate force to seize Minorca.
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This new war arrived just as he heard that his official request for leave had been granted. He decided to stay, and kept his leave a secret. Painfully conscious of his impaired vision, he was thinking about taking a seat at the Admiralty as overall director of the naval forces of the state. Nor was this a delusion, as many have argued following St Vincent’s acid asides. In truth, no one would have been better equipped to lead the officer corps by example and encouragement, rewarding merit and courage, rather than imposing harsh measures and blatant favouritism. Nor could any other officer have equalled his strategic insight and record of accurate analysis of complex situations.

The Spanish war had other consequences. With Nelson expected to return home on leave, the Admiralty despatched Sir John Orde to command a new station in the Atlantic approaches to Cadiz. He was Nelson’s superior in rank, but had a smaller command, fewer ships and less responsibility. As Nelson chose not to go home, it appeared that Orde had merely been sent to reap his ‘golden harvest’.
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Having made a public complaint about Nelson being given the Mediterranean detachment in 1798 it would have been hard to pick an officer less likely to work well with him. He was not overly concerned about the money – ‘God knows, in my own person, I spend as little money as any man; but you know I love to give away.’
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But it was the apparent lack of faith in his ability to handle the station that rankled, especially as he had taken immediate steps to meet the need: his reinforcement of Captain Strachan off Cadiz had led to the capture of two frigates before Orde arrived.

Orde soon tired of a position that everyone knew was false, and which he could not fill with dignity or ability equal to his rank. Complaining that Nelson was interfering, he asked to be relieved in March 1805, and was taken at his word by return of mail. Orde was the same petty-minded blockhead who had tried to fight a duel with St Vincent five years before. It seems he had been sent only to annoy the old Earl, who was refusing to go back to sea until Pitt apologised for his remarks in the House of Commons on Admiralty administration during the Addington Ministry.
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Spain was no longer the sea power she had been in 1796. Her fleet had declined through capture and disaster and had not been adequately replaced. The national coffers had been emptied to buy off Bonaparte, while a terrible outbreak of yellow fever swept across southern Spain, hitting Cadiz and Cartagena particularly hard.
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The situation was so bad that Orde was directed not to board any Spanish ships he might capture, but to take them into quarantine at Gibraltar.
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Efforts to mobilise the Spanish fleet were crippled by the loss of craftsmen and seamen, the shortage of food and stores, and above all the lack of hard cash. Gibraltar too was affected by fever: over two thousand people died in a few weeks.

However, the French now demanded Nelson’s full attention. Vice Admiral Pierre Villeneuve, Nile escapee and Napoleon’s ‘lucky’ admiral, now commanded at Toulon. On 18 January he put to sea with eleven battleships, cruisers and six thousand troops. British frigates
quickly reported back to Nelson, who moved to cover Naples and Sicily on the likely track of the enemy. Taking into account the strong winds then blowing, they could only be headed east, so he ran down to the Italian coast, through the Straits of Messina, and by 7 February was off Alexandria. There was no sign of the enemy. By 18 February he knew that the French, crippled by the wind on their first night at sea, had straggled back into Toulon – masts shattered, rigging strained and basic seamanship skills in doubt. Villeneuve was dismayed by the experience; Bonaparte was dismayed by his lack of resolution. Nelson, meanwhile, was concerned that the poor state of the
Royal
Sovereign’s
copper made her too slow for such pursuits.
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The fleet had suffered no damage in the storms or the pursuit, however, and was ready for another cruise only days after reaching Sardinia on 8 March. Realising Orde had not been sent out to supersede him, Nelson decided to stay until the movements of the French fleet were clear. He was still expecting a battle.
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A few days later Nile veteran Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Louis joined the fleet with flag Captain Francis Austen, then the best known of the Austen family.

The underlying purpose of Bonaparte’s movements was unclear. Lying in Cawsand Bay, for a brief respite from the hard pounding off Brest, Collingwood recorded his view:

This was a typically lucid and penetrating analysis by a master of war. Collingwood was Nelson’s best friend in the service because he was one of the few men to view the world from the same level, and with the same clarity. Nelson agreed, regretting that Orde’s command had broken up his system of Mediterranean trade protection, leading to the loss of one convoy, and risking many more.
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By this time Bonaparte had switched from trade attack to deception plans to facilitate an invasion, and he continued to change his mind throughout the 1805 campaign. He might outwit Orde, but not Collingwood or Nelson.

Nelson stressed that the key to success in this titanic conflict lay in striking blows in Europe, not frittering away the national resources on ‘buccaneering expeditions’ to the Spanish empire.
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According to the fleet surgeon’s report, Nelson needed rest and the assistance of an
oculist.
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Nelson himself complained of ‘heart’ spasms, though they were later diagnosed as indigestion, brought on by tension, lack of exercise and poor diet – but he was worried that a return might be misinterpreted:

By the time he wrote, however, the French were already at sea. The final campaign had opened.