Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw (116 page)

Capitulation Agreement between the German Army
and the Home Army
¹

(Translated by Wanda Wyporska)

On 2 X 1944 an agreement was reached in O
arów on the cessation of military operations in Warsaw. The authorized contracting party for the German side is the Commander of the Warsaw area,
SS-Obergruppenführer und Gen. der Polizei
, von dem Bach. The contracting parties for the Home Army are authorized on the basis of a power of attorney issued by the commander of the Home Army, General Komorowski (Bór): 1) Certified Colonel Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki (Jarecki), and 2) Certified Lieutenant Colonel Zygmunt Dobrowolski (Zyndram).

The agreement reads:

I.

1) On 2 X 1944 at 20.00 hours German time (21.00 hours Polish time) military operations will cease between German forces and all Polish military units fighting in the city of Warsaw area. All Polish formations tactically subordinated during the fighting, to the Home Army Commander from 1 VIII 44 up to the date of signature of this agreement, are to be regarded as Polish units. Henceforth they will be called ‘Home Army Units’.

2) The soldiers of the Polish units mentioned above will lay down their arms at the time appointed in the second section of the agreement below and will make their way to rendezvous points in close ranks headed by their commanders. Locations for surrendering arms and rendezvous points will be specified. Officers will have the right to retain side-arms.

3) At the same time the Home Army will hand over to the military authorities captured German soldiers and German nationals interned by the Polish authorities.

4) For the assurance of order and safety in the city of Warsaw, special camps will be designated by the Home Army Command. The camps will be freed from the obligation to surrender arms immediately and will remain in place until their functions are completed. The German Command has the right to control camp numbers.

5) From the moment of surrendering arms, Home Army soldiers will be treated in accordance with the regulations of the Geneva Convention of 27 VII 1929 concerning the treatment of prisoners-of-war. Home Army soldiers captured in the city of Warsaw during the battle from 1 VIII 1944 will also be subject to the same regulations.

6) The rights of prisoners-of-war will also be assigned to those non-combatants accompanying the Home Army according to article 81 of the Geneva Convention without respect to gender. In particular this concerns female workers at the HQs and in the areas of communications, supplies, aid, information and press services, war correspondents
etc.

7) In accordance with the application of the Geneva Convention, officers’ ranks issued by the Home Army Command will be recognized. Identity cards with pseudonyms will be sufficient proof of membership of the Home Army. Real names will be disclosed to the German military authorities. Members of the Home Army who have lost their identity cards will be identified by appointed Home Army commissions. The commissions will be established by the Home Army Command as required. The provision of this article is to be applied to those persons enumerated in article 6.

8) People who in accordance with previous articles are regarded as prisoners-of-war will not be prosecuted for their military or political activities during the battle in Warsaw or in the preceding period, even if they are freed from a prisoner-of-war camp. They will not be prosecuted for the contravention of German legal regulations, in particular for the failure of officers to register, previous escapes from prisoner-of-war camps, illegal visits to Poland
etc.

9) No collective responsibility will be born by the civilian population which was in the city of Warsaw during the battle. No one who during the battle was in Warsaw will be prosecuted for carrying out activities within the organization of administrative authorities, justice, security services, public welfare, social and charitable institutions, or for participation in battles and military propaganda. Members of the above-mentioned authorities and organizations will also not be prosecuted for their political activities prior to the Rising.

10) The evacuation of the civilian population of the city of Warsaw requested by the German command will be executed at a time and in a manner which will cause minimal human suffering. They will facilitate the evacuation of items of artistic, cultural and religious value. The German authorities will do their utmost to protect remaining public and private property.

II.

1) As from 7 o’clock German time (8 o’clock Polish time) on 3 X 44, the Home Army Command is obliged to remove its barricades, especially those lying closest to the German lines.

2) The Home Army Command will hand over all German prisoners-of-war, and also where possible German civilian internees, to representatives of the German Armed Forces on 2 X 44, no later than midnight German time (1–3 X Polish time).

3) Should the removal of the barricades not begin on time, the German Command reserves the right to annul this agreement on 3 X 44, beginning at midday German time (13.00 hours Polish time). In that case the annulment will become effective two hours after the delivery of the document voiding the agreement to the Polish lines.

4) The Home Army Command is obliged to leave Warsaw on 4 X 44, in order to surrender weapons, one regiment or possibly 3 battalions leaving from the various divisions. The tanks of these divisions must cross German lines on 4 X 44 at 9 o’clock German time (10 o’clock Polish time).

5) All remaining Home Army units, with the exception of those described in chapter I, page 4 of this agreement, will leave Warsaw to surrender arms on 5 X 44.

6) Home Army units will leave the Polish lines armed but with no ammunition. They will follow the following routes:

7) The following Home Army forces will remain in the city:

8) In agreement with the Chief Medical Officer of the Home Army, the Medical Chief of the German Forces will arrange for the evacuation of injured and ill Home Army soldiers and medical materials. The evacuation of the families of medical personnel will take place in the same way.

9) Home Army soldiers will be identified by red and white armbands or by badges with the Polish eagle, regardless of whether they are uniformed or in civilian clothing.

10) The parties to the agreement affirm that transport, accommodation, guards, and the care of prisoners-of-war remain exclusively under the control of the German Armed Forces (der Deutschen Wehrmacht). The German side guarantees that demands relating to Home Army soldiers will not be entrusted to foreign formations.

11) Women, who, under the terms of chapter 1, point 6 are prisoners-of-war will be placed in camps equivalent to ‘oflags’ or ‘stalags’. The female ranks of sub-commander, commander, senior commander, and inspector will be considered to be officer ranks. At their wish, female prisoners-of-war may be treated in the same way as civilian population of Warsaw.

12) The German military authorities will immediately inform the
Auswärtige Gefangenenhilfe der YMCA
in Sagan about the location and number of those placed in the Home Army soldiers’ camps and of persons accompanying them.

13) For technical help in the execution of this agreement
SS-Obergruppenführer und Gen. der Polizei
von dem Bach will have three Polish officers at his disposition.

III.

In the event of contraventions of this agreement the guilty parties will bear full responsibility.

Signatures
Von dem Bach
Iranek, Casimir Colonel
Dobrowolski Lieutenant Colonel

Deposition composed for the NKVD by General Leopold Okulicki ‘Bear Cub’
(Extracts: translated from the Russian by Dr Polly Jones)

‘The London government left the decision to start the battle for Warsaw entirely in the hands of the Vice-premier and Home Delegate Iankovskii, who, as the front approached, received advice from the AK Command . . . After rather lengthy discussions, the decision was taken to begin the fight as soon as the Red Army crossed the German defences on the Otvotsk–Rembertov–Radzimin line, which did not appear to be heavily fortified.’

‘These are the reasons which made the Battle necessary:

1. The desire to seize Warsaw before the arrival of the Red Army, with a view to organize state power and greet the Red Army as Warsaw’s rightful owners.
   
2. To prove to the whole world that we had fought unstintingly against the Germans, since nothing had so far been reported about our earlier battles (in Vilnius, L’vov, and the Liublino regions).
   
3. To prove our desire to defeat the Germans in conjunction with the Red Army in a large-scale engagement, and thereby to resolve the Polish–Soviet conflict.
   
4. To take revenge for the Germans’ five-year destruction of the Polish people.
   
5. To paralyse German actions and communications on the left bank of the Visla River: and through this, to facilitate the Red Army’s attack and to save Warsaw from destruction.
   
6. To prevent the front from stabilizing along the Visla, because this could cause huge damage to Warsaw and to civilians, who might be forcibly evacuated.
   
7. To prevent the Germans from selecting 100 thousand men from Warsaw for fortification works which would have deprived us of strength . . . and generated a very disadvantageous situation.
   
8. The morale of our soldiers and civilians, whom we have been preparing for battle over five years, could very well have fallen, if we had remained passive at this crucial moment . . .
   
9. There were well-grounded fears that the popular enthusiasm for a showdown . . . could provoke disorganized fighting without our participation or leadership.