No Lack of Courage (19 page)

Courtesy “B” Coy, 1 RCR BG.

“Fix and Load.” Members of “B” Coy Gp prepare to take the next objective.

Courtesy Graeme Smith.

Members of 3 Section, 4 Platoon “storm the breach,” 10 September 2006.

Courtesy Graeme Smith.

The “ground pounders'” timeless task—“closing with and destroying the enemy.”

Courtesy “B” Coy, 1 RCR BG.

“The Fog of War.” “B” Coy soldiers follow up a preparatory bombardment to clear yet another compound.

Courtesy Combat Camera, negative number AR20006-P005-0080.

An enemy compound burns as members of TF 3-06 prepare to push through to the next objective.

Courtesy Combat Camera, negative AR20006-P005-0080.

Brigadier-General David Fraser watches operations with Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Williams, commander of TF Grizzly (left), and Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, commander TF 3-06 on his right.

Courtesy 1 RCR BG.

A Taliban-fortified entrenchment in Panjwayi.

Courtesy 1 RCR BG.

The map used by RC(S) headquarters to explain Operation Medusa to the public.

B. Horn photo.

A 7 Platoon LAV III provides security on Route Summit, October 2006.

B. Horn photo.

The centre of Strong Point Centre prior to the attack. C/S 33C covers the northern approach of Route Summit.

Courtesy 1 RCR BG.

Canadian Leopard 2 A6M tanks patrol along Route Summit, November 2006.

Courtesy Combat Camera, negative AR2006-5002-0029.

Members of TF 3-06 conduct a shura during Operation Baaz Tsuka, 18 December 2006.

W
HILE MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS
were over on 14 September, the Taliban did not seem to accept their defeat. In fact, it was the period of reconstruction that proved to be deadlier than Operation Medusa itself, as a combination of roadside bombs and suicide bombers, as well as combat and mine strikes, killed another 10 Canadian soldiers in the month following the capture of Objective Rugby. “Kinetically we had great effect,” professed Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Williams, “in stark terms, the number of casualties we inflicted on the enemy was significant. We disrupted their leadership to the point where they realized from a conventional point of view they would not be able to take us on and achieve any sort of success.” However, he conceded, “we found that they tended to reverse their tactics . . . so after Medusa there has been an increase in the number of IEDs and suicide bombers and so on.”
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