Norman Invasions (35 page)

“Who would desire to belong to one who wants one less?”

“I am afraid to be exhibited, to be shown to men, naked—to be put up for sale, to be sold. I do not know what to do, how to act.”

“—Perhaps, I wonder, while it is still possible, before you are unable any longer to conceal your appetition, your aroused slave needs, your piteous need of a master, if you should present yourself as fearful and shy, timid, troubled, modest, and frightened, almost unable to move so horrified, so dismayed and terrified you are.”

“Mistress?”

“Some men enjoy taking a new slave, a fragile, lovely thing, and introducing her to the nature and requirements of her new condition, in getting her to her knees and teaching her to kiss and caress.

“Do not weep.

“Too, there are those who enjoy taking a woman who thinks she can resist, and teaching her differently, breaking her to the whip and collar, until she, to her ecstasy, knows herself his, and crawls of her own free will to his slave ring, her effusive, conquered heart begging to be accepted, to be permitted to please him, to be acknowledged, as his.”

“I know nothing of these things, Mistress.”

“How easily the word ‘Mistress' now comes to your lips. You see, you are intelligent. You learn quickly.

“Perhaps the important thing is to be yourself. Perhaps later, when you have become appetitious and needful, and erotic, brazen, and beautiful, for I see such things in you, as a natural and exciting transformation of yourself, things will be easier, and different. Until then perhaps it will be best to attempt to divine the will of the auctioneer, and do your best to please him. To be sure, we all do that. After all, he has a whip, and we are women. I know whereof I speak, for I myself was once put through that. A sale, or seeming sale. It was, unbeknownst to me, intended as a learning experience for me, that I might, newly brought to his world, be better apprised of my condition, of my status here, as a slave. Of what could be done to me. I found myself without so much as an explanation, without so much as even a word of farewell, remanded to an auction house. In my bonds, in tears and helplessness, I racked my heart and brain in misery. Had I in some way, even one unbeknownst to me, been less than completely pleasing to my master in some way? I did not know! I learned the lesson well. I was apparently purchased through an agent. How jubilant I was when I, unhooded, found myself on my knees before my own master, my own, true, beloved master! I assure you that I spent much of that night in tearful gratitude, at his feet. I had learned what might be done with me.”

“I will try to please the auctioneer.”

“You had better, or your prettiness will feel the lash.”

“I would be whipped?”

“Of course.”

“I am frightened.”

“I do not think you will have too much to fear, for the auctioneer is talented. He will see to it that you are well displayed. You may depend upon it. And do not be surprised when you find yourself handled as a slave. You will be exhibited, and controlled, almost ritualistically. You will move, and obey, in ways you never thought possible. On the selling surface you will reveal hitherto never understood, or dreadfully feared, but desired, aspects of your personality. Perhaps your female subconscious will be liberated for the first time. You will discover, my dear, perhaps to your surprise, that you have one. There is something about the snap of a whip which we all understand, and its lash across our calves is an admonition we cannot overlook. Do the best you can.”

“I will try.”

“And it is not uncommon, at a certain point in your sale, to have your vitality demonstrated.”

“What does that mean?”

“Men are interested in that.”

“I do not understand.”

“You will learn.

“I am afraid, so afraid.”

“Do not fear. Or fear no more than is appropriate, and that will hone your slave reflexes to perfection.

“Do not weep.

“It is not so terrible to be sold. Indeed, as you are merchandise it is fitting. And yours is not a unique fate. Countless women in countless times on countless worlds have preceded you to the block, which is a mere selling platform, a convenience for display. In time, you will doubtless grow accustomed to such things. And do not fear for, as I have indicated, the auctioneer will assist you, and turn, and display you, and such. He does not wish you ill, and desires little more than to make a good coin on you. Now it is possible, as I suggested, that in this sale, your first sale, you will be confused and terrified. Certainly it will all seem strange to you. But that is not unusual. You may even seem inhibited, wooden, almost unable to move. That is possible. You may appear frightened and confused, disconcerted, and bewildered, and you might appear, and might well be, utterly helpless and vulnerable. But the auctioneer, and the men, will understand that, and not hold it against you, not in a first sale. Later, surprising as this may now seem, you will learn to present yourself well on the block, extremely well, for a well-presented girl tends to bring a better price, and such prices are most easily afforded by an affluent master, and many girls, wisely or not, prefer to wear their collars in a rich house, in a mansion or palace, rather than a hut or hovel. We are often mercenary little things, aren't we? It is no wonder the men look upon us as what we are, as lovely, cunning little beasts, tolerable only, so to speak, on our leashes. But it sometimes happens that your eyes will meet those of a man in the tiers, and you will know, suddenly, that he is the man for whom you have always longed, and dreamed, he to whom you would be the perfect slave. You have suddenly realized that he is your love master. Oh, then you will present yourself well—I assure you, and to him! It will be as though there were no others in that great room, only you and he. You will then be erotic, brazen, and, beggingly beautiful, a needful slave desperately pleading with her rightful master to buy her. Will he buy you, or not? The decision, of course, is his.”

“We are so helpless, so vulnerable!”

“Yes, for we are slaves.”

“Thank you, thank you!”

“I wish you well, little slave girl. Wear your collar happily. In it, I assure you, you will find yourself more free than ever you were on your former world, and you will learn, and experience, a joy alien to your world, and greater than any you might have believed possible, or for which you might have hoped.”

Sometime ago, in what used to be referred to as the 20th Century, in certain antique inscriptions, or something like one hundred and two ziks before the modern era, there was a British philosopher, as it is said, there will always be an England, whose name may have been Bartelby Russett. And although contemporary pundits have an unwonted tendency to ignore or dispraise the Middle Ages, it must be understood that there were in such benighted, ignorant, and barbarous times occasional men of outstanding intellectual stature, of which small number Bartelby Russett was undeniably one. Had he not stood on the shoulders of pigmies he might have seen less far than he did. Russett once opined that the world might have been created but five minutes ago, bearing within it all the signs of age, memories, beliefs, records, contracts, plans, crumbling parchments, obsolete musical instruments, families, geological strata, weathered rocks, fossils, old books, old shoes, partially decayed radioactive substances, and such. The remarkable thing about Russett's hypothesis, which was, predictably, ignored or derided in his own time, was how very close to the mark he had actually come, given the imprecise, primitive technology of his time. As it has turned out, and as every schoolboy now knows, it actually came into existence not five but four minutes ago, bearing within it all the signs of age, including Russett's hypothesis itself.

To be sure, one of the fascinating aspects of Russett's hypothesis involves an intriguing philosophical anomaly. Namely, how do we know,
really
, that the world did not come into existence billions of years ago, and slowly, gradually, develop into its present state? It is a possibility, one supposes, at least logically. Skeptics enjoy playing with such ideas, the flippant idlers. According to science, and common sense, the world is something like four minutes old, give or take a few seconds, but will the skeptic subdue his irresponsible playfulness and have the common decency to acquiesce in this point, to desist in his reckless amusements, and accept the cognitively accredited, indisputably established results of contemporary science? No. He will relentlessly tantalize us with his shallow, silly, reckless, meretricious possibilities. Who could answer him? Who would want to? If he will not accept the results of scientific inquiry, what will he accept? What has he to offer in its place? Has he a plausible challenge to science? Has he, say, a different, or better, science? No, there is no practical, relevant alternative which he offers us. Why should the burden of proof in such a rash, giddy matter be on us, and not upon him? Fie upon him! Fie upon all scatterbrains!

Let him offer his considerations.

We shall refute him at every turn.

He suggests that the scientific hypothesis is implausible, but this is absurd, because it is itself the scientific hypothesis, and thus defines plausibility. Perhaps he wonders what point there would be to the scientific hypothesis, but, better, what point would there be to his gradualistic hypothesis; too, scientific hypotheses do not have to have points; they need only truth.

Perhaps he thinks the scientific hypothesis is arbitrary, but are not all beginnings arbitrary? If there is no problem with beginning billions of years ago, as he sees it, then, too, there is no problem with beginning four minutes, or so, ago. Perhaps the world might have started, say, five minutes ago, as in the Russett hypothesis, but, in fact, it didn't. Who are we to tell the world when, or how, to get underway?

Perhaps he thinks the scientific view is “disruptive”? But it would be so only if one accepted his own view. Are not such things relative? Why is it more disruptive to begin recently than billions of years ago? Too, why should a beginning be “disruptive”? Why should it not just be a beginning? Too, a beginning cannot be disruptive because before it there is nothing to disrupt.

The skeptic might suggest that his own vapid view is to be preferred to the scientific point of view on the grounds of allowing for the laws of nature, the principle of the conservation of matter/energy, and such, but this is to misunderstand the scientific view. The laws of nature, the principle of the conservation of matter/energy, and such, are part and parcel of the scientific view. It could not get along without them. It is merely that they haven't been around as long as the skeptic would like. They had to start sometime, so why when
they
say, and not when science says?

Perhaps the skeptic bemoans the scientific view because it seems to presuppose a transempirical causative factor? Well, it does not presuppose such
within
its world. And outside of its world, so to speak, is it not in the same boat with the skeptic's suggestions? Surely the mystery is there, on both views. Indeed, as the world is of recent origin the skeptic's view of an operative, effecting mystery more than five minutes ago is simply a mistake. It could not have occurred in the past because the past does not exist, or at least not much it. To be sure, it is growing.

Consider typical criteria for evaluating hypotheses, such as precision, clarity, simplicity, testability, fruitfulness, scope, and conservatism. The scientific hypothesis is obviously precise, almost to the second. Obviously the skeptic's suggestion is deplorably vague. Billions of years? How many billions? Nonsense! The scientific hypothesis, on the other hand, is marvelously clear. Who can not understand it, particularly if they can tell time? The scientific hypothesis, too, is simple, and easy, and straight-forward. It accounts for everything, and with a minimum of explanatory entities. It is testable, too, for one may count backward, and determine that the world was there four minutes ago. As for the rest, it started up then, and did not exist before, so there is nothing to test before the beginning. Hypothesis confirmed! The hypothesis also is fruitful and has scope. It is surely fruitful for its theoretical tentacles embrace and illuminate all fields, and it surely has scope, for it covers everything. More scope than that you cannot get. And if the skeptic is not satisfied here, do not his own views make similar universal claims? And conservatism, or the imperative to respect cognitive coherence, to fit in with other views, to cause as little cognitive dislocation, and revision and readjustment, as possible is clearly a strong suit of the scientific view. It
is
the scientific view; thus other views which might not cohere with it are,
prima facie
, to be rejected. And needless to say, the skeptic's views are not “conservative.” Their adoption would jeopardize a world view, and lead to intellectual anarchy, if not chaos.

By now the position of skeptic is clearly in a shambles.

But, failing to make his point by an appeal to science, objectivity, fact, rationality, logic, and such, he is likely to resort desperately to pragmatic or humanistic considerations which, strictly, are irrelevant to the matter, indeed, which constitute nothing more than an embarrassing appeal to
argumentum ad consequentiam
.

The following sorts of appeals are typical.

Would not the scientific hypothesis require recourse not simply to a transempirical, causative factor, but to an intellectually offensively
arbitrary
transempirical, causative factor? Not officially, but one could always speculate on such matters. In any event, would not the skeptic's suggestion also require something like that, as well? It seems the major differences would just be a choice of times. The skeptic's hypothesis also admits, of course, in another variant, the possibility of a causeless, eternal ground, for a causeless, eternal world. The scientific hypothesis could opt for the same view, actually. In a sense the four-minute world is also eternal, since it has existed for all time, as it had to, since there was no time before it. It could, of course, have just have popped into being, for no particular reason at all, as might have the skeptic's eccentric world, rather in the sense of a quantum fluctuation. If the world is the result of something like a quantum fluctuation why not a recent fluctuation rather than a remote fluctuation?

Would not the scientific hypothesis undermine revelation, subvert orthodoxy, cast doubt on the contents of highly regarded books, and so on? One supposes it might, but then science has often showed little regard for the claims of tradition, being determined to courageously follow the tracks of truth whithersoever they might lead. On the other hand, the revelation, orthodoxy, treasured books, and such, are still there, in the scientific worldview. It would be pretty much the same as it is now. To be sure, the world might be better off to have been spared various slaughterings, famines, plagues, and so on. Might it not be morally and psychologically preferable that such things, such books, and such, be understood as valuable, instructive fictions?

The skeptic might object that the scientific hypothesis wipes out glorious achievements, hard-won triumphs, noble deeds, and such. There is something to that objection, but one must remember that the scientific hypothesis would wipe out much grief, sorrow, tragedy, dishonesty, cruelty, hypocrisy, and failure, as well. It means, in effect, we could start anew, and make certain the new world is better wrought than the fictive worlds seem to have been.

Perhaps the skeptic might inquire as to whether the scientific hypothesis is just, or fair? This question, actually, does not come up, because before the world there was nothing, and thus nothing to be just or fair about. One cannot wipe out, so to speak, what never existed in the first place. Too, of course, we can do our best now to create a just, fair world, one freed of the burdens and heritages, the evils and weights, the dispositions and pressures, the miseries and pathologies, of a supposed actual past.

But the skeptic does not surrender easily, even when shattered, even when his position is incontrovertibly reduced to alarmed, shuddering atoms of gibbering rubble.

Might not, whines he, the scientific hypothesis promote a sense of insecurity. Might it not induce anxiety? Might not the wheel of the world slip off the axis of existence as easily as it once apparently found itself spinning upon it, say, about four minutes ago?

Of course, we snort! That is the nature of the world! What is wrong with you? Are you craven cowards? Who would wish, honestly, to inhabit a world which did not dangle precariously betwixt oblivions? Consider the pleasures of thriving in a world racing blindfolded amongst abysses! Who, if rational, would not welcome the carnivorous nature of reality? Who, if given the opportunity, would not choose to live thrillingly on the perilous edge of disaster and extinction? Besides, if the world popped out of existence, it might just as easily pop back in. Take comfort in that, if you wish. Cosmological popping theory, of course, is still in its infancy. We have not yet had much time to develop it, only about four minutes.

But the skeptic is indomitable in his madness.

Would not the scientific world, he asks, reflect discredit on a transempirical, causative factor, one which might produce such a world?

Certainly not, we respond scornfully.

First, speaking of discredit, would not the skeptic's hypothesized world, if it existed, with its alleged terrors, tragedies, and cruelties, reflect discredit on a transempirical causative factor, if anything could? Certainly the scientific hypothesis wipes out most of that horror, indeed, epochs and eons of it. If one were looking for pragmatic justifications here, rather than truth, would this not be a point in favor of the scientific world? Secondly, expressions such as ‘discredit' might well be out of place in these matters. Moral predicates are applicable only to moral agents, in moral situations. Solar systems and stars, rivers and germs, rocks, dust, and rain, are neither moral nor immoral. And for all we know, a transempirical causative factor, if it exists, even if it is intelligible to us at all, may be akin to such things, natural things which are and do, of their own internal necessities or vagaries, things to which moral predicates are simply inapplicable. Chide the stone and hurricane if you will, but they do not even know you exist.

You speak, exclaims the skeptic, as though the world were a joke.

I do not think we so speak, but perhaps the world
is
a joke. If so, is that not a point in favor of the world?

In the scientific hypothesis what happens to history?

Everything, and nothing.

Do human beings not need a past?

On the scientific hypothesis, they have a past. It began something like four minutes ago.