No Lack of Courage (22 page)

Back at 9 Platoon, Sergeant Walsh organized his section to better engage the enemy in their location. He placed Corporal Nick Damchuk, and Privates Jay Royer and Garret Achneepineskum behind a small berm directly behind his LAV C/S 33C, where they laid down suppressing fire to the area west of the stronghold. Walsh then deployed Corporal Chris Saumure and Private Ed Runyon-Lloyd at the front of the LAV to observe for enemy activity to the east of the position. Corporal Mike Lisk was in the turret of C/S 33C and he was soon joined by Master-Corporal Rob Murphy who used the small escape hatch on the side of the LAV to crawl up into the turret. Due to the lack of enemy activity in their primary arcs to the northeast of the position, Murphy traversed the turret over the back deck of the LAV so that the cannon could be fired to the southwest. He then used the height of the pintle-mounted machine gun to fire over the high feature to their front to add extra firepower to the fight. All the while, Corporal Jeff Morin was redistributing ammunition to the section as the scale of the combat quickly depleted the immediate supply.

Simultaneously, Lieutenant Corby quickly moved to his HQ LAV, sited on the north side of the position, to ensure a contact report had been sent out. As he neared his vehicle he could see they were busy engaging a large number of enemy directly to the west. Corporal Morgan Gonci had been in the driver's hatch prior to the attack. As the first few rockets exploded nearby he could feel the LAV shake. Corporal James White, observing from the gunner's seat, also felt C/S 33 reel as an RPG rocket hit the front, right side of the LAV, ripping off some of its up-armour plating. With the onset of the attack Sergeant Craig Dinsmore crawled up through the rear of the vehicle into the crew commander's seat and
Corporal Gonci immediately began to provide target indication from the driver's hatch. At the same time, Corporals Shane Robertson and Joey Paolini jumped into the back of LAV and raised the ramp. As Corby arrived he banged repeatedly on the back door until it was opened. He then instructed Robertson and Paolini to provide security to the north of C/S 33 to ensure the enemy did not outflank their position.

Corby took a headset and sent a supplementary contact report on the company net. He also requested a fire mission, sending his exact location, the distance to the enemy, and the bearing of 4,800 mils. Fortuitously, Major Greg Ivey, G29 the CO's affiliated battery commander who travelled in the 9er Tac convoy, was already in the process of calling in artillery support. Within 10 minutes of the start of the engagement, 155mm rounds exploded with an earth shaking “krummpp” 400 metres away from Strong Point Centre, dangerously close. Word was passed over the net that “AH” (Apache attack helicopters) were on their way.

Satisfied that the call for fire was taken care of, Corby tried to raise his sections on the radio to get a more accurate read on the battle. He began with the OP with the GPMG as it had the highest vantage point. He became concerned when he received no reply. His second call went to C/S 33B to the south of the position. Corby received a SITREP from Corporal Jones, who was in the turret of the 2 Section LAV. Jones informed the platoon commander that they had two casualties, vital signs absent. He also requested a medic to look after the other three wounded soldiers. Corby questioned Jones on the extent of the other injuries and determined that they were not critical.

Luckily there was an advanced qualified soldier to administer first aid. However, he, Master-Corporal Jeremy Leblanc, was in dire need of additional medical supplies. Corby decided not to risk his only medic by sending her across exposed terrain, in light of the heavy volume of enemy fire. Instead, Corby grabbed the medical bag and made his way to 2 Section's location himself.

Meanwhile Paolini and Robertson, on the outside of the HQ vehicle, were busy engaging the enemy. Between the two soldiers they saw two separate groups, five individuals in total, with small arms and RPGs engaging their position.

Out on the road, the CO's convoy continued to pour fire into the buildings, wood line, and marijuana fields. At about that time, Corby moved back to C/S 33C, which occupied the centre of the platoon position. He looked across at C/S 33B and could see that the turret was still firing. He quickly informed Sergeant Walsh of his plan to run the medical bag first to the OP and then to C/S 33B's location. Damchuk and Achneepineskum laid down a wall of suppressive fire as Corby made his mad dash.

To get to 2 Section's LAV he first had to pass by the southernmost OP. Corby did not expect to find anyone alive. As he arrived at the bowl in the centre of the strongpoint position, which was also the casualty collection point, Corby was able to get eyes on the OP. At first glance it had appeared that the OP had been struck hard. He could not see anyone and the tarp that had been hung above the outpost to provide shade had been torn away by the fire and it hung in tattered rags. Close by he could see the empty casings of four M72 launchers.

Corby called out twice to the OP. He finally got a response. Private Larochelle poked his head up with his C-6 and confirmed he was “okay” and “by himself.” The platoon commander directed Larochelle to provide covering fire so he could enter the OP. Larochelle pointed out where he had been engaging the enemy with his C-9 LMG, the C-6 GPMG, and the M72s. The firefight had been so brisk that Larochelle was down to his last half belt of 7.62mm GPMG ammunition. He had weathered the storm and continued to fire at any movement or weapon signature he could see. He also maintained his discipline and continued to observe his arcs of fire in order to ensure that no enemy was approaching from the east, even though he was taking heavy fire from the west.

Corby was humbled by the young soldier's valiant efforts.
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However, he had no time to reflect on Larochelle's courage—there was work to be done. Corby now instructed Larochelle to lay down more fire so he could make his final way to 2 Section's (C/S 33B) LAV. Corby promised that when he returned he would bring additional ammo.

After the first deadly RPG strike, Corporal Jones had remedied the gun malfunction and started to return fire. A second RPG round hit C/S 33B, setting off the automatic fire extinguishing system in the LAV. When
Corby arrived he quickly recognized that they had, in fact, suffered two killed. Master-Corporal Leblanc, who himself was wounded, had bandaged up the casualties, while the rest of the section were on the line, busy returning fire from a sandbagged wall they had constructed adjacent to the LAV position. Once patched up, Corporals Chris Dowhan and Chris Meace joined their section on the firing line.

By that time the “C” Coy soldiers were about 15–20 minutes into the fight. Corby now sent another SITREP to his company HQ. He learned that the company second-in-command was on the scene with numerous other LAVs to lend a hand. Corby recommended that they form a firing line north of his position and orient themselves to the southwest so that they could assist in suppressing the enemy's heavy fire into Strong Point Centre.

As the battle dispositions were discussed, Jones reported a second stoppage of the cannon. Master-Corporal Leblanc, despite his wounds, switched places with Jones in an attempt to rectify the stoppage. However, since he was becoming faint and weak from loss of blood, Leblanc was pulled from the turret and Jones returned to do what he could.

Lieutenant Corby was happy to learn that 1 Section, who had hit the IED in the morning, were on their way back out with a replacement LAV, which had just arrived in theatre, fresh off the assembly line from London, Ontario. However, his morale took a hit when he heard that the Bison ambulance that accompanied it was now disabled due to a mechanical breakdown. Corby decided to use the battle damaged C/S 33B to evacuate the dead and wounded to PBW. That would get his men back to PBW for medical attention quickly and C/S 33A could provide the necessary reinforcements and added firepower

By then the Taliban were largely suppressed. The weight of fire and dreaded artillery, which impeded insurgent movement, swung the battle to the advantage of the TF 3-06 soldiers. But that was no surprise to the Taliban. They were very aware of coalition tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and knew exactly how long it would take coalition resources to be fed into the battle. To further complicate the response, the Taliban often coordinated attacks to buy themselves more time. Today, they hit simultaneously at five different locations throughout the AO.

With the enemy suppressed and the dead and wounded evacuated, Corby's thoughts turned to securing the position for the night. His position remained on “100 percent stand-to.” To ensure he could hold the position, reinforcements and a resupply of ammunition was brought into the strong point. In addition, F-18 and F-16 fighter aircraft remained on station the entire night, providing observation and fire when required. At one point an air strike lit up the darkness with a bright orange wall of flame—a beautiful sight in a rather macabre sort of way. To the soldiers holding the road, the sound of fighter aircraft streaking overhead was reassuring.

At 0700 hours, 4 Platoon arrived to relieve the exhausted 9 Platoon. The relief in place went smoothly. 4 Platoon already had a section in place, which had been brought in during the night as reinforcements, and the entire platoon had already done a stint of duty at Strong Point Centre several weeks earlier. For 9 Platoon it was a bittersweet moment; they had weathered the storm well and shown resilience and courage but tragically, they lost another two of their comrades.

The attack on 14 October 2006 was one of the larger attacks. But the war of the flea continued with the Taliban continuing its incessant attacks on the Canadians who were stuck guarding infrastructure. By the end of November, approximately two months after the end of Operation Medusa, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Bolduc, CO of the 1st Bn, 3 SFG (Desert Eagles) estimated the strength of Taliban back in the Pashmul area at 800.
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As a result, another operation was required to try and clear out the insurgents to allow for reconstruction and development.

Regional Headquarters (South) (RC [S]), which became the formal title of the formation headquarters, replacing the MNB HQ title once NATO took full responsibility for Afghanistan in October 2006, set about preparing for another large operation. It assessed that a high level of insurgent activity continued to emanate from the Zhari/Panjwayi Districts. The formation-level staff officers claimed that although the local population was seeking an end to the violence, there still existed “hard-core” Taliban, assessed as “mostly foreign to the area,” who still viewed the areas as a key battleground. As such, ISAF directed planners to create the conditions to force the enemy out of the area to allow the local population to take over responsibility for the first line of security, reinforced by a smaller but
enduring presence of ISAF and ANA troops. ISAF deemed this as a precondition for further development of the Kandahar ADZ.

The RC(S) assessment underlined what Lavoie had been trying to convince his superiors of for a long time. The formation intelligence officers noted that the insurgents continued to conduct reinforcing and resupply operations with relative ease into the Zhari/Panjwayi Districts as a result of their rat lines coming out of the nearby Registan Desert and other lines of communication to the west. The intelligence analysts concluded that the influx of weapons, particularly mortars, enabled the enemy to conduct frequent attacks against PBW and the other FOBs in the area. They further noted that the Taliban had established a very effective early warning network in the area and were capable of conducting coordinated ambushes on extremely short notice. Moreover, the insurgents could also count on drawing additional fighters from Uruzgan, Helmand, and other areas of Kandahar, as well as Pakistan, to maintain relatively large force levels.

ISAF decided to build on the effects from Operation Medusa to establish an enduring stable environment within the Zhari/Panjwayi Districts to enable the development of the Kandahar ADZ. A senior NATO commander stated that the operation is a “show of unity and strength and a demonstration by ISAF of its ability to combat and defeat the Taliban.”
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ISAF ordered RC(S) to dislocate the “hard-core” (Tier 1) Taliban by separating them from the “local TB” (Tier 2) and the local population on which they depend. This operation was predicated on engagement of local tribal elders to convince them to accept their role in the development of security. Manoeuvre elements would support the initiative by interdicting, disrupting, and destroying Taliban command-and-control nodes and fighters.
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Operation Baaz Tsuka was born. Major-General Ton Van Loon, the Dutch ISAF commander, affirmed, “The aim of Baaz Tsuka is twofold, to destroy the Taliban's ability to mount a fresh offensive in the spring, and to encourage Afghan forces to take more control of security in the region.” He revealed, “For me, success is when the elders can actually take responsibility for their own security when we can deploy police into the area as much as possible, when we can make sure the Taliban cannot use the window to build up for a spring offensive.”
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Brigadier-General Tim Grant, the new commander of RC (S) who replaced David Fraser when he rotated out of theatre, insisted, “I'm still hopeful the plan laid out by General Van Loon will allow us to achieve the aim of dislocating the Taliban and have the village elders take more responsibility for influence and security with a minimum of fighting.” Grant said the goal was to separate the hard-line Taliban from those who were fighting mainly for the money.
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The colourful and gregarious Canadian chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, was predictably more direct. He put the operation in more understandable language, stressing that the principle aim of the operation was to kill Taliban commanders and suicide-bomb makers. “One of the parts of this kind of operation,” he explained, “is in particular to neutralize or take out the leaders who plan, prepare, facilitate; who get the money and get the vehicles for people” to conduct suicide bombings.
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