Nelson: Britannia's God of War (49 page)

With Hardy to run the ship, George Murray to handle fleet administration and John Scott to deal with English correspondence, Nelson had a fine team. Moreover he had chosen these talented men because he liked them, which made his work far easier. Hardy, known as ‘the ghost’ from his silent perigrinations about the ship, his presence announced by the appearance of a bald head stooped far ahead of his feet, spent so much time walking with the admiral that he adopted Nelson’s pace, rather than his own longer stride. Nelson’s inner circle was completed by his steward Chevalier and servant Gaetano Spedillo, who ministered to his human necessities. If his days were taken up with routine and correspondence, he always found the time for exercise, walking back and forth on the quarter-deck for hours, and he entertained many of his officers over dinner, including the youngest. He would not step off his flagship for two years. It contained everything he needed to control the Mediterranean.

On 1 November the
Victory
anchored in Agincourt Sound, in the Maddalena Islands, exploiting a fine chart produced by Captain Frederick Ryves of HMS
Gibraltar
. Further local surveys improved access to the anchorage: now the fleet had a secure base, with ‘water, brooms, sand, onions, some beef, plenty of sheep … but I suppose the French will take it now we have used it’.
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The anchorage was only two hundred miles from Toulon. Here the ships could rest and take on water and fresh victuals. The supply situation needed careful oversight. Food would be drawn from Sardinia and the Barbary coast, while ‘clandestine’ methods secured vital supplies from Spain and even France – Gibraltar and Malta were simply too far away to supply fresh food.
⁴⁸

The arrival of Spanish lemons and onions soon cleared up an incipient outbreak of scurvy. Nelson’s concern with nutrition had been influenced by his lemon-obsessed physician friend Dr Andrew Baird at the Sick and Hurt Board: ‘I am clearly of your opinion that we must not be economical of good things for our sailors, but only take care that they are faithfully supplied.’
⁴⁹
As Nelson explained to Dr Moseley of the Chelsea Hospital, who had treated his eye: ‘The great thing in all military service is health; and you will agree with me, that
it is easier for an Officer to keep men healthy, than for a Physician to cure them.’ To Baird’s lemons, Nelson added a personal preference for onions, fresh meat and plenty of fresh water. His own health was, he reported, indifferent, but ‘I must not be sick until after the French fleet is taken.’
⁵⁰

There was nothing seriously wrong with him, frustration and mental over-exertion aside, so he was still telling the same story twelve months later. Although the fleet was remarkably healthy, he set up a naval hospital in Malta. This period is striking for Nelson’s painstaking and professional management of his ships and fleets, and his mastery of the routine administration that kept the ships and men ready for a long cruise, a sudden battle or another year at sea. His record of fleet administration provides a rich source of detail on the everyday, the humdrum that was the reality of war at sea. No one else attended to the subject with such dedication.
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*

From the outset Nelson considered Sardinia the key to his strategy: it offered the only anchorages close enough to cover, if not blockade, Toulon, watch the Riviera, and intercept the French if they tried to make for the east or the Atlantic. ‘If I lose Sardinia, I lose the French Fleet,’ Nelson explained to Minto.
⁵²
His concern that the French might seize it was real enough, after their occupation of Corsica and Elba. Without Sardinia his small force could not secure Sicily, Malta or Egypt. His constant demand that precautions be taken, either by purchase or occupation, finally produced results in March 1805. When troops were available, General Sir James Craig’s instructions included the occupation of Sardinia among the contingencies to be considered, in consultation with Hugh Elliot and Nelson.
⁵³

With his strategy in place, Nelson spent the next year keeping everything in tune: ships, men, intelligence, logistics and options were all under constant review. It was a long wait, and offered few opportunities for his talent to flourish, but the nature of total war meant that everyone was prey to such pressures. He longed for the emotional release of battle, endlessly running the permutations of French strategy over in his mind. If his body and emotions were often in turmoil, these were merely the side-effects of concentrated mental commitment over the long months of waiting. The overriding aim was to get inside the enemy’s plans, to out-think them and anticipate their next move. This, and only this, would set up the next battle of annihilation.

Cautious, sophisticated enemies like the French did not fight for pride, and rarely in anger. They knew that the British would accept any opportunity to impose their will in battle, to ruin their strategic combinations, and they rarely took the risk. In twenty-two years of war there were only six occasions when a major French fleet was engaged by a British force of similar strength. Only two proved decisive, and on both occasions Nelson was in command. That was not luck: his whole being had been dedicated to setting up those battles, always recalling the battles of Hotham, Bridport, Howe and, in a previous war, Lord Rodney. He would out-think the enemy, and then outfight him. As he told Cornwallis, who faced the same problem off Brest, the French would wait in harbour until ‘they have an object worth fighting for … I do not mean to say that they will merely think us an object worth coming out to fight, I never saw a Frenchman yet fight for fighting’s sake, and I do not believe they will now begin.’ He hoped with all his heart that Cornwallis would meet the French, an opportunity his old friend was denied.
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While Cornwallis and Keith kept the French locked up in port, Nelson left them an opportunity to get to sea. Ultimately this would draw Bonaparte into a major error: he would attempt to win the war with an inferior fleet, from widely dispersed bases, by grand strategic combinations. His only hope was to link up his forces, and avoid or overwhelm part of the British fleet before launching his invasion. Such complex strategic combinations were the core of his military thinking, and worked well in Western Europe, but they did not work in underdeveloped Eastern Europe and Iberia, nor at sea. Bonaparte never really grasped the tremendous gap in quality between his navy and the British, or the complex and unreliable nature of oceanic navigation in the age of sail. He seemed to think that wind and weather, tide and current should bend to his Imperial will. The threat the French could pose to British trade and overseas territories was real, but there was little chance they would divert such masters of strategy as Cornwallis and Nelson, St Vincent and Lord Barham, from Bonaparte’s real objects.

*

In early 1804 the Admiralty, alarmed by the latest intelligence from Spain, sent two more ships: the first-rate
Royal
Sovereign
and the seventy-four
Leviathan.
When they arrived Bickerton shifted his flag from the shattered seventy-four
Kent
into the three-decker.
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Now the
French, under Latouche Tréville, chose to make an appearance just outside the harbour. This was all the encouragement Nelson needed. Well aware they would not seek battle, but might be forced into a harbour or roadstead, he issued his captains with the latest charts of the most obvious locations, which they were to study closely, and typically minute guidance for an attack on anchored ships. Each ship was to have four heavy anchors already attached to cables, and would send off the launch with the stream anchor and a hawser, ready to assist stranded vessels. The attacking ships should anchor to ensure ‘mutual support for the destruction of the enemy’. Suitable sailing directions for Leghorn roads may have been written at the same time.
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As the anniversary of Nelson’s return to the Mediterranean arrived, the French seemed as reluctant as ever to move. Instead Nelson had to deal with a trade war stretching across the theatre. As ever he exploited an unrivalled understanding of local wind, weather, currents and geography to frame his orders.
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The fleet was spread across the region, with eight battleships, four frigates and two smaller craft off Toulon, two frigates outside the Straits of Gibraltar, two sloops inside, a frigate and four smaller craft cruising between the Greek archipelago and Ancona to protect trade, a frigate off Barcelona, and three battleships in movement, one at Naples and another to visit Algiers to discipline the Dey. Further ships were escorting convoys, undergoing repairs or carrying dispatches to link Malta, Naples, Gibraltar and other points.
⁵⁸
While Nelson’s mastery of the entire run of business in the Mediterranean was astonishing, he never overrode the judgement of those whom he had ordered to execute well-defined tasks. He always worked through the proper chain of command to avoid giving offence, or undermine the confidence of promising officers. If things went wrong he was the first to leap to the defence of a bold and decisive subordinate.
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With Admiralty rarely sending any mail much of his news came from the Paris newspapers that were sent from Spain, usually ten to fourteen days old. The translation of Bonaparte from Consul to Emperor in May 1804 prompted further reflections on the state of Europe: he hoped for peace, but with Pitt returning to power on 12 May the die was cast for a climactic campaign. While he would regret the departure of Addington from office, he declared that ‘If Pitt is attentive to me he shall have my vote.’
⁶⁰
For Nelson the main impact was the end of St Vincent’s universally loathed Admiralty Board,
although he regretted the departure of his friend Nepean. Nelson knew the faults of the Board, but blamed those surrounding the old Earl, especially Admiral Markham and Troubridge.
⁶¹
While he knew the new First Lord, Henry Dundas, only slightly, Nelson was confident he would improve the supply of ships and men.

Sardinia remained his main concern. To block the movement of troops to embarkation ports on the Italian coast and on Elba, he placed frigates close inshore, altering the nature of the blockade to meet particular circumstances. He hoped the pressure would bring on battle; instead it resulted in some smart boat actions and a few wounded men. While delighted that the French had come out of Toulon in mid-June, Nelson rightly feared they did so only to ‘cut a gasconade’ before scuttling back into safety. He waited with an inferior force for them to try their strength. He would not fight them too close to Toulon, where their damaged ships could retreat to safety, unless the wind was favourable. A month later he was wound up to highest pitch by another apparent sortie, but he continued to think very clearly, and work out the options. Whatever the pressure, Nelson never abandoned the analytical approach to his problems or resorted to blind panic.

The tension of his long wait finally broke when the French press published a boastful, dishonest dispatch by Tréville, claiming the British had run away. In an unguarded moment Nelson declared he would make the Frenchman eat it, if he had the fortune to capture him. Tréville died on 18 August, worn out, it was said, by constantly climbing to his observation post to look at the British fleet. After Tréville’s death the French were noticeably less alert, despite sweeping the streets of Marseilles to man the fleet.
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As 1804 wore on the prospect of another winter running before the gales of the Gulf of Lyons began to pall, and the combination of exhaustion and boredom began to take a toll on Nelson’s resolve. In mid-August he promised Emma he would be home for Christmas, if only for a rest. Anxious that another senior officer might take his command he wanted Bickerton to stand in, and suggested that King Ferdinand make an official application for his early return.
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It was as if he doubted his own importance to the nation, as commander and talisman. Cut off from home, with little correspondence of any kind, he was losing faith in himself. He needed to recharge his emotional reserves with another infusion of public acclaim. Ferdinand took the
bait, but also wrote through Elliot to urge Nelson to come ashore for the winter. This was not what Nelson wanted: ‘Being on shore, either in Sicily or Naples, would not relieve my mind of the charge entrusted to me; for my thoughts would always be off Toulon, and I should not feel answerable for measures which I do not direct.’
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The Eastern Mediterranean and Adriatic required constant attention, with the Russians steadily building up their forces, and their influence. Nelson had long feared they meant to seize all of European Turkey.
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Their presence at least made it unlikely the French would strike in that direction: