Read No Lack of Courage Online
Authors: Colonel Bernd Horn
It took about four to five hours to clear the eastern part of the objective and it was a classical infantry ground slogging clearance. Shotguns were used to take the hinges off the doors; the doors were kicked in; grenades were tossed in and once they exploded the troops went in spraying the room with machine-gun fire. Then they searched for IEDs and weapons. We found a lot of IED making devices and lots of weapons on Rugby East. We also had to clear the wells. Often you'd throw a grenade down a well and get a secondary explosion because there were RPGs and munitions stored at the bottom and in holes dug into the sides of the well walls. “A” Coy cleared through until 1200 hours and then Bravo Coy passed through and cleared through Rugby Centre. Because their objective was bigger and more complex, it took them a bit longer to doâuntil almost last light. At first light I pushed my American company [Mohawk 6] through and the entire objective was secured.
42
Concurrent to Mohawk 6 being pushed through to secure the remaining vestiges of Objective Rugby, Charles Company assaulted across the Arghandab River and attacked Objective Rugby from the southeast. “We
established a line just north of the school, and then all of a sudden we start seeing LAV antennas to the north,” explained Lieutenant Wessan. “It was crazy. And that was it. Rugby was secure and everything was good to go.”
43
So in the end, “C” Coy secured the Taliban stronghold that had punished them dearly.
To Brigadier-General Fraser that was important. “And I wanted TF 3-06 to take that ground because of what they lost there,” he stated. “They took some heavy casualties and I mean for them, there was psychological value in that terrain . . . In fact, I was there when Charles Company actually took it and I was so happy that they were the ones who went across and seized the groundâI thought, âyou took it, no one else did, you guys did it' and that was another reason why I assigned them to TF Grizzly in the southâthis was important for that company because it came at a high cost.”
44
Once they had captured the ground the scale of the enemy preparation became fully apparent. “They had extensive fortifications,” remembered Captain Pappin, “bunkers, loopholes in thick walls and buildings, and some bunkers were built in the courtyards of mosques.”
45
Lieutenant Hiltz explained,
I was able to get a good look at the actual position itself and everything seemed to indicate that the enemy had prepared fairly significant defensive systems oriented to cover down to the south . . . Everything seemed to point towards the fact that they were defending in that direction with many lay back positions. And on one occasion I was able to actually see one of the positions before the engineers blew the entrances to one of the bunker systems . . . As a bunker system with approximately four feet of earth over top of it, a steel I-beam-reinforced roof and the actual interior of it was almost done similar to the crack filling on a wall in a house . . . It was done smooth and it could have held anywhere from 15 to 25 personnel. They were able to move into that bunker with pretty much impunity through a ditch system,
essentially an irrigation system that was actually ringed with trees, which would have concealed them . . . And again, they were low enough that it would have given them cover, so they would have been able to pull back into the bunker unmolested . . . In essence, there was quite a significant amount of trench system and bunker systems that they had built.
46
The extent of the fortifications once again raised the question of how “C” Coy had managed to escape from the Taliban killing fields with as few casualties as they suffered on 3 September. Sergeant Dinsmore verbalized what many inwardly thought, “You wonder how we didn't lose more men actually from seeing this side of the Arghandab River now.”
47
In the end, the assault on the Taliban stronghold in Pashmul was successful. Lavoie later revealed that the best moment of his tour was the seizure of Objective Rugby.
48
“The Taliban didn't think we would attack from the north,” surmised Lavoie, “because the ground was impassable and no one had done that before.” He explained that a clever deception in the south and the use of bulldozers to plough lanes through grape vineyards and marijuana fields to make lanes for the LAV IIIs, as well as “B” Company's utilization of the ground in conjunction with overwhelming fire from artillery and CAS at “danger close” range, overcame any and all opposition.
49
But for how long?
With the taking of Objective Rugby the combat phase of Operation Medusa was over. In the end, Fraser assessed, “after all that pressure, after all that time, the enemy just collapsed and they went to ground.”
1
The brigade commander declared that the conditions for TF 3-06 to move from Phase 3 (exploitation) to Phase 4 (reconstruction), namely the creation of a secured area of operations in the Pashmul District, was at hand.
Once again, a phased approach was taken. In fact, a three-stage plan was developed. The first stage entailed restoring security through the visible employment of ANSF throughout the area with RC(S) forces in support. It was also to be the commencement of an enduring ANA/ANP presence in the Pashmul/Panjwayi area. The next stage called for resettlement. In coordination with the Disaster Management Committee and key district leaders, as well as UN and appropriate civil agencies, ISAF forces were earmarked to assist with the return of the civilian population to the area. Finally, the third and last stage of the reconstruction phase of Operation Medusa was the development piece where the larger and more enduring projects targeted for long-term development could take place. After all, Brigadier-General Fraser had pronounced that the end state to Operation Medusa would be achieved when “the people of Afghanistan have freedom of movement along Highway 1, the villagers of Pashmul and greater Zhari have returned to their villages and the Taliban have been denied freedom of action in the vicinity of the Kandahar ADZ.”
2
By 15 September 2006, the various TFs began pushing their presence further out from their original objective areas. Although there were no enemy engagements, there were locals observed fleeing the area, which normally portends no good fortune. However, in this case no combat ensued. Moreover, the Government of Afghanistan and ISAF began radio and television broadcasts to encourage locals to return to their homes, explaining that the fighting had stopped. By 16 September some of the TFs, such as Mohawk 6, were redeployed to the Kandahar Airfield (KAF). The next day, 1 RCR BG began to rotate its companies through KAF for rest and refit, maintaining two company groups on security and clearance operations in their area of responsibility.
It seemed that by 17 September 2006, Operation Medusa, aside from the non-kinetic Phase 4 reconstruction phase, was over. It appeared that the ISAF Multinational Brigade, but particularly the 1 RCR BG that bore the brunt of the fighting in the Pashmul area, had indeed defeated the Taliban. The cost, however, was not inconsequential. In total, the Canadians had five killed and approximately 40 wounded. The fact that Canada bore the brunt of the fighting was not hard to notice. One reporter noted, “Canadians are getting killed at a rate five times the average for NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, where Canada's soldiers have suffered more than one-quarter of the combat deaths in Afghanistan [in 2006].
3
The victory, however, was hailed as a monumental success. A NATO statement was swiftly broadcast announcing the victory:
NATO launched its largest-ever combat operation, against a well-prepared and determined enemy. It was fought to the southwest of Kandahar City, in the Panshwaye [
sic
] and Zhari Districts. It was here that the Taliban filtered in large numbers of insurgents in to first take and then, far more significantly, hold the area. It was a trial of strength that will have a lasting effect both militarily and on the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.
4
Another NATO missive announced, “The operation has met its initial aims by dealing a severe blow to the leadership and forces of the extremists so that they are no longer a cohesive force and have had to dispense after suffering important losses.”
5
A political official was less restrained. He remarked that Operation Medusa “wiped the floor with the Taliban.”
6
Not surprisingly, NATO leadership used the success to push select messages. General James L. Jones, commander of Allied Command Operations cooed, “It has been necessary to fight in this instance to achieve the required effect. Importantly it has proved that NATO will not shirk from taking robust action where necessary and especially given the level of insurgent activity.”
7
Similarly, ISAF Commander Lieutenant-General David Richards boasted:
Operation Medusa has been a significant success and clearly shows the capability that Afghan, NATO and Coalition forces have when they operate together. I always said that I would be robust when necessary, and that is what I have done. The Taliban had no choice but to leave . . . Having created a secure environment in the area, it is now time for the real work to start. Without security, there can be no reconstruction and development. Without reconstruction and development there can be no long-lasting security.
8
According to Lieutenant-General Richards Operation Medusa was a key battle against the Taliban insurgency. “If Kandahar fell,” he explained, “and it was reasonably close run last year, it did not matter how well the Dutch did in Uruzgan or how well the British did in Helmand. Their two provinces would also, as night followed day, have failed because we would have lost the consent of the Pashtun people because of the totemic importance of Kandahar.”
9
The Afghan government also hailed the success of Operation Medusa. Provincial Governor Assadullah Khalid stated on 17 September 2006, “Six nations fought side by side to inflict significant casualties on
the entrenched insurgent forces, who could have avoided this sad loss of life by reconciling with the legitimate Afghan government.”
10
He added, “The ability of the Taliban to stay and fight in groups is finished. The enemy has been crushed.”
11
Khalid assessed, “This operation in Panjwai [
sic
] and Zhari is one of very few successes in recent years.”
12
The rather effusive praise from senior NATO and Afghan leadership was echoed by some scholars and analysts. Author Barnett Rubin, a respected global authority on Afghanistan, credited “Canada's military for turning back âa frontal offensive by the Taliban' in Panjwai [
sic
] last summer and for rescuing Afghanistan from what he considers âa tipping point.'”
13
The largely Canadian ground action did not go unheralded by its national command either. The CDS, General Rick Hillier, asserted, “Afghan ministers will tell you that operation [Medusa] saved Afghanistan.” He explained, “If Kandahar had been encircled, if Highway 1 had been shut down and if the Panjwai [
sic
] had been held by the Taliban, the government in Kabul would have fallen.”
14
Brigadier-General Fraser added, “It was one of the hardest things we've done for a very long time. Canada led the operation, NATO's biggest one ever, and successfully defeated the Taliban in this area. Canada did what was right and the cost was not insignificant.”
15
In more private settings, the MNB commander was more unrestrained. “The ISAF commander was ecstatic,” Fraser revealed. “He [Richards] just could not believe what we were able to accomplish . . . He was very enthusiastic, I mean psychologically, what our troops did was impressive. They saved the city of Kandahar, arguably saved the country and they saved the alliance. They proved that NATO could fight as a coalition.”
16
The MNB commander concluded, “We defeated the Taliban with only five of our casualties [killed]. Then the Taliban tried to bug out one night. Not many made it out. We saved the city, and in so doing, [we] saved the country.”
17
Lieutenant-General Mike Gauthier, commander of Canadian Expeditionary Command (CEFCOM), believes that Operation Medusa and follow-on operations signalled a major success in Kandahar. He bluntly elaborated: “Kandahar City did not fall; the Taliban heartland was lost by the enemy; the Taliban were unable to maintain momentum in the winter; and the capacity of the ANA was increased.”
18
NATO's initial assessment claimed 512 Taliban were killed and 136 captured.
19
Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber stated, “It is a conservative estimate that the Taliban suffered 1,500 casualties (1,000 wounded, 500 dead).”
20
Brigadier-General Fraser's assessment was similar. “We think we probably killed about 300 to 400 and captured 136, which includes the death of approximately five senior commanders on the ground. That's a significant defeat, the worst defeat the Taliban ever experienced in probably 40 years, according to the Afghan Minister of Defence.”
21
The effects of Operation Medusa seemed impressive. Brigadier-General Hayfield, the ISAF Chief of Operations, proclaimed, “Operation Medusa was a huge success.”
22
Similarly, media reported, “Medusa was, in military terms, a roaring success. The enemy was routed and more than 1,000 insurgents were killed, giving what British and NATO commanders call âpsychological ascendancy' over the Taliban.”
23
Moreover, British Brigadier-General Richard Nugee boasted, “Casualties from roadside bombs and suicide attacks have fallen from 245 in September 2006 to 29 for the first two weeks of November and soldiers in Panjwayi have started an $8m reconstruction drive.”
24