Scipio Africanus (19 page)

After the election of his successors, Scipio retired once more into private life, instead of taking a foreign province, as retiring consuls so often did. This circumstance has led one or two of the latter Roman historians to search for a motive. Thus Cornelius Nepos, the biographer of Cato, says that Scipio wanted to remove Cato from his province of Spain and become his successor, and that failing to obtain the Senate's assent, Scipio, to show his displeasure, retired into private life when his consulship was ended. Plutarch also, in his life of Cato, contradicts this, and says that Scipio actually succeeded Cato in Spain. Apart from the known historical inaccuracies of both these later writers, such pettiness would be inconsistent with all the assured facts of Scipio's character. We know that Cato and Scipio were always at variance, but the animosity, so far as speeches are recorded, was all on the side of Cato, to whom Scipio's Greek culture was as a red rag to a bull, and not less his moderation towards Carthage. The man whose parrot cry was
Delenda est Carthago
—fit ancestry of the Yellow Press—could not brook the man
whose loftier soul and reputation stood in his way, nor his narrow spirit rest until he had brought about the destruction both of Carthage and Scipio. Their quarrel, if one-sided spite can be so called, dated from Zama, when Cato—serving as quæstor under Scipio, and already hating his Greek habits so much that he would not live in the same quarters—took violent exception to his general's lavish generosity to the soldiers in the distribution of the spoil.

Fortunately there are external facts which demolish the statements of both Nepos and Plutarch on this matter. A decision to disband Cato's army in Spain was made by the Senate at the same time as they refused Scipio's request to allot Macedonia as his consular province, and disbanded that army also. Cato accordingly returned, and received a triumph at the outset of Scipio's consulship. As there was no army there was obviously no post for a proconsul, which shows the futility of the statement that Scipio desired to go to Spain at the end of his consulship.

His real motive, however, in staying at Rome instead of seeking some other foreign province is not difficult to guess. He had predicted the danger from Antiochus, and as the Senate's refusal to anticipate it made a struggle inevitable, Scipio would wish to be on hand, ready for the
call that he felt sure would come. He was right, for Hannibal was even then proposing to Antiochus an expedition against Italy, maintaining as ever that a campaign in Italy was the only key to Rome's defeat, because such invasion crippled the full output of Rome's man-power and resources. As a preliminary Hannibal proposed that he should be given a force to land in Africa and raise the Carthaginians, while Antiochus moved into Greece and stood by, ready for a spring across to Italy when the moment was ripe.

An envoy of Hannibal's, a Tyrian called Aristo, was denounced by the anti-Hannibalic party at Carthage. Aristo escaped, but the discovery caused such internal dissension that Masinissa thought the moment ripe to encroach on their territory.

The Carthaginians sent to Rome to complain, and he also to justify himself. The embassy of the former aroused uneasiness by their account of Aristo's mission and escape, and the envoys of Masinissa fanned this flame of suspicion. The Senate decided to send a commission to investigate, and Scipio was nominated one of the three, but after making an inquiry “ left everything in suspense, their opinions inclining neither to one side or the other.” This failure to give a verdict is hardly to the credit of Scipio, who had the knowledge and the influence with both
parties to have settled the controversy on the spot. But Livy hints that the commissioners may have been acting on instructions from the Senate to abstain from a settlement, and adds that in view of the general situation “ it was highly expedient to leave the dispute undecided.” By this he presumably means that as Hannibal was meditating an invasion it was policy to keep the Carthaginians too occupied to support him.

At the end of the year an incident occurred that sheds a significant light—rather twilight—on Scipio's career. The two candidates for the patrician vacancy as consul were Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, brother of the victor of Cynoscephalæ, and Publius Cornelius Scipio, namesake and half-brother to Africanus.

The upshot is aptly told by Livy : “ Above everything else, the brothers of the candidates, the two most illustrious generals of the age, increased the violence of the struggle. Scipio's fame was the more splendid, and in proportion to its greater splendour, the more obnoxious to envy. That of Quinctius was the most recent, as he had received a ‘triumph' that same year. Besides, the former had now for almost two years been continually in people's sight; which circumstance, by the mere effect of satiety, causes great characters to be less revered.” “ All
Quinctius's claims to the favour of the public were fresh and new; since his triumph, he had neither asked nor received anything from the people ; ‘ he solicited votes,' he said, ‘ in favour of his own brother, not of a half-brother ; in favour of his
legatus
and partner in the conduct of the war ' ”—his brother having commanded the fleet against Philip of Macedon. “ By these arguments he carried his point.” Lucius Quinctius was elected, and Scipio Africanus received a further rebuff when Lælius, his old comrade and lieutenant, failed to secure election as plebeian consul despite Scipio's canvassing. The crowd, eternally fickle and forgetful, preferred the rising star to the setting sun.

Meantime the war clouds were gathering in the East. Antiochus had safeguarded his rear by marrying his daughter to Ptolemy, King of Egypt. He then advanced to Ephesus, but lost time by waging a local campaign with the Pisidians. Across the Ægean, the Ætolians were labouring hard to stir up war against the Romans, and to find allies for Antiochus. Rome, on the contrary, was weary and exhausted with years of struggle, and sought by every means to postpone or avert a conflict with Antiochus. To this end the Senate sent an embassy to him, and Livy states that, according to the history written in Greek by Acilius, Scipio Africanus was
employed on this mission. The envoys went to Ephesus, and while halting there on their way “ took pains to procure frequent interviews with Hannibal, in order to sound his intentions, and to remove his fears of danger threatening him from the Romans.” These meetings had the accidental and indirect but important consequence that the report of them made Antiochus suspicious of Hannibal.

But the main interest to us of these interviews, assuming that Acilius's witness is reliable, is the account of one of the conversations between Scipio and Hannibal. In it Scipio asked Hannibal, “ Whom he thought the greatest captain ? ” The latter answered, “ Alexander ... because with a small force he defeated armies whose numbers were beyond reckoning, and because he had overrun the remotest regions, merely to visit which was a thing above human aspirations.” Scipio then asked, “ To whom he gave the second place ? ” and Hannibal replied, “ To Pyrrhus, for he first taught the method of encamping, and besides no one ever showed such exquisite judgment in choosing his ground and disposing his posts ; while he also possessed the art of conciliating mankind to himself to such a degree that the natives of Italy wished him, though a foreign prince, to hold the sovereignty among them, rather than the Roman people....”
On Scipio proceeding to ask, “ Whom he esteemed the third ? ” Hannibal replied, “Myself, beyond doubt.” On this Scipio laughed, and added, “ What would you have said if you had conquered me ? ” “ Then I would have placed Hannibal not only before Alexander and Pyrrhus, but before all other commanders.”

“ This answer, turned with Punic dexterity, and conveying an unexpected kind of flattery, was highly grateful to Scipio, as it set him apart from the crowd of commanders, as one of incomparable eminence.”

From Antiochus this embassy gained no direct result, for the “ king of kings ” was too swollen with pride on account of his Asiatic successes, too sure of his own strength, to profit by the examples of Carthage and Macedon. His standards of military measurement were strictly quantitative.

Realising at last that war was inevitable and imminent, the Roman Senate set about the preparations for this fresh struggle. As a first step they pre-dated the consular election so as to be ready for the coming year ; the new consuls were Publius Scipio, the rejected of the previous year, and Manius Acilius. Next, Bæbius was ordered to cross over with his army from Brundisium (Brindisi) into Epirus, and envoys were sent to all the allied cities to counteract Ætolian
propaganda. The Ætolians, nevertheless, gained some success by a mixture of diplomacy and force, and besides causing general commotion throughout Greece, did their best to hasten the arrival of Antiochus. Had his energy approximated to his confidence, he might well have gained command of Greece before the Romans were able to thwart him. Further, to his own undoing, he abandoned Hannibal's plan and the expedition to Africa, from a jealousy inspired fear that if Hannibal were given an executive role public opinion would regard him as the real commander. Even when he made his belated landing in Greece, with inadequate forces, he missed such opportunity as was left by frittering away his strength and time in petty attacks against the Thessalian towns, and in idle pleasure at Chalcis.

Meantime, at Rome the consuls cast lots for their provinces; Greece fell to Acilius, and the expeditionary force which he was to take assembled at Brundisium. For its supply, commissaries had been sent to Carthage and Numidia to purchase corn. It is a tribute alike to the spirit in which the Carthaginians were seeking to fulfil their treaty with Rome, and to Scipio's wise policy after Zama, that they not only offered the corn as a present, but offered to fit out a fleet at their own expense, and to pay in a lump
sum the annual tribute money for many years ahead. The Romans, however, whether from proud self-reliance or dislike of being under an obligation to Carthage, refused the fleet and the money, and insisted on paying for the corn.

In face of all these preparations, Antiochus awoke to his danger too late. His allies, the Ætolians, provided only four thousand men, his own troops delayed in Asia, and in addition he had alienated Philip of Macedon, who stood firm on the Roman side. With a force only ten thousand strong he took up his position at the pass of Thermopylae, but failed to repeat the heroic resistance of the immortal Spartans, and was routed. Thereupon, forsaking his Ætolian allies to their fate, Antiochus sailed back across the Ægean.

Rome, however, was unwilling to rest content with this decision. She realised that in Greece her army had defeated only the advanced guard and not the main body of Antiochus's armed strength, and that unless he was subdued he would be a perpetual menace. Further, so long as he dominated Asia Minor from Ephesus, her loyal allies, the Pergamenes and Rhodians, and the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Ægean, were at his mercy. All these motives impelled Rome to counter-invasion.

Once more Hannibal's grand strategical vision
proved right, for he declared that “ he rather wondered the Romans were not already in Asia, than had doubts of their coming.” This time Antiochus took heed of his great adviser, and strengthened his garrisons as well as maintaining a constant patrol of the coast.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE LAST LAP.

ROME, faced with a great emergency—second only to that of the Hannibalic War,—looked for its new saviour in its old. If the danger was less, and less close, the risk at least must have seemed greater, for her armies were venturing into the unknown. The first great trial of strength between Rome and Asiatic civilisation was about to be staged, and the theatre of war was alarmingly distant, connected with the homeland by long and insecure lines of communication. The spur of emergency quickens the memory, and Rome in her fresh hour of trial remembered the man who had saved her in the last, and who had been standing by for several years ready for the occasion which he had prophesied to deaf ears. Yet Scipio Africanus did not himself stand for the consulship—why it is difficult to guess. It may have been that he deemed the forces of jealousy too strong, and wanted to take no risks, or that affection and sympathy for his brother
Lucius, a defeated candidate the year before, inspired Africanus to give the latter his chance. Africanus had glory enough, and all through his career he had been ready to share his glory with his assistants. He left envy of others' fame to lesser men. His aim was service, and in any case he knew that if Lucius was consul, he himself would exercise the real power—Lucius was welcome to the nominal triumph.

His brother's election was secured, and with him, as plebeian consul, was elected Gaius Lælius, the old assistant of Africanus. It may be that Scipio worked for this, in order to ensure that to whichever Greece fell as a province he would be able to exercise an influence on the operations. As it happened, however, the double election put him in the unpleasant position of having to support his brother against his friend. For both consuls naturally desired Greece, which meant the command against Antiochus. Lælius, who had a powerful interest with the Senate, asked the Senate to decide—drawing lots was too uncertain for his taste. Lucius Scipio thereupon asked time to seek advice, and consulted Africanus, “ who desired him to leave it unhesitatingly to the Senate.” Then, when a prolonged debate was anticipated, Africanus arose in the Senate and said that “ if they decreed that province to his brother, Lucius Scipio, he would
go along with him as his lieutenant.” This proposal “ being received with almost universal approbation,” settled the dispute and was carried by an almost unanimous vote.

Though it is clear that Africanus planned this result, the fact does not lessen our appreciation of the nobility of a man who, after being the most illustrious commander in Rome's history, would stoop to take a subordinate position. If the means was diplomatic, the motive was of the purest—to save his country, leaving to another the reward. Apart from blood ties, he doubtless felt more sure of real control through his brother than through Lselius—though Lucius's obstinacy with the Ætolians refutes Mommsen's verdict that he was “ a man of straw.” Two good leaders in the same command are not a good combination. It says much for both Scipio Africanus and Lælius that this act did not break down their friendship, and it is a proof of the latter's generous nature, if also of the former's transcendent qualities, that in later years Lælius gave Polybius such testimony of Scipio's greatness.