Authors: Kenneth Sewell
The only conclusion that fit the physical evidence seen in the photographs was that missile number one had somehow exploded in the process of a launch attempt. That initial explosion set up a series of events that sank the submarine.
The determination that K-129 had sunk during a launch attempt left other, even more urgent questions unanswered. Had the launch mechanism been triggered accidentally or deliberately? Were the Soviets attempting to eject a malfunctioning missile from the tube, or was there something more sinister in the launch attempt? Considerably more analysis was needed.
During this time of high tension between the Americans and Soviets, any incident in which nuclear weapons were even marginally involved commanded immediate attention at the highest levels of the military. The more intelligence analysts learned from the
Halibut
’s photographs, the more ominous the picture became, and the more urgent their quest for answers.
A
NALYSIS OF THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO
K-129 was only the first step in the investigators’ probe into the cause and circumstances surrounding its mysterious sinking. Beyond the stunning photographs supplied by the USS
Halibut,
the investigators had a considerable amount of satellite, radio, and electronic intelligence to reconstruct the Soviet submarine’s fateful last journey and the possible intentions of those who commanded it.
The DIA analysts used a methodical approach to fill in the blanks where hard intelligence was lacking. The main purpose of the military intelligence document was to make a threat assessment of the K-129 incident. The method of evaluation applied “probability analysis” to each piece of evidence to form a bigger picture of several probable scenarios. For example, the fact that the Navy’s radio eavesdroppers had not picked up normal radio dispatches when the submarine crossed the International Date Line, and again, when it entered the mission patrol box, became a weighted factor in the analysis. The absence of regular radio contacts indicated operations on the submarine were not normal; otherwise, the routine radio reports at designated points in the journey would have been sent. Investigators at both Soviet fleet headquarters and Pearl Harbor could therefore determine a starting point of trouble, based on the first missed communication when the submarine crossed the 180th meridian.
Pieces of evidence supporting one scenario or another, such as an accident on board, were assigned a percentage of probability, based on known behavior of a missile submarine operating in that theater. A matrix was created to weight each on a scale from zero to one hundred.
The methodology employed to assign probability was a complex analytical system known as the Bayes’ Theorem. This system provides a means to apply quantitative thinking to what is normally called the “scientific method.”
In dealing with raw intelligence data where the evidence is circumstantial, as much of it was in this incident, this process allowed the analysts to produce a quasiscientific conclusion on what the mysterious Soviet submarine was doing so near American territory.
The analysis was conducted by the DIA’s team, assisted by scientists and military personnel from the submarine special operations unit. Since the only hard data came from the photographic and physical evidence gathered by USS
Halibut
from its dive on the K-129 wreckage, that package of information was central to the exercise.
Areas of inquiry covered in the analysis included: (1) the type and placement of the damage to the submarine’s structure; (2) the geographical coordinates of the submarine at the time of sinking; (3) the proximity of that location to an exact longitude and latitude required to program launch data into a missile system; (4) the location and situation of the crew members’ bodies found inside the wreckage; and (5) SOSUS tracking, radio interceptions, and satellite data on the maneuvers of the submarine before the sinking.
Since so little hard evidence was available on the K-129’s last mission—no decoded communications between the boat and its home base, no human intelligence from the Soviet Union—U.S. analysts relied on this process to interpret the strange events surrounding the sinking of the Soviet submarine near Pearl Harbor.
When all the data came together, the intelligence officers were shocked. The analysis resulted in a finding of “high probability” that the ill-fated Soviet boat was a rogue, and, more stunning, that it was probably intending to launch a nuclear missile against Pearl Harbor at the time of its sinking.
Strong evidence for arguing that the submarine was a rogue was the lack of any follow-up hostile actions against the United States or its Allies by the Soviets in the Pacific or elsewhere. Everything was normal in the Soviet Union. Even if that normalcy included the usual saber rattling and angry bluster, no movement of troops, planes, or ships had been detected. The submarine appeared to be acting alone at the time it sank.
Satellite surveillance of the Soviet Pacific Fleet indicated no increased level of defensive preparations. Likewise, reports from around the world failed to detect increased defensive or offensive preparations anywhere in the Communist bloc.
K-129 was an older-type submarine with only three missiles, as opposed to one of the Soviet navy’s newer nuclear-powered boats, which had a dozen or more missiles. This, too, made a sanctioned attack unlikely. An authorized strike by the Soviets would almost certainly have involved one of its more deadly nuclear submarines.
The Americans knew they had been tracking a Golf II missile boat that had sailed from Kamchatka to the general vicinity of the sinking. It was known that this type of boat could launch a missile while submerged—it did not need to surface. However, two pieces of evidence indicated it was on the surface at the time of the explosion. First, a spy satellite had recorded fireballs that could only have been seen if the submarine was on the surface. Second, the
Halibut
’s photography revealed that at least one of the crewmen had been fully clothed in foul-weather gear only worn by someone working outside the submarine. Inside, the submarine would have been uncomfortably hot.
The discovery that there was no skin on the face and hands of the sailor was initially explained as the work of sea creatures. But the skeletal condition of that sailor could just as easily have been caused by exposure to the heat from the fireball when the missile exploded. The fiery blast would certainly have engulfed the bridge area and burned all the exposed flesh in a flash of intense heat.
The boat’s location was another enigma.
The fact that K-129 sank several hundred miles closer to Hawaii than the regular Soviet patrol area was considered especially significant and bolstered the case that the boat was operating in an aggressive mode. The submarine was approximately 350 miles northwest of Hawaii, much closer than it needed to be for its missiles to reach Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Navy knew the Golf II’s missile range was between 700 and 800 miles.
The location was key to the rogue theory and was supported by the Soviet search area being so far off the mark. The search was concentrated hundreds of miles north of where the Americans knew the boat had sunk, indicating the submarine had been far off its authorized mission course. Along with these known discrepancies in location, the lack of routine radio communications led the investigators to reach a high-probability finding that K-129 was not acting on official orders. Therefore, it had to be classified as a rogue boat.
If it was a rogue, then what was the intent of the crew? Were the captain and crew attempting an unauthorized attack or could they possibly have only been planning to defect? The defection scenario was quickly abandoned because of the explosion in the missile area.
The answer seemed to lie in the submarine’s behavior at the time of the explosions and the location of the wreckage. The submarine surfaced and sank at an exact intersection of longitude and latitude, which would indicate that it was necessary to be at such a precise position for a programmed launch to home in on a target.
The U.S. Navy had limited information of Soviet computer technology, but at the time, analysts believed that K-129 would have to travel to an exact, predetermined location to launch its missiles. In all the vast ocean, the likelihood that a submarine would arrive and sink at an exact intersection of longitude and latitude by chance alone was slim to none.
The only logical military target for thousands of miles in any direction was the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The analysis rated the Hawaiian base as the “highly probable” target of the rogue submarine.
The analysis allowed Navy intelligence to be reasonably sure that a nuclear attack had been narrowly averted. The launch attempt could not have been an accident, even though the destruction of the boat itself was most likely an accident. It must have been chilling for the Navy’s top intelligence minds to realize that there was absolutely nothing in the nation’s arsenal that could have prevented a nuclear strike on American soil by a determined rogue. America had been spared the horror by luck, not by its superior defensive technology. Only a mistake by the would-be perpetrators had prevented a nuclear disaster.
The startling probability analysis, supported by ample photographic and technical evidence, created a new problem. Now that the DIA and Navy had their analysis of the K-129 incident, the question became what to do with such a sensitive document.
The timing of the completed report is important. Information fed into the analysis was not finally collected until late in 1968, more than six months after the submarine disappeared. It was September before the
Halibut
had completed its mission and returned the film and physical evidence to Pearl Harbor.
Though never officially confirmed, the existence of such a top-secret document on the K-129 incident is certain. What has not been revealed until now is that the document or documents concluded there was a “high” to “very high” probability that K-129 was destroyed while attempting to fire a nuclear missile at Pearl Harbor. This document, with its additional finding that the submarine was a rogue, has never been mentioned in any of the documents released by the U.S. Navy or the CIA, according to the anonymous source who worked on the report.
While, at the time, the knowledge that a rogue submarine might have destroyed itself in the act of firing a nuclear missile against an American naval facility and city was alarming, there was apparently no continuing threat perceived. No Code Red alerts were issued; no Strategic Air Command bombers were ordered into the skies.
That does not mean the White House and Pentagon simply ignored the intelligence team’s findings. Other circumstances weighed on the official reaction, or lack of public reaction, at the highest levels of government.
The Democratic Party had been in control of the nation’s defense for almost a decade, and expenditures for the war in Vietnam were exceeding all budget limits. Congress was in no mood for an expansion of military operations for any reason other than an attack on America itself. Of course, if the educated guesses of the intelligence community were correct, the K-129 incident qualified as such an attack. But there is no evidence that Congress was informed of the incident; at least there has never been a hint of a leak to indicate that any elected officials outside the White House were ever given details about the mysterious sinking of the Soviet submarine.
There are no records in the public domain to indicate when the Navy forwarded the findings to the secretary of defense or the Johnson White House. Certainly there were regular, off-the-record briefings of the White House while the analysis was in progress. The final analysis probably was not completed until very late in 1968, only weeks before Johnson relinquished office.
The Johnson administration had all it could handle in Vietnam, and had come under severe criticism from Republican leaders for failure to respond aggressively to the North Korean seizure of the
Pueblo
a few months earlier. With his war policies under attack from both the left and the right, the president certainly did not welcome the DIA’s assessment that a Soviet rogue submarine may have come within seconds of launching an attack against a U.S. city and military installation.
Any rumor of such an attempted nuclear attack would have created extreme panic among an already jittery American public. The country was aflame with anti–Vietnam War sentiment, producing campus riots and huge demonstrations in New York City and Washington. The intelligence estimate concerning the K-129 had to be kept secret for military reasons and concealed from the public for political reasons. Mindful of his already precarious place in history because of the Vietnam War and massive increases in government spending, President Johnson, along with his supporters, wanted the information about K-129 hidden behind a curtain of classification for many years to come, if not forever.
The best way to keep the awful facts buried was to opt for scenarios from the probability analysis that were less dramatic. Thus was born what was to become a massive disinformation campaign by the major agencies of the U.S. government’s intelligence community.
Initially there would be two lies permanently embedded in the early findings of U.S. military intelligence. First, the location of the wreckage of K-129 had to be obfuscated. If anything was ever leaked to the press about the incident itself, the site of the sinking had to be placed beyond the maximum range of the type of missiles carried by K-129.
At the time, there was a legitimate military reason to keep the location vague or even misstated: The Navy planned additional recovery trips to exploit the wreckage for more intelligence.
Other than the military men and intelligence agents, only the civilian scientists aboard the University of Hawaii research ship that discovered the oil slick knew there had been an accident involving nuclear material. The defense officials knew the importance of keeping the incident secret. As patriotic Americans in a time of war, the university research crew could also be counted on to keep quiet. They all agreed never to reveal their discovery.
“The captain [of R/V
Teritu]
was asked by our government not to speak of it and he is honoring their request,” said an official in the University of Hawaii oceanography department. “The logs are also gone, so there is no record in our possession of the incident.”
It must have appeared to the DIA that everything had been done to keep the location secret.