Authors: John Newman
Duran stated that Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:30 a.m. on 9/28/63 [Saturday] and again inquired about obtaining a Cuban transit visa to Russia. Again, Duran stated, Oswald was advised that the issuance of Cuban transit visa to him was contingent upon his first acquiring a Soviet visa. She stated she again on behalf of Oswald telephoned the Soviet establishment, at which time Oswald was requested to present himself in person at the Soviet establishment.46
This is a whole-cloth fabrication. Either the FBI crafted it or the Mexicans did. The latter is the more likely of the two, possibly at U.S. insistence. The key evidence, as previously discussed, is the original transcript of the November 23 Duran interrogation.
The very existence of the December 3 FBI document is damaging. Like the Warren Commission, the FBI had access to the real story. The evidence for this is an FBI report from it own representative in Mexico City on the "Activities of Oswald in Mexico City."" It is undated, but we can guess the time span because it displays awareness of only the first interrogation. Thus this intricate fabrication dates between November 23 and November 27, when Duran was rearrested and interrogated a second time. FBI records reflect that Belmont sent a memo to Deputy Director Tolson the day of the second arrest. That memo said this:
Assistant Director Sullivan called to advise that CIA has informed us that Mexican authorities have arrested Sylvia [sic] Duran, just as she was about to leave for Cuba. CIA wanted to know if we objected to Mexican authorities interrogating Duran vigorously and exhaustively. We agreed to this interrogation. They will give us the results of the interrogation promptly."
Besides this brutal passage, the memo also repeated the elaborate fabrication made of Duran's first interrogation, in which she talked in detail about Oswald visits after Friday. This sequence of events raises the possibility that this was a cover story, created between the two interrogations, to cover up the penetration operation in Mexico City. The Mexicans had no reason to make up stories about Duran's interrogation. The same was not true for the CIA, whose "Oswald" transcripts were threatened by what she was saying.
Duran's testimony to the HSCA was devastating to the authenticity of the Saturday telephone call. (Duran's full name was Silvia Tirado de Duran, and she was addressed as Tirado by the committee.) This is the pertinent part:
CORNWELL: Let's just talk hypothetically for a moment. Is there any chance that he was at the Consulate on more than one day?
TIRADO [Duran]: No. I read yesterday, an article in the Reader's Digest, and they say he was at the Consulate on three occasions. He was in Friday, Saturday, and Monday ... That's not true, that's false.
CORNWELL: All right. Let's try a different hypothetical. If the one in the Reader's Digest is definitely wrong, is it possible that he first came in like a Thursday, and then came back on a Friday?
TIRADO: No, because I am positively sure about it. That he came in the same day.49
An interesting aspect of Duran's account is how well it does fit with the September 27 calls between the Cuban and Soviet consulates. As discussed in Chapter Eighteen, these two transcripts appear authentic given the recollections of the Soviets, so Duran's statement to the HSCA provides further corroboration for these transcripts.
During the HSCA questioning of Duran by Gary Cornwall, the following exchange took place:
CORNWELL: Is it possible that, in addition to his visits on Friday, he also came back the following day on Saturday morning?
TIRADO [Duran]: No.
CORNWELL: How can you be sure of that?
TIRADO: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easy to remember, because not all the Americans that came there were married with a Russian woman, they have lived(d) in Russian and uh, we didn't used to fight with those people because of you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were friends, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, I mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him.
CORNWELL: Okay. I understand that but I don't understand how that really answers the question. In other words, the question is, what is it about the events that makes you sure that he did not come back on Saturday, and have another conversation with you?
TIRADO: Because I remember the fight. So if he (come) back, I would have remembered.
CORNWELL: Did Azcue work on Saturdays?
TIRADO: Yes, we used to work in the office, but not for public.
CORNWELL: Was there a guard, was there a guard out here at the corner near number seven on your diagram on Saturdays?
TIRADO: Excuse me?
CORNWELL: Was there a doorman out near the area that you marked as number seven, on the diagram?
TIRADO: Yes, but on Saturday he never let people ...
CORNWELL: Never let people in.
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't speak Spanish? And were very insistent?
TIRADO: No, because they could answer or something. They could ask me for instance, no? by the inter-phone.
CORNWELL: They could do that on a Friday, though.
TIRADO: But what I remember is that Oswald has my telephone number and my name and perhaps he show to the doorman (Spanish).
CORNWELL: When did you give him the telephone number and name?
TIRADO: In the second visit, perhaps.
CORNWELL: Okay.
TIRADO: I used to do that to all the people, so they don't have to come and to bother me. So I used to give the telephone number and my name and say "give me a call next week to see if your visa arrived."
CORNWELL: Well. Are you saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturdays?
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Is that correct?
TIRADO: Yes.
CORNWELL: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call?
TIRADO: Only one.
CORNWELL: Just one.50
This was very powerful testimony, which confirmed the story in the September 27 transcripts and raises fatal complications for the September 28 call. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Warren Commission would say only that it had "confidential information" to back up the extra calls and visits, and published Commission Exhibit 2021, the false version of Duran's Mexican interrogation provided by the Mexican government.
It is noteworthy how such important information known to Duran was apparently not known to the Warren Commission. The CIA did, however, inform the Warren Commission of Duran's claim that Oswald never called back. The Warren Commission chose to ignore it. The HSCA did notice, and Cornwell surfaced the issue for yet a third time with Duran. This is what happened:
CORNWELL: Did you ever see him again, after the argument with Azcue?
TIRADO: No.
CORNWELL: Did you ever talk to him again?
TIRADO: No.
CORNwELL: Not in person nor by telephone.
TIRADo: No, he never call. He could have called when I wasn't there, but I used to get the message, if somebody answer, I used to get a message.51
It is difficult not to observe the irony in how an interrogation arranged by the CIA helped blow the cover off one of its operations. In retrospect, Duran's arrest does not appear to have been a smart move.
Not everybody in the CIA thought it was a good idea to arrest Duran. A CIA memo for the record the day after the Kennedy assassination reflects the panic that ensued at headquarters upon Duran's arrest, Written by John Scelso, it states this:
After receipt of MEXI 7029 at about 1715 on 23 Nov 1963, saying that Mexi was having the Mexicans arrest Silvia Duran, Mr. Karamessines, A/DDP ordered us to phone Mexi and tell them not to do it. We phoned as ordered, against my wishes, and also wrote a FLASH cable which we did not then send. [Win Scott] answered and said it was too late to call off the arrest. He emphasized that the Mexicans had known of the Oswald involvement with Silvia Duran through the same information. He agreed with our request that the arrest be kept secret and that no information be leaked.32
According to the Lopez Report, after his conversation with Scelso, Scott asked the Mexicans to pass all information from Duran to the Mexico City station and not to inform "any leftist groups." The draft flash cable ordered by Karamessines stated, "Arrest of Silvia Duran is extremely serious matter which could prejudice U.S. freedom of action on entire question of Cuban responsibility.""
After Duran's rearrest on November 27 and the Agency's request that Duran be "vigorously and exhaustively" interrogated, the following day headquarters sent a "clarification" to the Mexico City station, "seeking to insure that neither Silvia Duran nor the Cubans would have any basis for believing that the Americans were behind her rearrest. The cable stated: `We want the Mexican authorities to take the responsibility for the whole affair.' "54
There were other changes made to Duran's original interrogation besides the addition of visits after Friday. Her description of Oswald as blond and short was mysteriously ignored by the Warren Report.55 Likewise for Duran's statement that "the only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul."56 Perhaps this was changed because it alluded to Oswald asking for some type of aid, a possibility raised by David Phillips discussed in Chapter Eighteen. Had Duran's real statements been included, the Lopez Report concludes, "the Warren Commission's conclusions would not have seemed as strong."
Smoke IV: CIA Knowledge of Oswald's Cuban Consulate Visit
Where Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Consulate are concerned, we encounter still more suspect explanations. One of the most interesting details is when the Agency discovered these contacts. "After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City," said the CIA in January 1964, "to determine the purpose of Oswald's visit." It was during this review, the Agency claims, that "it was learned that Oswald had visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City" and had spoken with Duran.57 The documentary underpinning for this claim is the Mexico City cable on October 9 and the October 10 headquarters response. Neither cable mentions an Oswald visit to the Cuban Consulate.
Because the September 27 and 28 calls all involved the Cuban Consulate, the above explanation requires a surprising condition: Headquarters could not have had knowledge of those calls until after the assassination. Ann Goodpasture told the HSCA that Mexico City did not inform headquarters. about this visit. The Lopez Report, however, contains an interview with yet another "unidentified" CIA person from the CIA Mexico City station. In this case it was a woman, and this is what took place in her question and answer session with the HSCA:
A: I did not send another cable but I know another cable was sent. I didn't send it.
Q: Another cable concerning Oswald was sent?
A: I think so. Where is the whole file? Wasn't there a cable saying he was in touch with the Cuban Embassy?
Q: We have not seen one.
A: I am pretty such [sure] there was.
Q: Did you send that cable?
A: No, I did not send the cable. When I found out about it I remember this, I said how come?
Q: Who did? Do you know?
A: I don't know who sent it. I think Ann (Goodpasture) might have. She might have sent a follow-up one with this information."
If Goodpasture did send such a cable, her statement to Lopez would have had to have been false. Still, the anecdotal evidence is mixed: Some people remembered that headquarters was notified of the Cuban Consulate angle and others remembered that it was not.
Outwardly the Agency has doggedly stuck to its story, staunchly denying any preassassination knowledge of Oswald's visit to the Cuban Consulate. There is a convincing and growing body of evidence that suggests this is a false denial to protect the Agency's sources in Mexico City. We will comment in the final chapter about what is at stake in this strategy. For now we look at the documentary evidence, which is impressive. The Agency personnel with whom these documents are associated are authoritative with respect to the issue at hand: the CIA deputy director for Plans (DDP), the CIA counterintelligence chief, and the CIA Mexico City station chief.
Let us begin with Richard Helms, who was the DDP when he and his subordinates met formally with Lee Rankin and other Warren Commission attorneys on March 12, 1964. The SECRET EYES ONLY Memorandum for the Record of the meeting contains this telltale passage:
Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from [three lines redacted]. Such information is routinely passed to other agencies and entered in CIA files. [two lines redacted]. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that provided on the other American citizens who might have made contacts of this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination.59
In Helms's view, it was Oswald's presence in both consulates that caused the event to be reported. Moreover, Helms did not make this statement lightly. He warned Rankin that this information "was extremely sensitive" and the very existence of these [ 2 to 3 words redacted] had to be very carefully protected.
New documentary evidence emerged on September 18, 1975, when George T. Kalaris, who had replaced Angleton as chief of Counterintelligence, wrote a memo to the executive assistant to the deputy director of Operations (DDO) [formerly DDP] of the CIA, describing the contents of Oswald's 201 file. This is the same memo discussed in Chapter Eleven, in which Kalaris claimed that Oswald's 201 file had been opened, in part, by the Agency's "renewed interest in Oswald brought about by his queries concerning possible reentry into the United States." Kalaris's memo also had this: