Scipio Africanus (15 page)

In Carthage the scales of public opinion appear to have been evenly balanced, on the one hand gaining confidence from Hannibal's achievements and invincibility, on the other depressed by reflection on Scipio's repeated victories, and on the fact that through his sole efforts they had lost their hold on Spain and Italy—as if he had been “ a general marked out by destiny, and born, for their destruction.”

On the threshold of this final phase, the support, moral and material, given to Hannibal by his country seems to have been, on balance, more than that accorded to Scipio—one more nail in the coffin of a common historical error.

His situation, already discussed, was one to test the moral fibre of a commander. Security lies often in calculated audacity, and an analysis of the military problems makes it highly probable that his march inland up the Bagradas valley was aimed, by its menace to the rich interior on which Carthage depended for supplies, to force Hannibal to push west to meet him instead of
north to Carthage. By this clever move he threatened the economic base of Carthage and protected his own, also luring Hannibal away from his military base—Carthage.

A complementary purpose was that this line of movement brought him progressively nearer to Numidia, shortening the distance which Masinissa would have to traverse with his expected reinforcement of strength. The more one studies and reflects on this manoeuvre, the more masterly does it appear as a subtly blended fulfilment of the principles of war.

It had the intended effect, for the Carthaginians sent urgent appeals to Hannibal to advance towards Scipio and bring him to battle, and although Hannibal replied that he would judge his own time, within a few days he marched west from Hadrumetum, and arrived by forced marches at Zama. He then sent out scouts to discover the Roman camp and its dispositions for defence—it lay some miles farther west. Three of the scouts, or spies, were captured, and when they were brought before Scipio he adopted a highly novel method of treatment. “Scipio was so far from punishing them, as is the usual practice, that on the contrary he ordered a tribune to attend them and point out clearly to them the exact arrangement of the camp. After this had been done he asked them
if the officer had explained everything to their satisfaction. When they answered that he had done so, Scipio furnished them with provisions and an escort, and told them to report carefully to Hannibal what had happened to them” (Polybius). This superb insolence of Scipio's was a shrewd blow at the moral objective, calculated to impress on Hannibal and his troops the utter confidence of the Romans, and correspondingly give rise to doubts among themselves. This effect must have been still further increased by the arrival next day of Masinissa with six thousand foot and four thousand horse. Livy makes their arrival coincide with the visit of the Carthaginian spies, and remarks that Hannibal received this information, like the rest, with no feelings of joy.

The sequel to this incident of the scouts has a human interest of an unusual kind. “ On their return, Hannibal was so much struck with admiration of Scipio's magnanimity and daring, that he conceived ... a strong desire to meet him and converse with him. Having decided on this he sent a herald saying that he desired to discuss the whole situation with him, and Scipio, on receiving the herald's message, accepted and said that he would send to Hannibal, fixing a place and hour for the interview. He then broke up his camp and moved to a fresh site
not far from the town of Narragara, his position being well chosen tactically, and having water”within a javelin's throw.“ He then sent to Hannibal a message that he was now ready for the meeting. Hannibal also moved his camp forward to meet him, occupying a hill safe and convenient in every respect except that he was rather too far away from water, and his men suffered considerable hardship as a result. It looks as if Scipio had scored the first trick in the battle of wits between the rival captains! The second trick also, because he ensured a battle in the open plain, where his advantage in cavalry could gain its full value. He was ready to trump Hannibal's master-card.

On the following day both generals came out of their camps with a small armed escort, and then, leaving these behind at an equal distance, met each other alone, except that each was attended by one interpreter. Livy prefaces the account of the interview with the remark that here met “the greatest generals not only of their own times, but of any to be found in the records of preceding ages ...”—a verdict with which many students of military history will be inclined to agree, and even to extend the scope of the judgment another two thousand years.

Hannibal first saluted Scipio and opened the conversation. The accounts of his speech, as
of Scipio's, must be regarded as only giving its general sense, and for this reason as also the slight divergences between the different authorities may best be paraphrased, except for some of the more striking phrases. Hannibal's main point was the uncertainty of fortune—which, after so often having victory almost within his reach, now found him coming voluntarily to sue for peace. How strange, too, the coincidence that it should have been Scipio's father whom he met in his first battle, and now he came to solicit peace from the son! “Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside Africa, for both had suffered grievously.” However, the past could not be mended, the future remained. Rome had seen the arms of an enemy at her very gates; now the turn of Carthage had come. Could they not come to terms, rather than fight it out to the bitter end “I myself am ready to do so, as I have learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children. But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young, and because success has constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never up to now at least fallen into the
counter-current of Fortune, will not be convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be.” Let Scipio take warning by Hannibal's own example. “What I was at Trasimene and at Cannæ, that you are this day.” “And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. Consider this, I beg you, and be not over-proud.” “... What man of sense, I ask, would rush into such danger as confronts you now?” The chance of a single hour might blot out all that Scipio had achieved —let him remember the fate of Regulus, from whom likewise the Carthaginians had sought peace on African soil. Hannibal then outlined his peace proposals—that Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain should be definitely given up to Rome, and Carthage confine her ambitions to Africa. In conclusion he said that if Scipio felt a natural doubt as to the sincerity of the proposals, after his recent experience, he should remember that these came from Hannibal himself, the real power, who would guarantee so to exert himself that no one should regret the peace. Hannibal later was to prove both his sincerity and the truth of this guarantee. But in the circumstances of the moment and of the past, Scipio had good ground for doubt.

To Hannibal's overture he pointed out that it
was easy to express regret that the two powers had gone to war—but who had begun it? Had Hannibal even proposed them before the Romans crossed to Africa, and voluntarily retired from Italy, his proposals would almost certainly have been accepted. Yet in spite of the utterly changed position, with the Romans “ in command of the open country,” Hannibal now proposed easier terms than Carthage had already accepted in the broken treaty. All he offered, in fact, was to give up territory which was already in Roman possession, and had been for a long time. It was futile for him to submit such empty concessions to Rome. If Hannibal would agree to the conditions of the original treaty, and add compensation for the seizure of the transports during the truce, and for the violence offered to the envoys, then he would have something to lay before his council. Otherwise, “ the question must be decided by arms.” This brief speech is a gem of clear and logical reasoning. Hannibal apparently made no advance on his former proposals, and the conference therefore came to an end, the rival commanders returning to their camps.

Both sides recognised the issues that hung upon the morrow—“ the Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, and the Romans for the empire of the world.
Is there any one who can remain unmoved in reading the narrative of such an encounter? For it would be impossible to find more valiant soldiers, or generals who had been more successful and were more thoroughly experienced in the art of war, nor indeed had Fortune ever offered to contending armies a more splendid prize of victory” (Polybius). If the prize was great, so was the price of defeat. For the Romans if beaten were isolated in the interior of a foreign land, while the collapse of Carthage must follow if the army that formed her last bulwark was beaten. These crucial factors were stressed by the opposing commanders when next morning at daybreak they led out their troops for the supreme trial, and had made their dispositions.

Scipio rode along the lines and addressed his men in a few appropriate words. Polybius's s account, though necessarily but the substance and not an exact record, is so in tune with Scipio's character as to be worth giving. “Bear in mind your past battles and fight like brave men worthy of yourselves and of your country. Keep it before your eyes that if you overcome your enemies not only will you be unquestioned masters of Africa, but you will gain for yourselves and your country the undisputed command and sovereignty of the rest of the world. But if
the result of the battle be otherwise, those who have fallen bravely in the fight will be for ever shrouded in the glory of dying thus for their country, while those who save themselves by flight will spend the remainder of their lives in misery and disgrace. For no place in Africa will afford you safety, and if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians it is plain enough to those who reflect what fate awaits you. May none of you, I pray, live to experience that fate, now that Fortune offers us the most glorious of prizes; how utterly craven, nay, how foolish shall we be, if we reject the greatest of goods and choose the greatest of evils from mere love of life. Go, therefore, to meet the foe with two objects before you, either victory or death. For men animated by such a spirit must always overcome their adversaries, since they go into battle ready to throw their lives away.” Of this address Livy says “he delivered these remarks with a body so erect, and with a countenance so full of exultation, that one would have supposed that he had already conquered.”

On the other side Hannibal ordered each commander of the foreign mercenaries to address his own men, appealing to their greed for booty, and bidding them be sure of victory from his presence and that of the forces he had brought back. With the Carthaginian levies he ordered
their commanders to dwell on the sufferings of their wives and children should the Romans conquer. Then to his own men he spoke personally, reminding them of their seventeen years' comradeship and invincibility, of the victory of Trebia won over the father of the present Roman general, of Trasimene and Cannæ—“ battles with which the action in which we are about to engage is not worthy of comparison.” Speaking thus, he bade them cast their eyes on the opposing army and see for themselves that the Romans were fewer in numbers, and further, only a fraction of the forces they had conquered in Italy.

The dispositions made by the rival leaders have several features of note. Scipio placed his heavy Roman foot—he had probably two legions—in the centre; Lælius with the Italian cavalry on the left wing, and on the right wing Masinissa with the whole of the Numidians, horse and foot, the latter presumably prolonging the centre and the cavalry on their outer flank.

The heavy infantry were drawn up in the normal three lines, first the
hastati,
then the
principes,
and finally the
triarii.
But instead of adopting the usual chequer formation, with the maniples of the second line opposite to and covering the intervals between the maniples of the first line, he ranged the maniples forming the rear lines directly behind the respective
maniples of the first line. Thus he formed wide lanes between each cohort—which was primarily composed of one maniple of
hastati,
one of
principes,
and one of
triarii.

His object was twofold : on the one hand, to provide an antidote to the menace of Hannibal's war elephants and to guard against the danger that their onset might throw his ranks into disorder; on the other, to oil the working of his own machine by facilitating the sallies and retirements of his skirmishers. These
velites
he placed in the intervals in the first line, ordering them to open the action, and if they were forced back by the charge of the elephants, to retire. Even this withdrawal he governed by special instructions, ordering those who had time to fall back by the straight passages and pass right to the rear of the army, and those who were overtaken to turn right or left as soon as they passed the first line, and make their way along the lateral lanes between the lines. This wise provision economised life, ensured smooth functioning, and increased the offensive power—a true fulfilment of economy of force. It may even be termed the origin of modern extended order, for its object was the same—to negative the effect of the enemy's projectiles by creating empty intervals, a reduction of the target by dispersion, the only difference being
that Hannibal's projectiles were animal, not mineral.