No Lack of Courage (29 page)

5
.    Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, interview with author, 18 October 2006.

6
.    Captain Tim Button, interview with author, 9 January 2009.

7
.    CTV News Staff, “Operation Medusa a ‘Significant' Success: NATO,” 17 September 2006,
www.ctv.ca/serviet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060917/
suicidbomb060917?sname=&noads=24Nov06
, accessed 24 November 2006.

8
.    Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, ACOS, Multi-National Brigade HQ, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

9
.    Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 8 October 2006.

10
.  It is not difficult to understand the feelings of one local Afghan who captured the sentiments of many: “We are in the middle, we aren't with the Taliban and we aren't with the government,” he confessed quite frankly. “If you help us we will be with you. And if not . . . .”
Adam Day, “The Battle for the People,”
Legion Magazine
, January/February 2007, 24.

11
.  Elizabeth Rubin, “Taking the Fight to the Taliban,”
New York Times Online
, 29 October 2006,
www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29taliban.html
, accessed 29 October 2006.

12
.  Montgomery Mcfate and Andrea V. Jackson, “The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,”
Unrestricted Warfare Symposium 2006 Proceedings
, 150.

13
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 15 October 2006.

14
.  Mitch Potter, “The Story of C Company,”
Toronto Star
, 30 September 2006.

15
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 15 October 2006.

16
.  Quoted in Declan Walsh, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Julian Borger, “From Soft Hats to Hard Facts in Battle to Beat Taliban,”
The Guardian
, 18 November 2006, 5.

17
.  Quoted in Walsh, et al, 5. A British special operations force (SOF) officer with vast experience in the new environment asserted, “The sheer velocity of the insurgent's determination to kill us had to be gripped quickly. There was no room for error.” He added, “It was kill or be killed . . . It is warfare where the enemy is prepared to die to achieve his objectives. That is hard to counter and the insurgent approach has forced us to think not just out of the box, but around the corner.” Michael Smith, “Secret War of the SAS,” Mick Smith's Defence Blog, 18 January 2008.

18
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 15 October 2006. Work began on Route Summit on 29 September 2006; paving commenced 18 January 2007 and the project was completed 22 January 2007. Its name derived from one of the battalion's officers. The operations officer, Captain Chris French, wondered “What do we call the route?” He lived on Summit Trail in Petawawa, Ontario, so the new road quickly became Route Summit.

19
.  “Route Summit serves two purposes,” stated Brigadier-General Tim Grant. “It's a project the local people had asked for because it will allow
commerce to flow freely in this particular area.” Brian Hutchinson, “Toll for Afghan Road Paid in Soldiers' Lives,”
Star Phoenix
, 12 December 2006, D7.

20
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 8 October 2006.

21
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 15 October 2006.

22
.  In the battle group's first two months in theatre it had suffered 15 killed and 85 wounded. With regard to the HLTA, the section leave plan was adopted from the previous tour where, under the circumstances at the time, it was found to be less disruptive and more efficient. The whole question of leave was a difficult one. No one wanted to leave their comrades short in such dangerous conditions, but the long, demanding tour made the rest very important.

23
.  Some ANSF were available but in inadequate numbers. Moreover, their ability, as well as their loyalties, were often suspect. The primary concern with the ANA was the fact that they had not yet arrived and their numbers were small. TF 3-06 was partnered with a Kandak from a different province and their companies numbered between 60–80 strong. Lavoie also observed that there was confusion over terms when dealing with ANA. ANA troops were actually “under operational control,” Lavoie clarified, “but still, once ANA commanders are told what to do they must clear it with their Brigade commander. For example, the order to ‘dig in on the road' was delayed for 1.5 days until approved by their chain of command.” However, Lavoie noted that “compared to the ANP, these guys [the ANA] are Spetznaz (wear a uniform and usually don't shoot at you).” He stated that there are a number of ANP checkpoints in the battle group AOR, designed to support security through observation and physical security. But their value is questionable as Lavoie and others have walked in on checkpoints where all members have been sleeping with weapons totally accessible. According to Lavoie, most of the ANP received two weeks of training and were about 17 years old. When the ANP battalion commander arrived, Lavoie found out he was illiterate and unable to read a map. “I had to take him out
to tell/show him where to place his troops at TCPs,” related Lavoie. Moreover, “ANP don't wear uniforms because they are ‘uncomfortable' so there are ANP in civvies carrying AK-47 assault rifles in pickup trucks. It's hard to tell good guys from bad. For that reason there were some fratricides early on in the operation.” Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

24
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 15 October 2006.

25
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, interview with author, 13 October 2006.

26
.  
Ibid
.

27
.  Les Perreaux, “19 Day Visit to Hell,” Canadian Press, TF 3-06 BG Notable News,
veritas.mil.ca/showfile.asp?Lang=E&URL=/Clips/National/061023/f00860DN.htm
, accessed 23 October 2006.

28
.  Larochelle was later awarded the Military Star of Valour for his actions.

29
.  Quoted in Kenneth Finlayson, “Operation Baaz Tsuka, Task Force 31 Returns to the Panjwayi,”
Veritas
, Vol 4, No. 1, 2008, 15.

30
.  “Hillier: NATO Offensive's Aim to ‘Take Out' Taliban Leaders,” CBC News, 15 December 2006,
www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/15/nato-offensive.html
, accessed 29 October 2007.

31
.  The operation was broken into four phases: The first phase was designed to shape the environment. This phase set the coordination of shuras to generate momentum towards a local security arrangement. Phase 2 was designed to interdict and dislocate the enemy. Phase 2a was designed to interdict insurgent reinforcements and exfiltration along Taliban lines of communication. Phase 2b, in turn, would disrupt the enemy by clearing and securing targeted population centres. Phase 2c was designed to secure designated areas, while Phase 2d would envelop Taliban elements in the respective zones. Phase 3 was consolidation, a combination of security, development, and information operations designed to contain the threat until the local population were able to assume a greater responsibility for their own security, thus allowing a reduction of military forces.

32
.  Doug Beazley, “Turning Up the Heat, Canadians Preparing for Major Role,”
Toronto Sun
, 17 December 2006, 8.

33
.  Brian Hutchinson, “Troops Mass to Crush Taliban,”
Ottawa Citizen
, 16 December 2006, A1.

34
.  
Ibid
.

35
.  Brian Hutchinson, “Troops Rallied for Falcon Summit,”
National Post
, 18 December 2006,
www.canada.com/globaltv/national/story.html?id=7c3b5ffa-3b92-4f19-a075-a6076a3be794
, accessed 29 October 2007.

36
.  An important component of the NATO operation, particularly since the turmoil emanating from the failure of Operation Medusa to galvanize European allies to fight was the messaging that stressed “unity of effort.” The latest operation stressed that “ANSF, supported by ISAF and CF are successfully accomplishing the decisive phase of the biggest ever combined operation in Southern Afghanistan.” NATO themes also underlined the minimal amount of collateral damage created during the offensive.

37
.  Quoted in John Ferris, “Invading Afghanistan, 1836–2006: Politics and Pacification,”
Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Vol 1, Canada in Kandahar
, 19.

38
.  Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat,” Report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 December 2006.

39
.  ABC News/BBC World Service Poll, “Afghanistan: Where Things Stand,” 7 December 2006.

40
.  “Afghan Public Opinion Amidst Rising Violence,”
WorldPublicOpinion. org
, 14 December 2006. A survey conducted in Afghanistan in May 2007 reported that 70 percent of Afghan males believed that the Taliban will prevail in the conflict,
CTV Nightly News
, 25 May 2007.

41
.  Paul Koring, “The Afghan Mission—A Thin Canadian Line Holds in Kandahar,”
Globe and Mail
, 6 December 2006, A26.

42
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, ACOS, Multi-National Brigade HQ, 1 CMBG briefing, 22 January 2007.

43
.  Brooks Tigner, “Taliban Evolves to Counter ISAF,”
Jane's International Defence Review
, January 2008, 4.

44
.  Interview with a SOF commander, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 15 March 2007.

45
.  Bill Graveland, “NATO Says Attack on Taliban Command Post a Message to Rebels,”
The Guardian
, 15 December 2006, B8.

46
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, Presentation, Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, 25 May 2007.

47
.  Elizabeth Rubin, “Taking the Fight to the Taliban,”
New York Times Online
, 29 October 2006,
www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29taliban.htm
, accessed 29 October 2006.

48
.  Jeffrey Simpson, “NATO's Very Survival Hinges on the Afghan Mission,”
Globe and Mail
, 29 November 2006, A29. Of note, there were only 46 suicide attacks in Afghanistan up to 22 July 2006. See also “Afghanistan's Taliban—War Without End,”
The Economist
, 25 October 2007,
www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10026465
, accessed 14 November 2007.

49
.  Anthony H. Cordesman, “Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat,” Report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 December 2006.

50
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, interview with author, 21 October 2006.

51
.  Mitch Potter, “General Frets About Home Front,” Middle East Bureau, 1 October 2006.

52
.  
Ibid
.

53
.  Brigadier-General David Fraser, Presentation, Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, 25 May 2007.

54
.  
CTV Nightly News
, 28 September 2006.

55
.  Michael Ignatieff,
Virtual War: Ethical Challenges
(Annapolis: United States Naval Academy, March 2001), 8.

Epilogue

1
.    Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,” CRS Report for Congress, 23 January 2009, 2. The prestigious
Economist
magazine reported that “since January
[2007] almost 6,000 people have been killed, a 50% increase on last year. They included 200 NATO soldiers and more than 3,000 alleged Talibs. Insurgent violence is up by 20% on 2006,” “Afghanistan's Taliban—War Without End,”
The Economist
, 25 October 2007,
www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10026465
, accessed 14 November 2007.

By November 2009, the coalition as a whole had lost 1,142 troops since October 2001. Dr. Liam Fox (British MP), “Beyond the Smoke: Making Progress in Afghanistan,” speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/liamfox-address
, accessed 9 October 2009.

2
.    “French Army Chief Rules Out Military Victory in Afghanistan,”
afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jd3DKrlYPLUzIwIfryRK7U8tAPYQ
, accessed 18 October 2008.

3
.    Bill Graveland, “Report: Taliban Growing Stronger,”
The Chronicle Herald
, 9 December 2008,
thechronicleherald.ca/World/1094914.html
, accessed 9 December 2008. A senior officer of the Afghan Directorate of National Security professed, “This war has no tactical solution if we do not fight the Taliban at the theatre level as well and that is to attack their leadership and their headquarters where they are,” A. Saleh, “Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan,” Report by the Afghan National Directorate of Security, 5 May 2006.

4
.    
CTV News Net
, 10 March 2009.

5
.    General Stanley McChrystal, “ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance,” Headquarters ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2009.

6
.    General Stanley McChrystal, Speech, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, U.K., 1 October 2009.

7
.    
CNN Live
, 3 November 2009.

8
.    Bill Roggio, “Taliban Contest or Control Large Areas of Afghanistan,”
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/12/taliban_contest_or_c.php
, accessed 6 December 2009. In the areas under control, the Taliban operated a parallel political administration and often declared Sharia law, and ran courts, recruiting centres, and tax offices, as well as maintained security forces.