SAS Urban Survival Handbook (64 page)

A receptionist is the most common way of forestalling visitors, and an effective one if access beyond his/her position is physically controlled. A ‘panic’ button should be fitted below the reception desk, or somewhere else within easy reach, so that assistance can be rapidly summoned. An extreme example might be that a receptionist could be attacked or be taken hostage for bargaining by hostile intruders.

WARNING

There must ALWAYS be someone at a reception or security desk. Depending on the level of security required, no responsible member of staff should leave their post for ANY reason (least of all a reason suggested by the visitor) without someone ‘standing in’ for them.

WALK-IN THEFT

Walk-in theft is common. Thieves may be quite daring – although when most people are busy at their job, it is easy to steal things without being noticed. DON’T MAKE IT EASY FOR THIEVES. If you have a one-person office or workshop, lock the door whenever you leave – even if only for a few minutes. NEVER leave wallets or clothing unattended or on your desk. Bags, in particular, should never be left hanging over a chair or on the floor.

Portable expensive equipment, such as computers, should be protected in some way. Companies often ‘brand’ their names into the plastic casings, instal ‘theft alert’ tags which sound an alarm if the equipment is carried past a ‘theft detector’ at a prescribed point, or fix the equipment to desks. There are also cables which, when unplugged from equipment, will trigger alarms.

Escort all visitors

Breaches of security are more usual at night, but many thieves and spies just walk in and walk out unchallenged. ALL members of staff should be instructed to question EVERY unknown person not accompanied by known personnel. This can be done by offering help and escorting the visitor to the appropriate person/department, or waiting with them until someone arrives to deal with them. NEVER let a non staff-member move around the premises unaccompanied. AVOID escorting unknown visitors alone if you have to pass through unoccupied areas or corridors. NEVER walk in front of unknown visitors—keep an eye on them at all times.

SCREENS/CHECKPOINTS

Identity cards

Each ring of security must be controlled by security cardoperated or digital keypad locks or manned by security staff. Staff at reception/checkpoints should NOT be expected to remember all faces and names of all personnel. Identity cards with photographs are commonly used and can be worn on duty, giving continual authorization throughout the building. These may also incorporate magnetic stripes which carry information regarding the bearer’s identity and security status.

In companies where there may be a high turnover of staff, or where a large number of staff need access to many areas, ordinary keys would be totally impractical. Magnetic and keypad codes could be constantly updated, whereas ordinary locks would have to be changed and new keys cut.

PIN systems

Greater levels of security can be obtained by computercontrolled systems, where each employee not only has a card with a magnetic stripe, but also has to use a personal identity number (PIN)—just as you do when using a bank’s self-service cash machine.

Transmitter/infra-red

An alternative to consider is a system which uses a small radio transmitter (similar to ones used to open automatic garage doors) or an infra-red ‘remote control’ (similar to those which operate car alarms and domestic electronic equipment such as televisions and hi-fis). It may be possible to ‘personalize’ these to individual employees, but this system should not be expected to work on its own. A transmitter might fall into the wrong hands.

PFI systems

In extreme cases, security can be provided by systems which use recognition of personal features to screen individuals. PFI (personal feature identification) can be based upon voice, hand or fingerprints or, amazingly, the pattern on the retina at the back of the eye.

PFI systems used to be relatively slow in operation, but the development of sophisticated microchips has now made them an effective but expensive way of controlling access. Their only real drawback (apart from the cost) is that they have a small error rate—between one and five per cent for voice prints. Although a system like this may exclude (and annoy) some people who are entitled to access, it will NOT admit anyone it does not recognize.

Timer locks

Timing devices can be used with both electronic and conventional locks to refuse entry. Even authorized personnel will be denied access. Not only will this prevent members of staff from moving around the premises when they are not entitled to, but it will also deny them access if they are placed under threat in any way. All safes and vaults should ALWAYS incorporate a timer.

Double-door entry systems

For an extremely high-security reception checkpoint at a main entrance or between security levels, a ‘trap’ between two sets of locked doors could be considered. The ‘trap’ could be monitored by CCTV, a video recorder and a microphone for further communication with a visitor. A built-in metal detector could be used to detect weapons, metal objects and tape recorders. A theft detector could sound an alarm if an attempt is made to carry out security-tagged portable material or equipment.

Such systems would slow down escape from high-security areas in the event of fire or other emergency. Safety may have to be balanced against security. There is always a risk of a ‘fake’ emergency being created or a door held open after the passage of a legitimate user—though this would become especially difficult with a ‘trap’ system.

GUARDS/GUARD PATROLS

Stationary guards or watchmen may require electronic alarms and CCTV surveillance equipment to enable them to know what is going on around a building, supplemented by guard patrols. Dogs can be used to announce the presence of intruders as well as deterring them.

Patrol times should not follow obvious patterns or else intruders would know when to expect them. Intruders may be able to calculate time taken between one point and another—routes should be varied. Professional thieves might even use their own temporary electronic sensors/detectors to let them know when someone is approaching.

Finding reliable guards is difficult. Do NOT seek to save money—good security pays for itself! Use an established and reputable company or train your own guards, if your organization is big enough to do so.

Limit the number of tasks a security guard has to do—he/ she cannot be in several places at once! Monitor the guard’s work to ensure that he/she does not become too bored. They must be alert at all times.

Never forget that it is lonely, slightly-risky work sitting at a security desk. Sooner or later a friendly ‘visitor’ is bound to try to start a conversation with the guard—who may be glad of the companionship. If the ‘visitor’ is clever, he/she may be able to gather all kinds of information.

BASIC BRIEF FOR GUARDS

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  ALWAYS go by the rule book
  
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  NEVER allow access without full authentication by the person/department expecting the visitor
  
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  CONFIRM identification for any repairmen, service engineers, ‘official’ visitors and representatives
  
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  DON’T confirm by telephone at numbers or using names supplied by visitors. Use your own sources. Make prior arrangements for regular visitors – these may include ringing a contact number to confirm arrival of a visitor and an appropriate security password
  

External vulnerability

You may not be in a position to organize a high perimeter wall, rolls of barbed wire, electric fences and guards in watchtowers but you CAN apply the same basic principles to any situation. It is very unlikely in the centre of a city that a site could be surrounded with a protective zone. It’s likely that there may be public access around the building, which of course makes doors/windows highly vulnerable.

Really determined intruders may make approaches from underground, through adjoining buildings or from the roof. Ideally all possible routes of entry or weak areas require protection, although most ‘professional’ thieves find they don’t have too much trouble. They KNOW the obvious steps which may be taken to secure premises.

Concentric rings of defence can compensate for external vulnerability. Penetrating the outer rings will not necessarily allow access to the real target of the intruder. A concentric system also makes it much more difficult to use even sophisticated surveillance techniques from outside the building.

Specialist advice should be called in when very high level protection is required or when the site is vulnerable to a break in security.

INDELIBLE EVIDENCE

Video recorders linked to a CCTV surveillance system permit close scrutiny of intruders and their methods. Dye-smoke devices are sometimes used to spray dye at intruders, marking clothes and skin with a harmless but long-lasting colour. Some of these dyes are invisible except in special lighting conditions.

WARNING

Can entry be made to your premises:

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  Via ventilation and other ducts?
  
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  Via sewers or other underground service channels?
  
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  From the roof – especially if there is access from adjoining or neighbouring buildings within roping distance?
  
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  Through the walls of adjoining properties, including cellars and roofspaces?
  

GUARD DOGS

Dogs for guarding commercial and industrial premises are usually chosen from breeds which have been developed for their strong territorial sense and fighting qualities. German shepherd dogs

(Alsatians), Rottweilers and Dobermans are frequently used. They may develop close alliances with their handlers, but should not be treated as domestic pets. To treat a guard dog as a family pet is to confuse both roles, and you risk undermining the dog’s effectiveness. More seriously, the dog could pose a threat to other family members.

Guard dogs MUST be reared to follow a strict discipline and this must be maintained. They MUST be trained to control and restrain intruders, not to kill them, but must be tenacious up to the point of inflicting serious injury. Very careful training is required for both dogs and handlers.

An intruder may try to make friends with dogs by bringing food several times. Dogs must be taught to resist such temptations. Drugging/poisoning dogs is an old technique which should be a thing of the past. Dog ‘whistles’ and ‘deterrents’ which emit a sound that is beyond the range of human hearing should have no effect either. Real guard dogs should be impervious to all distractions—even the sound of gunshots.