And according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what the prophet said at the time: “Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair.” And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came forward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter before he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and therefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth, having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be
happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle—sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was in most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers;
jg
he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale;
jh
birds, on the other hand, like the swans and other musicians, wanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon,
ji
who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came the lot of Atalanta;
jj
she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus
∥
passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites
jk
was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted to have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations.
All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness,
jl
which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then toward evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upward in all manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself lying on the pyre.
And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness, and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been describing.
35
ENDNOTES
Book 1
1
(1.331d)
if Simonides is to be believed:
Like his father, Cephalus, who quotes Pindar to support his views (1.331), Polemarchus cites a saying of Simonides as justification for his understanding of justice. Both poets are quoted again in book 2 along with several others (namely Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus), as Glaucon and Adeimantus detail how poetry helps perpetuate the commonly accepted view of justice as an unprofitable inconvenience (see especially 2.363a-366a). These early indications of poetry’s influence on basic ethical attitudes and beliefs prepare for Socrates’ focus, in books 2 and beyond, on poetic “imitation”
(mimesis)
and on poetry’s role in education and acculturation.
2
(1.332b)
And are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?:
The notion that it is proper to help friends and harm enemies is asserted in a variety of poetic texts from the archaic and classical periods. The poem composed by the Athenian statesman Solon (late seventh to early sixth centuries B.C.E.), which begins with an invocation to the Muses, is exemplary; in its first few verses, the author prays, “Grant me prosperity from the blessed gods and let me have respect from all men; may I be sweet to my friends and bitter to my enemies.”
3
(1.332b)
an enemy ... owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him
—
that is to say, evil:
In Crito and other dialogues, Plato represents Socrates vigorously contesting the notion that it is acceptable (and just) to harm one’s enemies and retaliate against those who have caused injury.
4
( 1.332c)
if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?:
Analogies comparing justice—whether in everyday moral choices made by individuals, as here, or in the authority exercised by political leaders, as at 1.340d ft.—to various arts and skills
(technai
in Greek—for example, of the doctor, helmsman, and musician) are central to
Republic’s
analysis of justice. The implications of these analogies are considerable, as are the effects. One important effect is to suggest a link between “justice” and knowledge, or expertise, which enables one to distinguish between appearance (seeming) and reality (being), as at 1.334c-335b and 1.339d-341a. These suggestions set the stage for Socrates’ subsequent arguments that “justice” in the individual results from the rule of the soul’s rational (that is, knowledgeable) principle over “spirit” and “appetites” (book 4), and that justice in the state can be realized only when the rulers are “philosophers” (books 5-7).
5
(1.334a)
a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer:
Several epic poems composed in dactylic hexameter, including
Iliad
and
Odyssey,
were attributed to “Homer” in antiquity.
Iliad
is set at and around Troy (a non-Greek city in Asia Minor) in the tenth year of the legendary war between the Greeks and the Trojans;
Odyssey
relates the homecoming of Odysseus to the island of Ithaca in the tenth year after the Greek victory at Troy. Unlike Plato’s interlocutors, modern scholars (with a few exceptions) tend to view
Iliad
and
Odyssey
as products of centuries of oral story-telling and poetic improvisation, rather than creations of a single individual (that is, “Homer”).
Iliad
and
Odyssey,
in more or less the forms that they now have, became widely known throughout Greece during the latter half (650-500 B.C.E.) of the archaic period, and Athenians in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. revered them as key cultural landmarks. Several Platonic dialogues, including
Republic
and
lon,
attest to the contemporary popularity of the Homeric epics, which were widely performed by “rhapsodes” and subjected to analysis and interpretation by professional critics. It is worth noting how Plato has his interlocutors speak of Homer (and other poets) in the present tense, as if they were still alive.
6
(1.335b)
in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?:
The Greek literally reads “in regard to the excellence
(aretê)
of dogs, or of horses....”
Aretê,
from which the adjective
aristos
(“best”) is derived, is the condition or quality that makes a given thing or individual “good.” When used in general terms of human beings, it commonly refers to moral excellence as well as other qualities or factors (such as intelligence, courage in battle, self-restraint, piety, physical attractiveness, birth, wealth) that would make a man stand out among—and be “better” than—his fellow citizens.
Aretê,
then, is sometimes translated as “virtue” (see below at 1.348c), but in typical usage its range of meaning is generally broader than that of the English word “virtue.”
7
(1.336a)
Periander
or
Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban:
Periander was tyrant of Corinth (c.625-585 B.C.E.). The Macedonian king named Perdiccas to whom Socrates refers here is probably Perdiccas II (c.450-413 B.C.E.). Xerxes was the king of Persia (d.465 B.C.E.) who led the invasion of Greece in the late 480s B.C.E. Ismenias the Theban is possibly the Ismenias who, in 395 B.C.E., took gold from the Persians in exchange for his help in fomenting war between the Thebans and the Spartans. Since the “dramatic date” of
Republic
is necessarily earlier than 395, Socrates’ reference to this Ismenias constitutes a (presumably deliberate) anachronism.
8
(1.338c)justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger:
Thrasymachus’ definition relies on a term (that is,
to sumpheron
—“interest” or “advantage”) that he expressly precluded Socrates from using at 1.336c-d. Nonetheless, that justice is advantageous to the just person is a concept that Socrates, along with Glaucon and Adeimantus, will develop, although along lines wholly different from those in Thrasymachus’ mind.
9
(1.338d)
have you never heard that forms of government differ
—
there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?:
As he draws attention to the ways in which the ruling authority of a community is responsible for determining what constitutes acceptable (that is, “just”) behavior on the part of its inhabitants, Thrasymachus shifts the focus of the conversation from the “just” behavior of ordinary individuals to the “just” exercise of political power. From this point on, the investigation moves back and forth between the two points of focus. It can be argued that these two kinds of “justice” are fundamentally different. Yet Socrates will eventually define justice as a condition of the soul that is responsible for all kinds of “just” behavior, whether in private dealings or in the exercise of political power (4.442d-443e), and the conflation that begins here anticipates his formulation.
10
(1.341d)
every art has an interest?:
The way in which Socrates, here and elsewhere, conflates the practitioner of a given skill or craft (for example, a doctor) with the
technê
itself (for example, medicine) is noteworthy.
11
(1.343b)
and you further imagine that the rulers of States, if they are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage
day
and
night: Thrasymachus’ contemptuous dismissal of Socrates’ view of leadership looks ahead to the metaphor developed in books 2-5 that likens the guardians of the ideal city-state, as leaders and protectors, to shepherds and their dogs—see, for example, 5.451c.
12
(1.343d)
the unjust man has always more and the just less:
The phrase
pleon echein—
in Greek, literally “to have more”—recurs throughout the first two books of
Republic
to describe (1) the self-aggrandizing behavior of the unjust man, who feels no scruple about competing with others (and harming them, if need be) in order to get all that he wants, and (2) the advantages that such aggressively self-seeking behavior is thought to bring. Compare 1.349b: “Does the just man try to gain any advantage [
pleon echein]
over the just?,” 2.359c: “then we shall discover... the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest
[dia pleonexian
],” and 2.362b: “and at every contest, whether in public or private, [the unjust man] gets the better
[pleonektein]
of his antagonists.” Thrasymachus’ glamorization of the pursuit of personal advantage and power
(pleonexia)
has much in common with Callicles’ argument concerning the “law of nature” in Gorgias 482c-486d as well as with the argument of Antiphon’s “On Truth.” Although Thrasymachus’ praise of injustice is surely meant to seem at first blush outrageous and “sophistic” in character, Plato’s interlocutors invite us to believe that his ideas, for all the arresting frankness of their expression, are really in accordance with mainstream values. See Glaucon at 2.358c: “I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears,” Adeimantus at 2.367: “I dare say that Thrasymachus and others . . . ,” and, more generally, Socrates at 6.493a: “all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists... do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion of the many.” Compare
Gorgias
492d.