7
(4.432d)
Why, my good sir, at the beginning of our inquiry, ages ago, there was Justice tumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more ridiculous:
See 2.372a and also 2.370b. The definition of justice that emerges in this passage—that is, of doing one’s own business—looks back to the formulation of justice introduced by Polemarchus at 1.332b as “giving what is due or proper,” insofar as the role of leadership is “due” and “proper” to the guardians in the ideal state, as it also is to the “rational principle” in the individual human being (4.441e).
8
(4.433a)
Justice was doing one’s own business, and not being a busybody:
The verb “to be a busybody”
(polypragmonein)
and the related noun (
polypragmosynê,
“meddlesomeness”) and adjective (
polypragmon
) were ideo logically charged terms in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. They were typically used by critics of Athenian democracy to disparage its empower ment of average citizens who, as members of the Assembly and as jurors in courts, could “meddle” in affairs of state as well as in the lives of important men. The same terms were also used to critique the “meddling” of Athens in the affairs of the city-states that were its nominal allies in the Delian League. The association of injustice in the state with
polypragmosynê,
which is described at 4.434a-c as the “meddling” of the bronze/iron class in the business of rulers and auxiliaries, is an obvious criticism of the current institutions and practices of Athenian democracy. The earlier comparison at 3.389c of average individuals to the patients of a doctor or the crew on a ship anticipates this passage’s emphasis on the dysfunction that occurs when such people attempt to give orders instead of taking them.
It is worth noting how Socrates and his interlocutors, here in book 4 and in the more detailed analysis of the four “degenerate” political constitutions in books 8 and 9, assume that the division of the ideal city-state’s citizens into three groups (rulers, auxiliaries, all others) reflects the actual and natural categorization of people in all types of political communities. This assumption follows upon their agreement that in the ideal state people are grouped according to their
natural
abilities, and it furnishes them the grounds for assessing the defects of any political arrangement that fails to observe the ideal state’s distinctions and prohibitions against “meddling.”
9
(4.435b-c)
we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same
terms,
because he is affected in the same manner?:
This assumption, which Socrates strives to justify in the following pages, is a corollary of the major assumption that “justice” in the state is qualitatively identical to “justice” in the individual (2.368c-e; compare below at 4.442d). The understanding of human psychology that Socrates advances in this passage capitalizes on commonplace conceptions (for example, the opposition between “reason” and “appetites”) but is nonetheless distinctive. In particular, his conception of the third and intermediate part of the soul (“spirit” or “passion” [
thumos
])
,
which he posits as reason’s “ally” (4.440a-441c), requires special explanation. In
Phaedrus,
Plato has Socrates develop a similar (though not identical) image of the soul, which is likened to a chariot with a team of two horses. The charioteer (that is, “reason”) drives; of the two horses, the one on the right side is fair and disciplined, corresponding to the “spirited” part (
thumos
) of the soul in
Republic,
whereas his dark and unruly counterpart on the left corresponds to
Republic’s
appetitive part.
10
(4.435d)
I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question:
This is the first of several important passages in
Republic
in which Socrates, Glaucon, and/or Adeimantus acknowledge the methodological inadequacies of their discussion and call attention to the fact that, in the current circumstances, they are not able to explore their concerns properly. Compare 5.450e-451a and 5.472b-c; 6.484a, 6.504b, 6.506c-d, and 6.509c; 7.517b, 7.532d-e, 7.536b-c; and 10.595c. The cumulative effect of these passages is to highlight the provisional and suggestive nature of the conversation dramatized in
Republic.
11
(4.435e)
the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the Northern nations:
Thrace was located on the northern edge of the Aegean Sea; the Scythians were a nomadic people based, during the classical period, in the area north of the Black Sea. Phoenicia, mentioned below, was located on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea. Socrates’ statement reflects the standard cultural and ethnic prejudices that Greeks of his time entertained, and also the thinking of medical theorists such as Hippocrates, who argued that climate influenced the character of individuals and whole peoples. On Phoenician and Egyptian “character” and the importance of climate, compare Laws 5.747c-e.
12
(4.437d)
is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else.. ?:
That is, if one is thirsty for a
cold
drink, one is actually subject to two separate conditions: thirst (which makes one desire a drink) and heat (which makes one desire coldness). Appetite for good food is accordingly an appetite for food that is modified by some other force or factor.
13
(4.439e)
And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?:
The Greek word translated here as “passion” and “spirit” is
thumos,
which the ensuing discussion identifies as the source of anger and indignation. This understanding basically accords with traditional conceptions of
thumos
as the wellspring of courage and daring, and also competitiveness (compare Euripides,
Medea
1079-1080 and Aristophanes,
Acharnians
480). Given the pains Socrates takes in the ensuing exchange to distinguish “spirit” from the appetitive part of the soul, it seems that Plato could not assume that his readers would automatically see
thumos
as something other than (an) appetite.
14
(4.442a)
the concupiscent, which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain:
So, too, the bronze/iron group is the largest in the state—far larger than the classes of (gold) rulers and (silver) auxiliaries. In statements such as this, we can see the complete interdependence of the psychological theory that Socrates develops in
Republic
and the political philosophy that arises from his conception of the ideal state.
15
(4.443c-d)
But in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned, however, not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man:
Socrates’ striking conclusion, that the “justice” of an individual is not the product of his or her deeds and dealings with others but is rather the well-ordered “psychological” state that naturally gives rise to “just” actions, departs radically from traditional conceptions of “justice” and has far-reaching implications. Most notably, Socrates’ formulation deemphasizes the political and social interactions that are the focal points of most considerations of “justice,” since these are merely the results of the rule of reason in the soul over spirit and appetites. On the logic advanced in
Republic,
an individual can be “just” even if he or she has no social contact with other human beings.
16
(4.444b)
Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles-a meddlesomeness, and interference ...
?:
Stasis
(“strife”) typically refers to civil strife and factionalism within a polis. Many Greek city-states, including Athens, had considerable experience with stasis in the classical period; during the Peloponnesian War, factional strife within Athens brought about two oligarchic coups (411-410 and 404-403 B.C.E.). “Meddlesomeness” is Jowett’s translation for the noun
polypragmosynê
, which is derived from the verb
polypragmonein,
translated above as “to be a busybody” (4.433a). “Interference” is his translation for
allotriopragmosynê,
a variation of
polypragmosynê.
For the political and ideological thrust of these last two terms, see note 8 on 4.433a.
Socrates’ leading question strikes yet another blow at Athenian democracy. By linking
polypragmosynê
(“meddlesomeness”) to civil strife and factionalism
(stasis),
Socrates insinuates that there is inherent dysfunction in a political system (such as Athens‘) that encourages its citizens to become politically active. This formulation harks back to Socrates’ identification of injustice as the source of “divisions and hatreds and fighting” at 1.351d.
17
(4.444c)
they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body:
The comparison of justice and injustice in the soul to bodily health and disease previews the arguments that Socrates will develop in books 8 and 9 about the psychological dysfunction brought about by “injustice” as it has just been defined in book 4.
Book 5
1
(5.449b)
when Polemarchus, who was sitting just a little way off, just beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him:
The personal interactions in this passage are noteworthy. Polemarchus, who was at the beginning of the dialogue an uncritical proponent of the commonplace view of justice, seems caught up in the spirit of the discussion among Socrates and the two brothers, and ventures to seek clarification (via Adeimantus) about two key proposals concerning the guardians’ way of life. Even Thrasymachus, who was openly hostile to Socrates in book 1, appears won over (5.450a-b); it is he who now emphasizes the importance of the conversation (compare Socrates at 1.344e) and urges Socrates to cooperate with the group’s request for more details about the “community” of wives and children.
The lengthy digression that Polemarchus’ request initiates postpones further consideration of the dialogue’s main questions—that is, whether justice leads to “happiness” and is “profitable”—until book 8. At first Socrates and his interlocutors are concerned with considering the role to be undertaken by women of the guardian classes and the “community” of wives and children; Glaucon, however, insists that Socrates address the more general questions of whether the ideal city-state could ever be brought into being, and under what conditions it might be founded (5.471c—e; compare 5.466c). This prompts Socrates to make his famous claim that the ideal state will come into being only when “philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy” (5.473d—e). Socrates’ assertion leads in turn to efforts to (1) define “philosophy” and “philosophers” (5.474b-6.487a), (2) explain the unfavorable reputation of philosophers in contemporary Athens (6.487a—497a), (3) identify the ultimate goal of the philosopher’s education (6.502c-7.521b), and (4) elucidate how future philosophers might be prepared to achieve that goal (7.521c-540c).
Though technically parts of a digression, these topics are clearly of central importance to
Republic.
The philosopher-ruler is the key figure upon whom the ideal (that is, just) state depends for its (hypothetical) existence, and he (or she) is also implicitly the exemplar of justice in the individual, since he (or she) is “orderly and divine, as far as the nature of man allows” (6.500c-d). It should be noted that Plato strives to create strong impressions in his readers’ imaginations throughout this long section, in which he has Socrates convey some of his most vivid and memorable images—including the simile of the sun at 6.507a-509b and the allegory of the cave at 7.514a-518b; see also the metaphor of the ship of state at 6.488a-489a, and the image of philosophy as a bride abandoned by her true grooms and forced to “wed” unworthy suitors at 6.495b-496a.
2
(5.449d)
the right or wrong management of [domestic] matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil:
The notion that proper “household management” was intimately connected to the effective management of political affairs became widely accepted in Athens during the classical period; in
Protagoras
318e-319a, for example, Plato has Protagoras claim to teach his students how they “might best arrange their household business and become most successful with respect to the affairs of the city.” Socrates’ outline in books 2 and 3 of the guardians’ early education argues for a yet more intense connection between “domestic affairs” (that is, the education and training of children) and the successful management of the polis.
3
(5.451a)
the danger is not that I shall be laughed at ... but that I shall miss the truth ... and drag my friends after me in my fall:
Socrates was formally accused and convicted in 399 B.C.E. on charges of impiety and “corrupting the youth.” It is in the light of the latter charge, perhaps, that Plato has Socrates express caution about speaking his mind and (potentially) misleading his young companions. Glaucon’s reassurance that Socrates “shall not be held to be a deceiver” may be equally pointed.
4
(5.452a)
several of our proposals ... being unusual, may appear ridiculous:
Socrates repeatedly draws attention to the possibility that his proposals concerning guardian women may strike many as “ridiculous”; compare 5.452c and 5.457a-b, and also 5.473d-e, where he introduces the concept of the philosopher-ruler. Utopian social models that empowered women (and also featured “communism” in wives and children) were satirized by comic playwrights, such as Aristophanes in
The Women at the Assembly
(
Ecclesiazusae
)
,
which was produced in 392 B.C.E. Socrates’ comments seem aimed at acknowledging—and discrediting—this kind of comic satire.