Read Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw Online
Authors: Norman Davies
Tags: #Non-Fiction, #War, #History
The 27th no doubt hoped to find refuge in Lublin. The peasants were friendly. Numerous other AK units were operating. Warsaw was on the horizon. As luck would have it, however, they arrived in the same week as Rokossovsky. Hostile Communist partisans were emboldened by the Red Army. On 24 July, the 27th engaged a group of Germans. And they liberated a couple of towns. Moving on, they suddenly found themselves surrounded. They had walked into a Soviet trap. Their radio operator had no time to encode the message that was picked up at Barnes Lodge
en clair
. ‘They are disarming us. They are approaching us . . .’ The last substantial unit from the east had been eliminated. Once again, they had fallen not to the Germans, but to ‘the ally of the allies’. In little more than a week, 20–30,000 Home Army soldiers had been removed from the scene.
As usual, streams of reports from the NKVD were flowing back to Moscow. Yet the language was shifting. In his report of 15 July, Serov had used the proper name ‘Polish Home Army’. But now, Stalin had issued the decree that had made his displeasure plain. So now the NKVD reports talked disparagingly of ‘White Poles’, ‘illegal formations’, ‘rebels’, and most frequently, ‘bandits’.
Events were moving extremely fast. Key decisions had to be made before the full significance of the developments could be clarified. The AK Command in Warsaw felt obliged to recommend adoption of the plan for a ‘Battle for Warsaw’ on 21 July, only days after the first major roundup in Vilno had occurred. The critical meeting of Premier Mick’s Cabinet on 25 July, when the decision was taken to approve Boor’s plan, took place
before
the reservations of the Commanderin-Chief were received,
before
news of the 27th Division’s fate had come in, and four days
before
the attempted roundup of the 5th Division. In any case, Premier Mick was swayed at this juncture by two particular considerations:
by the hope that the Soviets might behave with greater generosity on territory which Moscow regarded as Polish, and by the conviction that nothing could be resolved without a face-to-face meeting with Stalin. For this reason, he had given absolute priority to his journey to Moscow, and had left London in haste without waiting for all the loose ends to be tied up.
Nonetheless, the dramatic SOS from the 27th Division at the moment of its disarming could not fail to make a strong impression in London. It came too late to influence Premier Mick’s Cabinet. But it provided suitable ammunition for urgent intervention with the Western powers. On 26 July, the Polish Ambassador in London requested an interview with Churchill. Instead, he was granted a short meeting with Anthony Eden, deputizing for the PM, on the following day.
I raised the matter of the disarming of the 27th (Volhynian) DI of the AK, handing Mr Eden a memorandum about it. The Foreign Secretary replied that he would take it up with [Soviet] Ambassador Gusev . . .
86
Next, the Count returned to his frequent earlier requests regarding assistance from the RAF for the Polish Underground, but with explicit reference to Warsaw. Lastly, he moved to the important matter of combatant rights, which the Home Army wished to secure before engaging in battle with the Germans:
The Foreign Secretary took note of the AK Commander’s argument for a radio broadcast to be transmitted [by the BBC] in German and Polish with a view to guaranteeing combatant rights for AK soldiers fighting the Germans, and threatening retaliation if the German authorities perpetrated further atrocities . . . It was evident that this last point aroused doubts on the British side, which has found itself in difficulties more than once with games of this sort . . .
87
The meeting closed after Eden had expressed his ‘strong displeasure’ that American news agencies had released details of Premier Mick’s journey to Moscow. Eden complained that this ‘indiscretion could provoke a brutal reaction from the Soviet Government.’
88
Whether or not he knew that Tabor was about to meet the leaders of SOE in a totally different climate is a matter of conjecture.
In the light of subsequent developments, or lack of them, one may assume that Eden did not pursue the Ambassador’s points with any great energy. But he did order one of his subordinates to reply immediately, and in the negative, to his request for RAF support, and to give noncommittal answers to his other requests. The letter, written on 28 July, says nothing new about British policy. It would not be remarkable but for the fact that it refers unmistakably to ‘A Rising in Warsaw’.
89
It destroys at a stroke all later claims that the Western powers had not been informed about the Rising in advance. (See Appendix 16.) The last week of July 1944 was, for the leaders of the Resistance in Warsaw, the week of painful decision. Responsibility for launching the ‘Battle for Warsaw’ had been thrust onto their shoulders; and none of the available options was particularly attractive. To judge from the evidence of Operation Tempest, doing nothing was to invite automatic defeat. Yet to launch a rising which the Germans were able to crush would be catastrophic.
Underground leaders had to think deeply about what ‘success’ actually meant. They certainly could not hope to smash the Wehrmacht single-handedly. At the most, they could aim to seize the city, or large parts of it, and then to hold on for long enough to allow other critical developments to occur. They estimated that five to seven days would suffice. Within that time, the Premier should be able to strike a deal with Stalin in Moscow. The Western powers should be able to fly in arms, and possibly reinforcements. The Underground authorities would be able to come into the open and establish their own administration. And the Soviet Army would be in position to mount the conclusive assault and to drive the Germans from the scene.
Thought had equally to be given to the consequences of a delayed result. What would happen if the planned five to seven days were to be prolonged to ten days or even twenty? Logically, a prolongation would give more time for the Premier to negotiate in Moscow, more time for the West to organize assistance, more time for the Underground to consolidate their administration, and more time for the Soviet build-up to assume dominant proportions. On the other hand, it would also give the Germans space to organize their counter-measures and it would stretch Underground resources to the limit. It was hard
to imagine the Home Army holding out for two to three weeks. [
RECRUIT
, p. 228]
Much had happened in the preceding days. The Soviet Army had raced to the Vistula and beyond. The PKWN had been set up in Helm, and was claiming general authority over the liberated areas. Reports were multiplying of resistance units being disarmed. The number of SOE missions was increasing. The world was digesting the news about the bomb plot on the
Führer’s
life at Rastenburg. The Nazi giant was reeling. Its enemies rejoiced. The psychological pressure for striking another blow and for adding to Germany’s discomfiture was enormous.
Anyone who analysed the Home Army’s predicament would have identified four or five major considerations. Each factor played its part in the total equation. None was a determinant in itself.
For one thing, the civilian population was restless. There were fears that they might take matters into their own hands. After nearly five years of Nazi occupation, many people were longing for revenge. They had not reacted on the 29th when the Germans called for 100,000 recruits to report for ditch-digging. But they might not stay passive indefinitely. The mood was volatile.
For another, the Communists were plotting some sort of action of their own. The Home Army had no means of learning the Communist plans – and historians have had little more luck. But it was reasonable to suspect that they were in contact with the PKWN and that Moscow’s repeated appeals for a popular rising were mainly directed at them. On the 29th, the military wing of the Communist PPR was renamed the ‘People’s Army’; and on the 30th, posters in the streets appeared denouncing the exiled Government as usurpers. For the time being, no one in Warsaw took much notice. But delay could work to the Communists’ advantage. In which case, all hopes for building a democratic country would be lost.
Western reactions to the Rising were very difficult to predict. By late July, the Home Army leaders were aware that the British had shown no enthusiasm for requests to fly in the Polish Parachute Brigade or to bomb German airfields. The logistics were simply too difficult. And Novak was on his way from London to confirm depressing news that Polish affairs were not a top priority in Anglo-American eyes. He was to warn them that a Warsaw Rising would be seen as a ‘storm in a teacup’. On the other hand, Underground leaders in touch with Tabor had grounds to think that the last word from London and Washington had yet to be spoken. The more bullish among them could guess that Western enthusiasm would increase once a Rising had been launched. It would certainly increase if the Premier reached agreement with Stalin.
RECRUIT
A Jewish lad, who had escaped from the Ghetto, joins the Home Army
I was born in Warsaw on 6 May 1925 to a well-to-do Polish-Jewish family. My parents and my older and only sister perished in the Holocaust. I attended secondary school in Lodz. A few days after the war broke out, we left Lodz and proceeded by car eastwards to the vicinity of Ruvno, where our relatives owned a large estate . . . We never reached [our destination] . . .
We arrived in the Warsaw Ghetto before the Germans started mass liquidations. Life was still bearable and people with means could survive. I continued my last year of secondary school in one of the Underground schools, and even took some exams. At the same time I worked, first in a German factory that assembled Astra adding machines in the Ghetto, and later on . . . in a work gang outside the Ghetto. We left early in the morning every day and returned in the afternoon . . . The important thing was that we were fed and it kept me in very good physical condition.
In January 1943, the Germans rounded up my parents, my sister, and myself, and took us to the
Umschlagplatz
. . . There the SS separated me from my family, beat me up, and put me in a transport to one of the concentration camps. The freight train was standing in the Danzig Railway Station. We were pushed into the freight cars and were so tightly packed it was impossible to move or breathe. Near the roof of the car I noticed a small opening that was narrow but not fastened . . . I decided that whatever the consequences, if I could squeeze through that opening, I would jump out . . .
After a few hours, around four or five o’clock in the morning, the train at last started moving . . . We had travelled maybe fifteen minutes when it stopped. At that moment I pulled myself up and with great difficulty squeezed through the opening. Everyone in the wagon tried to stop me, fearing reprisals by the Germans, but I was too quick and in a few seconds I was outside and jumped . . .
First I lay under the train. It was a cold winter’s day, but the snow was not very deep. I observed the SS combing the field round the train with searchlights. As soon as they changed direction, I ran a couple of hundred metres in record time . . .
When the train left, I got up and started to walk in the direction of some woods. After a few minutes I came to a small chapel and went in. Later in the morning I walked towards some houses. I knocked on a door. A farmer came out and I asked him the way to Warsaw. He invited me in, served breakfast, and didn’t ask any questions – he understood. Afterwards he took me to a small train station. Within twenty minutes I was in the centre of Warsaw . . .
In Warsaw, I went to see a very close friend of my sister . . . Within a few hours,
she arranged for me to stay with an aunt of hers who was of German origin and above suspicion . . . This woman organised papers, lodging and work, and my first contact with the Underground . . . At first I was only doing sabotage on railway equipment . . . [But] after [four] months, I was transferred to Lt. ‘Wildcat’’s Cherniakov combat team. This meant that I had passed the initiation. The unit which I joined was one of the [Home Army’s] Special Operation Commando units known as ‘K-Div. College A’ . . . We knew each other very well and became close friends . . . [But] we were all kept totally in the dark about one thing – the names and address of our superiors . . .
Sometime in mid-1943, my Home Army superior, Wildcat, approached me and asked me out of the blue if I was a Jew. For a moment I hesitated, and then confirmed it. Till then I had told everyone that I was from Lvov because my documents were from there. Wildcat explained that they had checked that my family didn’t exist in Lvuv. This aroused the suspicion that I was either a Ukrainian or a Jew.
The same day Wildcat informed André, the CO of Special Operations in the Warsaw district, that I was a Jew, and asked him if the safety of the unit might be endangered, since I could be recognized . . . However, as I hadn’t lived in Warsaw since the age of six, the possibility was disregarded. If I had attended school there, the risk would have been unacceptable and I would have been transferred to a partisan unit in the forest.
Wildcat asked me not to tell anyone about my being Jewish, but ‘Elephant’ already knew because Wildcat had questioned him, knowing we were very close. Wildcat immediately arranged new papers for me, and instead of ‘Richard Zhuravski’, I became ‘Richard Zhukovski’.
1
S. Aronson
German reactions were going to be brutal whatever happened. Armed resistance would provoke a massive and murderous response from the SS. On the other hand, if the Rising were timed to coincide with a Soviet assault, the SS would not have the leisure to respond as they wished. In any case, the prospects were hardly less bleak if the Germans were allowed to prepare defences uninterrupted. For their established policy throughout the retreat on the Eastern Front was to declare strong points, like Warsaw, a ‘fortress’, to evacuate all civilians, to dig in, and then to watch the physical destruction of the city from the ensuing bombardments. From the
Varsovians’ viewpoint, to do nothing was simply to invite a different form of disaster. It was to invite a repeat of the disaster that had recently been inflicted on Minsk. [
MELECH
, p. 231]