Read No Lack of Courage Online
Authors: Colonel Bernd Horn
Nonetheless, once the firebase heard that there were mass casualties “we started to pound everything that we could,” stated Sergeant Walsh. “We called in for a reference, so one of the sections threw out white smoke and told us everything east of the white smoke was friendly, everything west was enemy . . . so we just used the white smoke as a reference point and just started hammering everything, trying to keep their [enemy] heads down to let [C/S] 31 recover their casualties and to be able to pull off the position.”
45
As Charles Coy Gp began its withdrawal, one issue still remained. Someone had to retrieve Warrant Officer Nolan's body. Sergeant John Russell quickly stepped up. “Sergeant Russell pulled forward in his LAV and once he got the go ahead we fired at a rapid rate,” described Lieutenant Hiltz. “It was complete mayhem as rounds were going in both directions all around them.” The LAV pulled up to the stranded vehicle
and Russell and Private Spence dashed out, grabbed Rick Nolan's body, and pulled him back into their LAV. “In a matter of two minutes they were back out and we covered them the whole time,” assured Hiltz.
46
Back at the CCP, Lieutenant Bules had backed up his LAV, lowered the ramp, and began loading as many of the wounded as possible. “We backed up and put the ramp down near the CCP,” stated Bules. “I didn't have anyone in the back of my LAV that day so I had just put the back hatches down and we had gone in just with the crew for the battle.”
47
By the time Bules was ready to pull out he had 12 soldiers and the bodies of the deceased in his LAV III. He was unable to put his ramp up and he had no chain so “we just pretty much drove out of there with the ramp bouncing up and down every time we hit a bump,” recounted Bules. “I just kept telling my driver to go slow and he kept saying we got to get the hell out of here.”
48
Major Sprague turned to his FOO to assist with withdrawal. “When the company commander was prepared to withdraw, Captain Matheson brought in air-burst rounds onto the marijuana fields and the corn fields, probably about 200 to 250 metres out in front of the company's dismounted troops to assist with the extraction,” explained Major Ivey. “At the same time, there were buildings in depth that we suspected the Taliban were using to fire RPGs and 82mm recoilless rifles so as best as we could we used hellfire missiles from the attack helicopters, as well as 500 and 1,000 pound laser guided munitions to neutralize those areas.” Ivey clarified, “it was a tough slog because it was probably the first time that the FOO had been put in a situation like that where he was with the company commander conducting the fire plan, using the 25mm cannon, controlling artillery at danger close distances under contact and his forward air controller [FAC] in the back [of his LAV] was controlling the aircraft all at the same time. So there was a lot going on.”
49
The withdrawal continued and all of the wounded and dead were pulled from the bloody field of battle. All the stranded vehicles that could not be recovered were “BIP'd” by CAS. “C” Coy Gp then regrouped. “We pushed back into the centre of the riverbed and just leaguered up and basically composed ourselves, and got all the casualties out,” stated Master-Corporal O'Neil, “then we pushed back to battle position 302.”
50
The attempted assault on the enemy positions had been costly. The TF suffered four killed and eight wounded. “How more people weren't killed,” pondered Sprague, “I don't know.”
51
He asserted, “This wasn't some one-hour firefight we were inâwe were fucking fighting for our lives, for seven hours.”
52
Private Daniel Roasti asked the same question. “I'm convinced someone was watching over us . . . The amount of bullets that were flying, I just don't know why some of us are still here.”
53
Once “C” Coy Gp moved back to battle position 302 on Ma'SÅ«m Ghar “it was basically business as usual for us,” commented Major Ivey. He explained:
The offensive air support plan kept slogging along as intended and that night we had a significant amount of air based on the day's actions, since we now had a pretty good idea where the enemy was. So, the FOO parties basically began trying to destroy as much of those compounds as they could and that happened all throughout the night. And I remember specifically, and I will never, ever forget thisâthat night just seemed to go on forever because we were on Ma'SÅ«m Ghar and we kept dropping artillery and bombs anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 metres from our own location. And the echo of the bombs and the A-10 Thunderbolts and the other aircraft that we had just rang through the entire Arghandab valley. And, you know, we'd try and get to sleep as best we could behind the vehicles and the light from the explosions was so bright that it would go right through your eyelids as you were sleeping. And, you couldn't sleep because you could see the explosions go off because we were up on top looking down into the valley and every strike would just light up the entire valley.
54
By 1700 hours, 3 September, an intelligence report revealed, “the enemy believe that they are winning, and their morale is assessed as high.”
In fact, the Taliban quickly claimed victory following the withdrawal of “C” Coy Gp back to their battle positions on Ma'SÅ«m Ghar. Moreover, despite the loss of a significant amount of Taliban fighters, the intelligence report concluded that it did not have a demoralizing affect on the remaining Talibes. In fact, the defence of Pashmul became a rallying point for the local Taliban insurgents and they began pushing reinforcements into the area and re-manning many of the abandoned ambush positions.
Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber, the MNB operations officer, took a stoic stance. “It was either a really good feint or an unfortunate attack. Either way, despite the loss of life, it worked like it had to happen, because it unmasked Taliban positions.” He clarified, “So we sucked back, pounded it some moreâwe spent the remainder of that day pounding the hell out of them [Taliban] and Omer pulled back to set up and to try again the next morning.”
55
“C” Coy Gp regrouped. “We pulled back to the battle position and we began to take stock and to start the healing process and start talking through some of the issues while still maintaining a strong force on the line,” explained Lieutenant Hiltz.
56
Major Sprague spoke to the entire sub-unit about the day's activities and then passed on the word that “C” Coy Gp was going back in the next morning to do a feint at approximately 0700 hours, following Bravo company's feint from the north, in an attempt to draw the Taliban out of their defensive positions. Hiltz asserted, “So the plan was that we would get everything ready to go that night. We would take a good night's rest and have a chance to suck back and take a breather and focus on what had happened and then realize that we had a job to get on with.”
57
For many in “C” Coy Gp the prospect of going back into the grinder was daunting. The chaos at the white school complex was still fresh in their memories. Particularly unnerving was the fact that very few actually saw the enemy. In the residual glow of the ongoing bombardment of the enemy positions, the soldiers prepared for another assault at dawn.
The change in the original plan created a great deal of dissension within the ranks. Many of the participants could not understand why things were “rushed” and why the additional 48 hours of bombardment were not permitted. Retrospectively, they argued that that would have weakened the enemy physically and psychologically, and provided more time to map out the enemy's strength and disposition.
1
“There seemed to be a rush to get â3' [call sign 3ââC' Coy] across the wadi, with no real orders,” commented one soldier. Another stated, “We were pushed across the wadi but then what? We weren't even sure what the objective was . . . We were going into the unknown.”
2
Private Will Needham offered, “We rolled in, drove right into an ambush site, and it was told to us the night before that this grid was basically an ambush site.”
3
One soldier quietly concluded, “The enemy was surrounded, cut off and wildly outgunned. We held all the cards, and we played their hand.”
4
Many of the senior NCOs were equally unimpressed. Master Warrant Officer Keith Olstad summarized their overall dissatisfaction. “There was a plan,” he stated emotionlessly, “and you only vary from the plan if the enemy influences events . . . [the change in plan] was influenced by decisions not by the enemy.”
5
In the aftermath of the failed attempt by Charles Company to secure Objective Rugby the intelligence community underwent serious self-examination to determine what had gone wrong. Was the ferocity and strength of the enemy ambush unexpected? Was it in fact an intelligence
failure? The conclusion was a resounding “no.” Captain Chris Purdy, the TF intelligence officer revealed:
We in the intelligence community had a sit-down and we were basically trying to figure out amongst ourselves who had come up with any assessment [regarding the enemy leaving the pocket]. And, an intelligence assessment that stated that the enemy had actually left was not made. I think basically the assessment [to launch early] may have been based on some frustration that we weren't seeing the enemy, yet through sensors on the higher level we [intelligence community] knew that the enemy was there, but legitimately we could not say exactly where they were. And I think it was probably recognized that if we were to go in there and do something it was going to have to be an advance to contact in the first stage. The intelligence community was basically saying that we still know the enemy are there, the assessment is that they're going to stay and fight, especially within the particular vicinity around Bayenzi. They may fold in the surrounding areas, but [Bayenzi/Objective Rugby] was going to be the Taliban's last stand right in that area. And, due to the ground, they really were able to shape us into where we had to cross. The whole area was very canalizing. Again with TF Orion's experience, we knew where they got hit when they tried to come from the south, when they tried to come from the north, and then from the east. So we basically picked a spot where we thought that the engineers could doze, get some LAVs actually rolling across because when TF Orion went across, there were heavy, heavy IEDs on the main routes. So we were adamant that we would not take these main routes because we know that they are just laced with mines and IEDs. We were pretty limited to what spots we could choose to roll a LAV across the river.
6
Captain Purdy extrapolated, “As far as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) goes, it was a combination between brigade intelligence assets, the ASIC [all source intelligence cell] and the battle group . . . Originally we thought that the enemy would mass and we'd be able to bomb them for four straight days.” However, he quickly added, “The intelligence side never actually said that that was going to be the case. We [intelligence] actually were wondering why we were going ahead with this feint when we were assessing that they [enemy] were probably more likely to draw us in [to their kill zones] . . . That's what we were trying to do to them. So we knew it would likely come to a head and then there would be a stalemate.”
7
Another intelligence officer was blunter. “The intelligence was clear!” exclaimed the officer. “The General was clearly informed! And clearly [he] chose to ignore the intelligence.” The distraught officer stated, “Intelligence can only advise the commander; that was done, he made the decisions.”
8
In the end, Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie was never given a reason for the change in plan but he suspected that the initial success, specifically how easily Charles Coy Gp had seized Panjwayi, had created a false impression in the higher headquarters. Originally, “everyone was expecting a real fight, but it never materialized,” stated Lavoie. “We rolled through the village unopposed, seized the high features [Ma'SÅ«m Ghar and Ma'ar Ghar], isolated the village and then started pounding the enemy on the other side,” explained the CO. Lavoie believes that the unmitigated victory created the impression that there was an opportunity to exploit.
Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) Chief Warrant Officer Bob Girouard supported his CO's assessment. “Because there was no return fire from the enemy [on 2 September] the brigade felt that there was not going to be any enemy resistanceâthat the enemy had dispersed . . . Therefore, instead of giving the CO his three days, they wanted him to go in immediately. And from there, basically, is when everything more or less went astray.”
9
“They [Brigade] wanted to rush it through,” acknowledged Lavoie, “so I asked what happened to the original timelines.” He described how each layer of leadership is continuously pushing for results on the ground. “Consistently higher pushes,” noted Lavoie. “They want IO [information operations] successes, and brigade in turn is pushed by NATO HQ [headquarters] for obvious success, however, the calls for greater effort and faster
results never come with resources . . . Since there are not sufficient resources, you must phase the operation, therefore it takes longer.”
10
Lavoie later lamented that the worst moment of his tour operationally “was crossing the Arghandab on 3 September and losing four soldiers killed in action despite my gut instinct telling me that conditions were not set and the intelligence picture was not clear and the battle procedure was too compressed/non-existent.” He acknowledged, “I said no the first time but the rest is history.”
11
A now seasoned Lavoie concluded, “Now, I just say noâI learned my lesson the hard way at the beginning of the operation.”
12