Read No Lack of Courage Online
Authors: Colonel Bernd Horn
Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie assigned Major Andrew Lussier and his ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance) squadron, which was roughly a company-sized sub-unit largely made up of personnel from the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), to join “B” Coy and assist with the northern feint. “The next day [4 September] we were set at the start line at first light, I think it was 5:30 a.m.,” said Lussier, “and we were all along just south of Highway 1.”
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The CO's intent was for “B” Coy and the ISTAR Squadron to penetrate Cracked Roof to draw the enemy's attention and focus to the north. The soldiers of both sub-units were poised for the attack, ready to assault when, 15 minutes before H-Hr, the command radio net exploded to life. “And that's when we got the news: âStop, stop, stop. Charles Company has just been fucking strafed,'” revealed Lussier.
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News of the friendly-fire incident hit everyone hard. “That was one of the worst days of my life,” recalled Captain Piers Pappin, the 4 Platoon commander. “The âC' Coy LAV captain came on the radio as the OC so we all knew there was some real shit . . . We thought they were all dead.”
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Not surprisingly, everything ground to a halt.
For “B” Coy, somewhat dislocated from the BG, time came to a standstill. However, it was a “little bizarre,” according to Captain Pappin, who was anchoring the left flank of the blocking position. “It was what I called the phony war of Medusa . . . We conducted our feint and then we sat on our positions for quite a long time and we didn't see much enemy activity . . . We knew they were there but there was not a lot of movement.”
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It seemed to be a stalemateâneither side was ready to make a decisive move. However, during that period the enemy conducted small probing attacks because, as Pappin observed, “they were confused about what we were doing and would do.” As a result, “when the insurgents probed we would do a hasty attack, and kill them and then pull back to our original blocking position.”
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“B” Coy also closed down an enemy supply and reinforcement rat line into Pashmul. “We noticed a route that no one was covering,” recounted the 4 Platoon commander, “so we set up an observation post that observed the area and could cover it with fire . . . We shut it [enemy rat line] down.”
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The formation flank to the west was also firm. Brigadier-General Fraser had given that task to TF-31, which was a sub-unit from the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (3 SFG) or “Desert Eagles.” The unit, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Bolduc, was starting its fifth rotation in Afghanistan.
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The American TF arrived in theatre with the mission of conducting consolidation operations, which meant establishing, maintaining, or regaining control of key populations centres or lines of communication in the regions, districts, or provinces. Major Jamie Hall, the OC of the American SF “C” Coy, which consisted of six Operational DetachmentâAlpha (ODA) teams, was responsible for the Kandahar area, therefore, he was assigned to Operation Medusa. Each of his six ODAs also had a 30 man ANA company attached to it.
Fraser had given TF-31 the task of screening the western flank. As such, Major Hall decided to slip into the operational area unseen. He took a 60 mile route through the Registan Desert, braving temperatures of 48°Celcius instead of using the highly congested and targeted Highway 1 and Highway 4 route from the Kandahar Airfield (KAF) through Kandahar City to the Panjwayi. “I wanted to quietly infiltrate the enemy's battlespace before they knew we were coming,” explained Major Hall.
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However, he conceded that “it was like driving across Mars.”
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But in the end, TF-31 arrived in location and deployed along the western flank.
Nonetheless, regardless of the firm grounding to the north and west, because of the friendly-fire incident a pause in operations was required. The 1 RCR BG needed to reorganize and plan out the next steps. The RCR “C” Coy Gp was sent back to the Kandahar Airfield to regroup and say farewell to their dead. They returned to Ma'SÅ«m Ghar on 6 September 2006, to rejoin the fight. General Rick Hillier, the chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) summed up “C” Coy's resilience:
On that terrible weekend [Labour Day Weekend 2006], they lost a company commander in action, lost a company sergeant-major, lost one out of three platoon commanders, lost all three platoon warrant officers, one wounded, two killed, lost five section commanders out of nine and lost all of the sections' second in command master-corporalsâa total of 40-plus wounded and five killed in a 48-hour period. They all stepped. A young sergeant promoted to sergeant last July became the company sergeant-major. Young master-corporals became platoon commanders and platoon second-in-commands. And young soldiers became section commanders and they carried on the operation and the fight against the Taliban that gave NATO such an incredible boost right at the start of the mission. Now, if that's not a Canadian epic . . . I don't know what is.
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The return of Charles Coy to the battlefield was mirrored by a press release from the NATO Secretary General Japp de Hoop Scheffer who stated, “[there is] a hard fight, a hard battle going on because NATO forces were attempting to exert control in places such as Panjwaii [
sic
] a no-man's land, where nobody has ever been before excepting small and sporadic past forays by very thinly spread coalition forces.”
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He added, “Operation Medusa is accomplishing its task and I can tell you from everything we've seen and heard today, and the commanders we've talked to, the operation itself is going along well . . . I would characterize it as a successful operation that has to take its course and it will in the time that's coming.”
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The NATO secretary general's carefully chosen words veiled the tensions that existed. Despite the rhetoric of the importance of the battle, few NATO nations actually committed troops to the battle. And, those that did had differing views of how the next phase of the battle should unfold.
“Now Omer [CO] was adamant that he didn't want to try it the same way a third time,” revealed Schreiber, “and good on him.” The MNB operations officer continued, “We agreed, but we were under a whole bunch of pressure from Major-General Freakley that he wanted us to go. He said you still have another company down there, get that company, get it in there and get after them.” Schreiber elaborated, “We didn't want to do it hard, we always were going to do it smart, we didn't want to rush into a failure. So we came up with an alternative plan.” The BG was going to use three dismounted companies, clearing from the east, move down the canals to get into the area and then clear out the enemy. “Now that, that was still going to be ugly because we're talking about clearing that area by hand to hand combat.”
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The ISAF commander was not enamoured with the revised slow Canadian approach. Fraser simply stated that they could not risk taking many more casualties because of the national political ramifications. Lieutenant-General Richards refused to accept that rationale and called Fraser's national command. However, in the end, the ISAF commander was forced to relent. Schreiber asserted:
So commander ISAF said okay, you can do it your way, continue with the slow approach and the emphasis on
fire power. He gave us 72 hours to continue to try and pull apart the Taliban position in Objective Rugby. So we took the 72 hours. But, commander ISAF was adamant that at the end of the 72 hours he wanted to move to what he called the decisive phase, which was to attack and clear Pashmul, and the three objectives Cricket, Lacrosse and Rugby.
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The pressures on Fraser and Lavoie were tangible. “Brigadier-General Fraser was getting phone calls from Lieutenant-General Richards and Major-General Freakley on an hourly basis,” revealed Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber, “saying this is the most important thing NATO's ever done, the future of NATO rides on this, the future of Afghanistan rides on this.” He assessed, “There was a lot of psychological pressure being put upon Brigadier-General Fraser and then being transmitted down to poor Omer [Lavoie] to get this done faster . . . There was an implied âdon't worry about the casualties, just get in there.'” However, at the same time, Schreiber acknowledged there was also “a lot of pressure” from Canadian Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM) headquarters in Ottawa clearly stating that “you can't have any more casualties, the political situation is precarious.”
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In the end, Fraser admitted they “got to a stage where in fact I would say there was a tremendous amount of pressure from ISAF to âget it done!'” But he also insisted, “On the other hand, there was a tremendous amount of support from Canada to do the right thing but not to rush into it.” As always, in war there are a myriad of competing demands. Fraser realized that there was also a culminating point. “How long could I keep my assembled forces out here in the field?” he pondered. And of course, the enemy always has a major vote in the affair.
And so, with a myriad of competing pressures, a well-entrenched and tenacious enemy as well as an impatient chain of command, both Brigadier-General Fraser and Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie had to revitalize Operation Medusa. A new plan was required so the formation and BG staffs set to work. On their shoulders rested the fate of a nation and apparently an alliance.
By the time what was left of Charles Coy returned to Ma'SÅ«m Ghar, a new battle plan had taken form. First, on 6 September Brigadier-General Fraser requested tanks from General Hillier, the CDS, because his forces were facing a dug-in enemy.
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Second, the emphasis of Operation Medusa was shifted from the south to the northern flank, onto the shoulders of “B” Coy Group. Up until that time, “B” Coy had largely sat out the action and had only sporadic and limited firefights with Taliban forces. They were now the primary effort.
Before launching the second assault, however, Brigadier-General Fraser had to reform his brigade. First he created Task Force Grizzly, which consisted of the remainder of The RCR “C” Coy Gp combined with an American rifle company and commanded by the American national command element, which became the TF HQ.
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“Based on the results of our first probe [on 3 September], it became clear that I needed to adjust,” explained Fraser, adding that “the enemy had focused on where he thought we were going to cross the Arghandab River from the south.” Quite simply, the ground the coalition had attacked “was key terrain tactically for the Taliban and they had reinforced and defended the northern shore of the Arghandab River,” with tenacity and resilience.
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Fraser elaborated:
In fact, they actually created a kill zone in the objective area we had code-named Rugby. They had designed to
take us either from the east or from the southeast. They were really focused on us coming from the south and a lot of their commanders were in Kandahar, Sperwan Ghar, and along the southern part of the Arghandab River. Sperwan Ghar was an important area because from there they could escape into Helmand Province or into the Reg[istan] Desert, which led to Pakistan. As a result, based on that assessment and the initial moves by TF 3-06, I decided to give Task Force 31 the task to take Sperwan Ghar and once that was accomplished push across the Arghandab River and take Siah Choy. I created Task Force Grizzly to create the impression of force, but more importantly, it was actually a feintâto deceive the Taliban that we were still coming across the Arghandab River from the south. Meanwhile, I shifted TF 3-06 to the north so that they could initiate a deliberate sweep from our Patrol Base [Wilson] in the North clearing our main axis of advance down to the Taliban strongpoint.
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Once the redeployment of forces was complete, Fraser ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie and his BG to deliberately put pressure on the enemy to force the Taliban to react. Instead of the Canadians continuing to move into ground of the enemy's choosing, Fraser wanted to force the Taliban to react to their choice of terrain. Fraser ordered TF-31 to move north into Sperwan Ghar at the same time that 1 RCR BG started moving from the north, clearing towards the Arghandab River. He changed their mission from one of screening the western flank; in essence flank security, to the task of disrupting the Taliban command-and-control node in Sperwan Ghar. Fraser also had British SOF operating in the Registan Desert to interdict any reinforcements coming from, or retreating enemy attempting to escape to Pakistan. His plan was to clear the ground step-by-step and capture or destroy as many Taliban as possible.
The 1 RCR BG commander was in line with Fraser's intent. “With Charles Coy now combat ineffective,” Lavoie explained, “I, in concert with supporting arms commanders and my operations officer created a
new plan of attack.” He directed “B” Coy to spearhead an assault from the north of Pashmul, moving slow and deliberately to the south. He then pushed his other sub-units forward, securing strong points and clearing routes of IEDs and mines. “With all arms working together and under the constant umbrella of air cover,” noted the TF 3-06 CO, “my BG [would] advance towards Pashmul and the Arghandab River.”
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The renewed push was started on 6 September 2006 by “B” Coy when they breached the treeline that marked the divide between friendly and enemy territory. When word finally came to renew operations, “B” Coy was ready. “We sat on the line so long,” commented Captain Pappin, “that we had already done rehearsals and talks on how to breach the line . . . At night we also did fighting patrols to define the next bound.” As a result, “when we got the word,” asserted Pappin, “we knew exactly how to do it.”
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